Table A.1: Linear regression of logwages: OLS vs FE
Within band F/G (1) OLS (2) FE (3) OLS (4) FE (5) OLS (6) FE Female -0.011∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.006)
Tenure within band 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) Salary band H 0.266∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ (0.006) (0.010) Salary band I 0.353∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ (0.008) (0.014) Observations 85516 85516 85516 85516 58544 58544 Individuals 1084 1084 1084 1084 1024 1024 Adjusted R2 0.866 0.871 0.510 0.748 0.642 0.779
Notes: Linear regression, monthly data 2003-2017. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Panel Fixed Effects Estimates with individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by indi- vidual. Directorate, age and time dummies included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sample includes salary band F/G: economist/senior economist, H: principal economist, and I: adviser. Dependent vari- able: log of wages (measured as salary steps). Female (dummy): 1 if the employee is a woman. Tenure within band: years in the current salary band. Salary band H [I] (d): 1 if the employee is in salary band H [I].
Table A.2: Linear regression of logwages: Number and ages of children Within band F/G (1) (2) (3) (4) Female -0.013∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) Tenure within band 0.018∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) One child 0.019∗∗ 0.002 0.036∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) Two children 0.032∗∗∗ 0.014 0.064∗∗∗ 0.034∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.018) Three or more children 0.033∗∗ 0.015 0.076∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗ (0.016) (0.013) (0.023) (0.019) Children younger than 1 -0.015∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.031∗∗∗ -0.008
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) Children between 1 and 3 -0.010∗ -0.001 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.010
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) Children between 3 and 6 -0.003 0.001 -0.019∗∗ -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) Children older than 6 0.013∗ 0.003 0.013 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) Salary band H 0.301∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) Salary band I 0.400∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ (0.007) (0.008)
Age dummies No Yes No Yes Observations 85516 85516 58544 58544
R2 0.829 0.867 0.537 0.650
Notes: Linear regression, monthly data 2003-2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. Directorate and time dummies in- cluded. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sample includes salary band F/G: economist/senior economist, H: principal economist, and I: adviser. Dependent variable: log of wages (measured as salary steps). Female (dummy): 1 if the employee is a woman. Tenure within band: years in the current salary band. Salary band H [I] (d): 1 if the employee is in salary band H [I]. Age dummies: 1 if the age of the employee is within a interval, namely (. , 35), [35 , 40), [40, 45), [45 , 50), [50 ,55), [55,. ). Number and ages of children are dummy variables.
Table A.3: Linear regression of the probability of promotion: Before and after 2011 (1) Before 2011 (2) From 2011 (3) Before 2011 (4) From 2011 Female -0.0025∗∗∗ -0.0004 -0.0025∗∗∗ -0.0011
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) Tenure within band 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Temporary promotion -0.0011 0.0043∗∗∗ -0.0016∗ 0.0026∗ (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0015) Top performer 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ (0.0007) (0.0008) Bonus 0.0012 0.0036∗∗∗ (0.0018) (0.0009) Mentee 0.0034 (0.0027) Observations 27500 31856 27500 31856 R2 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005
Notes: Linear regression, monthly data 2003-2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. Directorate, time and age dummies included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable: Permanent promotion (dummy), takes value 1 if employee moves to a higher salary band. Female (d): 1 if the employee is a woman. Tenure within band: years in the current salary band. Temporary promotion (d), takes value 1 if employee has ever moved to a higher salary band for a limited time. Top performer (d): 1 if employee’s salary award is among the top 25% in her business area at least once in the last 2 years. Bonus (d): 1 if employee received cash bonuses in the last 2 years. Mentee (d): 1 if employee participated in the mentorship program in the last 2 years. Children (d): if the employee has dependent children.
Table A.4: Linear regression of the probability of promotion: Before and after 2011 & Presence of children
No child Children
(1) Before 2011 (2) From 2011 (3) Before 2011 (4) From 2011 Female -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0046∗∗ -0.0054∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0022) (0.0020) Tenure within band 0.0005∗∗ 0.0003∗∗ 0.0003 0.0009∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) Temporary promotion -0.0008 0.0065∗∗ -0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0048∗ (0.0012) (0.0029) (0.0020) (0.0029) Top performer 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0018∗ 0.0046∗ 0.0046∗∗ (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0024) (0.0021) Bonus 0.0013 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0041 0.0009 (0.0024) (0.0012) (0.0041) (0.0019) Mentee 0.0034 0.0084 (0.0041) (0.0052) Observations 15174 16416 4925 5823 R2 0.004 0.006 0.014 0.010
Notes: Linear regression, monthly data 2003-2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. Directorate, time and age dummies included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable: Permanent promotion (dummy), takes value 1 if employee moves to a higher salary band. Female (d): 1 if the employee is a woman. Tenure within band: years in the current salary band. Temporary promotion (d), takes value 1 if employee has ever moved to a higher salary band for a limited time. Top performer (d): 1 if employee’s salary award is among the top 25% in her business area at least once in the last 2 years. Bonus (d): 1 if employee received cash bonuses in the last 2 years. Mentee (d): 1 if employee participated in the mentorship program in the last 2 years. Children (d): if the employee has dependent children.
Table A.5: Gender promotion gap over time: Three-year rolling estimates
Period
Coeff. Female
Obs.
2003-05
-0.0040***
9,181
2004-06
-0.0033***
9,807
2006-08
-0.0021**
10,569
2007-09
-0.0023**
10,962
2008-10
-0.0019*
11,440
2009-11
-0.0007
11,758
2010-12
-0.0011
12,157
2011-13
-0.0008
12,734
2012-14
-0.0015
13,492
2013-15
-0.0019
13,907
2014-16
-0.0014
14,392
2015-17
-0.0015
14,356
Notes: estimated coefficients of the dummy Fe- male for same specification as Table 6, column (2), for three-year rolling samples. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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