How to Approach the Explanatory Gap: A Solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness

David Chalmers offers an interesting view on consciousness by suggesting a rather unique connection between mind and matter, but not taking an outspoken dualistic or materialistic point of view. His explanation will contribute to a general understanding of consciousness at the level that is required to understand further argumentation with regards to the self in this research. Chalmers considers identifying the problem of consciousness as one of the most fundamental problems in science of the mind. Even though it is still not quite clear whether or not consciousness is purely physical, thanks to large amounts of research, empirical investigations and scientific publications, it is evident that there is a link between chemical, biological processes and mental states and experiences.

Chalmers asserts that he confronts the problem of consciousness using a direct approach, providing what he calls a ‘naturalistic’ account of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995). First of all, he divides the problems regarding the concept of consciousness into ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ problems. Easy problems have to do with ‘functions’ and are susceptible to methods of cognitive science such as neural mechanisms. In this context, Chalmers suggests this part of consciousness should be called ‘awareness’. The hard problem is experience. These include things like bodily sensations, mental images and the felt quality of emotion. This is similar to what other philosophers describe as qualia and introspection, explained above. The main question he addresses is the following; While it is widely agreed that experience rises from physical processing, why does it give rise to experience or a ‘rich inner life’ at all?

9 _{As will become clear throughout this chapter, the explanation and conceptualization of consciousness}

and experience uses a more materialistic based starting point. However, it does not exclude that matter can give rise to immaterial states or experiences. Regardless, the plausibility of the conceptualization of consciousness proposed in this chapter does not depend on its materialistic approach. Both a materialistic and a property dualistic view are compatible with the theory of stream of consciousness and the theoretical framework that is built around it in the following chapters.

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Functional Explanation

Chalmers argues that mental phenomena that belong to awareness are functionally definable, and only need the capacity for verbal report of internal information. Examples of such mental phenomena are the focus of attention, the deliberate control of behavior or the integration of information by a cognitive system. The hard problem of experience however, cannot be explained this way, because the argument above does not explain the link between the physical (such as the mechanisms in the case of the ‘easy’ problems) and experience. He argues that here, an ‘extra ingredient’ is missing. This can be many things, some of which have already been mentioned by other authors (such as functions involved in mathematical reasoning or new discoveries in neurophysiology). However, Chalmers claims these all fail to answer the question of why these processes that are described give rise to experience.

With the concept of this ‘missing ingredient’ in mind, Chalmers addresses his own theory, which takes experience as fundamental. This could mean the addition of something fundamental to our ontology by adding new (basic) principles to the basic laws of nature, in a sort of dualistic way that he calls naturalistic dualism. He then identifies the paucity of objective data as a problem for his theory, which he plans to solve through means of verbal reports and thought experiments.

In order to tackle the hard problem of consciousness, Chalmers suggests two non-basic principles and one basic principle. The two non-basic principles are the following:

- Principle of structural coherence - Principle of organizational invariance

The basic principle:

- The double-aspect theory of information.

They will each be briefly explained below.

The Three Principles

1) Principle of structural coherence:

This principle entails that there is structural coherence between the structures of consciousness and awareness. Chalmers adds an extra definition to awareness that states that it is information that is directly available for global control. He argues that any information that

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is consciously experienced will be represented cognitively, and that awareness is the ‘substrate’ or ‘neural correlate’ of consciousness. He shows this with an example of the visual field. The example entails that the fine-grained structure of the visual field directly corresponds to the structure of visual processing. Even though this does not explain why experience exists in the first place, certain facts about structures found in processing, correspond to facts about the structure of experience.

2) Principle of organizational invariance

This principle claims that any two systems with the same functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. According to this principle, what matters for the emergence of experience is not the specific physical makeup of a system, but the abstract pattern of causal interaction between its components.

At this point, Chalmers uses a thought experiment to show that a system itself may

undergo changes whilst not noticing these changes itself.

He argues this is possible because physically, nothing has changed. The thought experiment proposes a physical system that gives rise to experience, consisting of neurons. Then, piece by piece, the neurons are replaced by silicon chips that function the same as the neurons, giving rise to the same experience. Chalmers claims that when this occurs, there is no room for a thought like ‘something has changed.’ If there was room for such a thought, it would be visible in the physical system, and it is not, because the system stays the same. Therefore, the specific physical make-up is not what matters, but the abstract pattern of causal interaction between its components.

3) Double-aspect theory of information

This basic principle involves the notion of information.10 The double-aspect principle stems from the observation that there is a direct isomorphism between certain physically embodied information spaces and certain phenomenal (or experiential) information spaces. This means that we can find the same abstract information space embedded in physical processing and in conscious experience. In other words, a connection exists between information that exists

10 _{For a definition of ‘information’, Chalmers uses the description by Shannon that can be found here:}

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in the mind, and information that exists in the world. This idea is used to support Global Workspace theory (4.1.2) and to explain environment-brain unity (4.2.2).

Theories of the Self: Unified Consciousness or a Bundle of Perceptions?

Now that the basics with regards to the discussion surrounding consciousness have been explained, we can turn to the concept of ‘self’, and the relation between consciousness and the self. This section discusses the self from the perspective of David Hume (1711 – 1776) and Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804). Both have written influential literature on the subject of self, experience and consciousness. Hume differs from Kant in that he was an empiricist, which means he believed that all knowledge comes from experience. Kant was not an empiricist nor a rationalist, but rather aimed to combine the two. Even though Kant and Hume’s perception of the self are partly contrasting, their ideas on the self and the unity of self will be helpful in conceiving how this self can be influenced by neurotechnology. In order to analyze via what ways it can be influenced, the concept of self must be broken down into the multiple aspects that it encompasses. By using views from both Kant and Hume to explain the relation between experiences and the self, it will also become clear how the two are related. This will aid in understanding the role of experiences in the theory of a stream of consciousness, which will be explained in section 3.3.