Alex Mintz, J. Tyson Chatagnier, and David J. Brulé
Introduction
This chapter presents an analytic procedure for aiding policy analysts in analyzing past decisions made by terrorist groups as well as predicting future decisions. First, we define and operationalize suicide attacks. Then, we describe the procedure—Applied Decision Analysis—generally as a framework for deve-loping descriptive (and predictive) decision profiles of terrorists on the basis of a decision model or a set of processing characteristics. Next, we discuss a decision model—the Poliheuristic Theory—which we argue is a useful tool for forecasting and analyzing decisions. Then, we illustrate the Applied Decision Analysis procedure with two case studies. The first examines al-Qaeda’s decision to carry out a suicide attack on the USS Cole. The second case study concerns Osama bin Laden’s decision to merge his al-Qaeda organization with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. We conclude by assessing the usefulness of the Applied Decision Analysis procedure for explaining and predicting terrorists decisions.
Defining and operationalizing suicide attacks
Ganor, Schweitzer, and Shay provide a useful definition of a suicide attack: “an operational method in which the very act of the attack is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator” (Ganor 2000: 135). They also point out that in a “true suicide attack, the terrorist knows full well that the attack will not be executed if he is not killed in the process.” This definition is widely used in the literature on suicide terrorism. However, different scholars have operationalized and coded suicide attacks in different ways.
Several cases in which suicide attacks were foiled or occurred are not covered by these definitions. For example, on May 16, 2005, the Associated Press has reported that three Jewish militants were interrogated for plotting to blow up the
Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. According to the AP, “the suspects said they planned to commit suicide after firing an anti-tank missile at the holy site in Jerusalem and throwing grenades at police who would try to arrest them.” Such an attack (if carried out) would not have been considered a suicide attack based on conventional definitions, even though the militants planned (a priori) to commit suicide as part of their mission.
To cover such attacks, we expand the definition of suicide attacks to: any attack where the suicide act of the terrorist was an a priori objective of the mission.
Operational definitions of suicide attacks based on our expanded definition include:
(1) instances in which the very act of the attack “is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator” (the conventional way of defining suicide attacks (Ganor 2000)), or (2) instances in which the attacker commits suicide in the course of the attack although the very act of the attack is not dependent upon his or her death.
In addition, to avoid selection bias, intercepted suicide attacks should also be coded and analyzed. These intercepted suicide attackers are identified as such if (1) the attacker was intercepted en route to the target and confessed to a plan to commit a suicide attack; or (2) the attacker was intercepted on the way to the target and was subsequently convicted by authorities of attempting to carry out a suicide mission.
Applied Decision Analysis
Applied Decision Analysis (Mintz 2005) is a procedure for developing descrip-tive (and predicdescrip-tive) decision profiles of individual decision makers on the basis of a decision model and/or a set of processing characteristics. The procedure consists of two key steps. First, the analyst must identify the decision matrix of the decision maker. A decision matrix consists of the alternatives, dimensions, and implications of the alternatives corresponding to each dimension. The second step involves the analysis of the decision through the use of the Poliheuristic Theory of decision making (Mintz et al. 1997; Mintz 2004), a fruitful analytic tool for explaining and predicting terrorists decisions.
Identify the decision matrix
A decision matrix consists of a set of alternatives, the dimensions (or criteria) for selecting among these alternatives, and an assessment of the implications of each dimension for each alternative. Weights (levels of importance) can optionally be assigned to each dimension, if the analyst observes that dimensions should receive unequal weight in the analysis.
The Decision Board 4.0 software can be used as a tool for (a) organizing the information relevant to individuals’ decisions via the construction of decision matrixes, and (b) for tracing and identifying the decision rule and profile of the terrorist. Once the researcher has chosen the number of dimensions and alterna-tives relevant to the decision, the Decision Board displays a generic matrix, which can be tailored to the specific policy or research problem.
Alternatives
The set of alternatives includes the likely courses of action a terrorist (or a terrorist group) may reasonably consider when faced with some problem or deci-sion scenario. For example, when involved in negotiations with a state, a terrorist organization’s leader may consider the following: “Continue with Attacks,”
“Temporarily Halt Attacks,” or “Stop Attacks.” In another example applicable to state leaders when faced with an international crisis, the leader may consider the following alternatives: “Do Nothing,” “Apply Sanctions,” “Containment,” or “Use Force.”
Dimensions
A dimension is an organizing theme for related information and variables relevant in evaluating alternatives (Mintz et al. 1997). Thus if the leader of a terrorist organization is concerned with the political consequences of a decision while in negotiations with a state, then inter-group rivalry, public sympathy, personal honor, and other variables related to this general organizing theme may be used to evaluate the alternatives “Continue with Attacks,” “Temporarily Halt Attacks,”
or “Stop Attacks.” If the leader desires a choice that satisfies such criteria on the political dimension as “increase positive public perception of the group” and
“maintain status within group,” he or she evaluates the alternatives in light of these criteria. Other dimensions that may be relevant to the alternatives in the terrorist leader’s case are “Operational success” and “Support of other countries.”
Implications
The implications consist of a description of the likely consequences of an alter-native for a given dimension. Each alteralter-native has implications corresponding to each dimension. For example, in the case of the terrorist leader, the “Stop Attacks” alternative has implications for the organization’s political standing, relations with other countries, and operational success of the organization—
which are all relevant dimensions.
Ratings
Implications can be rated by the analyst, for example, from ⫺10 (very bad) to
⫹10 (very good), although assigning numerical ratings to implications is optional. For example, if choosing the alternative “Stop Attacks” is likely to result in a loss of domestic support, the analyst should assign a negative rating (very bad, ⫺8 or ⫺9) to the political implications of “Stop Attacks.” In contrast, if
“Continue Attacks” is likely to lead to an outpouring of public sympathy and increasing recruitment levels, then this alternative should receive a positive rating (e.g. very good, ⫹8, or ⫹9).
Weights
Weights indicate the importance level of each dimension, for example, from 0 (not important at all) to 10 (very important). Thus, in the terrorist leader example, the analyst assigns different weights to the political, diplomatic, and operational dimensions, unless he or she considers each dimension to have equal weight in the decision.
Poliheuristic decision analysis model
The second step in the Applied Decision Analysis procedure is the analysis of the decision using the Poliheuristic Theory (Mintz et al. 1997; Mintz 2004). Much of the current scholarship on terrorist decision making (McCormick et al. 2003;
Pape 2003; Wintrobe 2002) suggests that terrorist decision making can be largely understood as the product of rational calculations. In other words, choices made by terrorist organizations are the result of goal-oriented, value-maximizing behavior in which terrorists choose the alternative that produces the best of all possible expected outcomes across all relevant dimensions. But terrorist decision makers may choose among alternatives primarily on the basis of a single dimension.
Similarly, terrorists may disregard large amounts of relevant information and ultimately choose alternatives that are not the “best” available.
That rational decision making is cognitively demanding is not a new suggestion (Simon 1957). The process by which individuals arrive at decisions may vary in a number of ways, including, for example, alternative-based versus dimension-based information search (Billings and Scherer 1988); compensatory versus non-compensatory information search (Payne et al. 1993); maximizing versus satisficing decision rules; and holistic versus non-holistic search (Sage 1990).
Moreover, these decision processes may critically affect the choice of the decision maker (Mintz et al. 1997).
A useful approach for explicitly taking into account the role of cognitive short cuts in individuals’ decisions is the Poliheuristic Theory. The theory postulates a two-stage decision-making process. In the first stage, the decision maker employs a non-compensatory decision-making strategy, which reduces the menu of alternatives through the elimination of options that are unacceptable on a critical decision-making dimension. A high score on a less critical dimension cannot compensate for a low score on the key dimension. In the second stage, the decision maker chooses among the remaining alternatives by using analytic decision rules (Mintz 1993, 2004; Payne et al. 1993).
Unlike other decision-making approaches (Friedman 1953; Steinbruner 1974; Kahneman and Tversky 1979), the Poliheuristic Theory identifies a key dimension that must be satisfied in order for an alternative to be accepted.
Specifically, crucial dimensions are often non-compensatory. Alternatives are not evaluated simultaneously. Instead, individuals reduce the set of alternatives in the first stage by rejecting those options that fail to breach a minimum threshold
on the key decision dimension. For example, if an individual’s key decision dimension is “personal safety”—the decision maker seeks to minimize personal risk—he or she is likely to eliminate alternatives that are likely to result in death or injury, despite other potential benefits of choosing those options.
In the second stage, a choice is selected from the remaining alternatives based on its ability to maximize expected benefits on other relevant dimensions (Mintz et al. 1997). In other words, decision makers choose from the remaining options based on an alternative’s ability to maximize expected net benefits. The theory suggests that decisions are non-compensatory, non-holistic, dimension-based, and order-sensitive in the first stage of the decision-making process and maximizing in the second stage. Moreover, in contrast to rational models of decision making that assume a maximizing principle in which the “best” alterna-tive (the one with the highest benefit-cost ratio) is selected, Poliheuristic Theory postulates that individuals do not necessarily maximize in the first stage of the decision process but do maximize in the second stage of the process, resulting in a satisficing process.
The two-stage, multi-dimensional decision-making strategy posited by the Poliheuristic Theory does not privilege process validity over outcome validity, or vice versa (Mintz 2004). Indeed, it mirrors the manner in which decisions are often made as demonstrated by supportive evidence obtained across a range of diverse methodologies (DeRouen 2000, 2003; Redd 2002; Sathasivam 2003).
In the following pages, we illustrate the utility of the Applied Decision Analysis procedure by examining two decisions by Osama bin Laden—one is organizational, the decision to merge al-Qaeda with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the other is operational, the decision to carry out a suicide bombing attack against the USS Cole.
The suicide attack on the USS Cole
On October 12, 2000, an explosion rocked the US Navy destroyer Cole, tearing a gaping hole in its side, killing 17 members of the ship’s crew, and wounding 39 others. The Cole had been refueling in the Yemeni port of Aden, when two suicide attackers drew close to the Cole in a small harbor boat and detonated a large quantity of explosives aboard their vessel. Although no one immediately claimed responsibility for the attack, the blast that crippled the Cole was the result of a year’s worth of planning by al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen and supervised directly by Osama bin Laden (National Commission 2004). The al-Qaeda leader was deeply involved in the terrorist operation. From the selection of the location and type of target to the provision of financial resources for purchasing the explosives used in the attack, bin Laden was the ultimate overseer of the strike in Yemen (ibid.; Mandel 2002).
Before the Cole bombing, suicide attacks against military targets were typically the hallmark of desperation. For example, kamikaze pilots of the Second World War began sacrificing themselves only when the Japanese cause became desperate
(Berman and Laitin forthcoming; Rosenthal forthcoming). In light of bin Laden’s extensive resources and consequent range of potential terrorist operations, why did the terror mastermind choose to carry out a suicide attack on a US destroyer?
The 1998 merger
In 1998, Osama bin Laden orchestrated the fusion of his al-Qaeda terror network with Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Throughout the late 1990s, bin Laden was concerned with creating a “global Salafi jihad” (Sageman 2004:
46), which would target not only the secular dictatorships in the Middle East, but also—indeed, primarily—the United States and its allies throughout the world (Karmon 1998; Williams 2002; Ressa 2003; Schweitzer and Shay 2003; Whittaker 2004). In order to succeed in this endeavor, it was necessary for bin Laden to increase his network and to acquire greater religious backing for his fatwas (Gunaratna 2002).
To this end, he attempted to curry favor with several organizations, chief among them Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ).
After suffering a series of setbacks at the hands of Egyptian security officials, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (as well as other militant Egyptian Islamist groups) acceded to a process of “progressive integration” into al-Qaeda (Williams 2002;
Napoleoni 2003: 110; Sageman 2004). The integration came to a head in February 1998, when bin Laden met with al-Zawahiri and the heads of several other groups, including the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG), Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan, and the Jihad Movement of Bangladesh (Gunaratna 2002). These groups formed an umbrella organization, with the intent to target Americans and Jews worldwide, both military and civilian, and issued a joint fatwa declaring this intent.
While the acquisition of control over each of these groups would be beneficial to bin Laden, it is clear that al-Zawahiri was the most important among them (Scheuer 2002; National Commission 2004; ICT 2005), and the signatory whom bin Laden most desired to keep within the new organization. This is evident not only from his initial attempts at wooing al-Zawahiri into the group—overtures which were not made toward any of the other signatories—but also through his attempts to aid al-Zawahiri when some members of EIJ objected to the shift from “the ‘near enemy’ . . . Egypt, toward the ‘far enemy,’ the United States” (Schanzer 2005: 42).
When the leader of EIG found himself in similar circumstances, leading him to retract his signature, bin Laden simply had him replaced (Sageman 2004). These circumstances demonstrate the importance of incorporating al-Zawahiri and his structure into al-Qaeda, and his leadership potential. As a well-respected cleric and a vital partner, al-Zawahiri had the potential to assume the mantle of leadership (or co-leadership) within al-Qaeda, were bin Laden to concede it.
Constructing bin Laden’s decision matrix
The first stage in the utilization of Applied Decision Analysis is to identify the decision matrix employed by a decision maker, which in this case is Osama bin
Laden, acting as head of al-Qaeda. Across different decisions, the alternatives will change, but the dimensions and their relative weights should remain reasonably stable. Thus, different decisions can generally be analyzed using the same matrix, and replacing only the alternatives. We first identify the general criteria with which bin Laden seems to be concerned across decisions, and then we identify the alternatives implicit specifically in each decision.
The political dimension
Because traditional decision analysis tends to focus on political leaders, the political dimension is often one of greater importance. It represents an alterna-tive’s effects upon the leader’s political survival, or potential to stay in office (Mintz et al. 1997; Mintz 2004; Kinne 2005). In the case of personalist autocrats, Kinne (2005) suggests that threats to the leader’s power may arise from within his country or organization, or from without. Thus, the political dimension for bin Laden is a measure of his personal honor and status among his colleagues and the radical Islamic world.
The political dimension is often—including in this case—the dimension of paramount importance. Leaders place their political survival above other concerns not simply because of an inherent desire to be in office, but because their other goals are not achievable without the position—if they do not lead their countries or organizations, they will have no effect upon future decisions concerning these countries and organizations. According to his own statements, bin Laden sought to expel Americans and non-Muslims from the Middle East, overthrow the secular Arab governments (ICT 2005)—whom he believes to be allied with the United States (Scheuer 2002)—and ultimately re-establish the Caliphate, ostensibly under his own control (Gunaratna 2002; Schweitzer and Shay 2003). For bin Laden to achieve his ultimate goals, he would need to main-tain leadership of the al-Qaeda organization.
Through his actions, bin Laden has indeed shown a propensity to concern himself with his personal status. He has been described as an adept manipulator of media and propaganda, who is “careful to tailor his statements carefully for the selected audience,” using “selective Qur’anic references” and playing upon the particular feelings of those at whom his statement is directed (Burke 2003: 158).
When his mentor, Abdullah Azzam, died, bin Laden “chose selectively” among Azzam’s writings and words “to lend credence to his narrow political vision”
(Gunaratna 2002: 86). Furthermore, there is evidence that he plotted against Azzam, in order to gain political status and “reconfigure . . . the nascent Al Qaeda in his own image” (Gunaratna 2002: 23). Finally, he is not above full denial of fairly obvious facts. Despite the fact that the CIA funding of mujahideen during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is well-documented common knowledge, bin Laden as a “self-styled champion of Islam” understands that he “cannot afford . . . to be seen as owing anything to America” (Corbin 2002: 24). Thus, to increase his status and serve his political goals, he described the CIA as a burden,
and claimed that the funding came not from the United States, but from the Arab states.
Because of its inherent primacy among bin Laden’s goals (i.e. because his other goals cannot be accomplished without it), the personal political dimension shall be assigned the greatest weight. If bin Laden is a non-compensatory decision maker, he should reject alternatives that score negatively on this dimension. In other words, alternatives that overtly and credibly threaten bin Laden’s leadership of al-Qaeda should be eliminated immediately. On the other hand, if bin Laden is a compensatory decision maker, this dimension should function in the same way as the other dimensions, and should only impart a greater influence upon the outcome, as its weight suggests.
It should be further noted that the political dimension can be broken down into bin Laden’s standing with the mass public, and bin Laden’s standing within his organization. Thus, there is an organizational political dimension and a mass political dimension. These remain the most important of dimensions. The former signifies the amount of power that bin Laden holds within al-Qaeda. If this were to collapse, then so would his leadership and any potential to realize his goals.
Within the organization, his personal honor is highly important. For bin Laden, the organizational political dimension is the slightly more important of the
Within the organization, his personal honor is highly important. For bin Laden, the organizational political dimension is the slightly more important of the