and understanding
162 Approaches to developing thinking
to very general abilities, and thus can be taken to mean a very wide range of processes and actions. In addition, the word ‘skill’ suggests that it is a matter, on the learner’s part, of applying procedures for thinking, in much the same way that one might have acquired the skill of riding a bike, or using scissors. While it may be possible to suggest that thinking can be characterized as a skill because it can be improved by practice (White 2002), the development of young children’s thinking and understanding will be much more than this, and include supporting positive dispositions to use such skills in appropriate situations, and attitudes of ‘delight’ in so doing (Coles and Robinson 1991a:14). Johnson (2001) points out that, in many aspects of activity, to have mastered a skill is often taken to mean that one can exercise it without thinking!
Traditionally, this idea of skill and cognitive ability has been the defining principle of
‘good’ thinking (Project Zero Patterns of Thinking, http://pzweb.harvard.edu./Research/
PatThk.htm). In recent years, however, greater emphasis has been placed upon a wider view.
The Patterns of Thinking project, led by David Perkins and Shari Tishman, reflects a more current view that it is much more than this:
Certainly, good thinkers have skills. But they also have more. Passions, attitudes, values and habits of mind all play key roles in thinking, and, in large part, it is these elements that determine whether learners use their thinking skills when it counts. In short, good thinkers have the right ‘thinking dispositions’.
(Project Zero Patterns of Thinking, http://pzweb.harvard.edu./
Research/PatThk.htm)
‘Good’ thinkers may have a repertoire of strategies for thinking, be able to think reflectively about their own thinking, be confident in their attitude to thinking, and willing to take risks in their thinking and learn from mistakes. Meadows suggests that ‘In short they will be people who enjoy thinking’ (1993:333).
This may seem to be at odds with the premise outlined in the subtitle to Claxton’s Hare Brain Tortoise Mind (1998): Why Intelligence Increases When You Think Less. However, what Claxton is arguing for is less reliance on one particular form of thinking, which he calls
‘d-mode’ (‘deliberate-mode’) thinking. This form of thinking is characterized by logic, precision, clarity, generalizations and explicit language. Whereas, of course, this way of thinking is important, Claxton suggests that it should not be the only way of thinking that we develop and value. As described in Chapter 1, he believes that the mind has three
‘processing speeds’, including one which is more playful and contemplative. He argues that too much emphasis on the ‘deliberate’ or ‘d-mode’ of thinking can prevent us from looking at problems and ideas in different ways, and warns:
If we see d-mode as the only form of intelligence, we must suppose, when it fails, that we are not ‘bright’ enough, or did not think ‘hard’ enough, or have not got enough
‘data’. The lesson we learn from such failures is that we must develop better models, collect more data, and ponder more carefully. What we do not learn is that we may have been thinking in the wrong way.
(Claxton 1998:12, emphasis in original) He suggests that the slower ways of thinking and knowing are just as important because they make use of sensations, images, feelings and hunches as well as clear, conscious thoughts,
which can help us to connect different inputs in new ways, and because confusion and uncertainty (allowed in these slower ways) may precede the development of a good idea.
One practitioner in our research emphasized the value of children having the opportunity
‘just to “be” really’, saying that this required time and space. She suggested that outdoor activity provides a particularly good context here, possibly allowing children more time to stand back, watch, take their time and reflect (Robson and Hargreaves 2005:87).
Models for teaching thinking
In recent years there has been considerable interest in the explicit development of children’s thinking. Two recent Department for Education and Skills Research Reports in England, for example, have both had as part of their brief to investigate ways of developing young children’s thinking (Moyles et al. 2002, Siraj-Blatchford et al. 2002). Across the world, a wide range of programmes have been developed, with, McGuinness (1999) suggests, a common aim of developing thinking to a qualitatively higher level. The Thinking Skills Review Group propose as a working definition that such initiatives are:
Approaches or programmes which identify for learners translatable, mental processes and/or which require learners to plan, describe and evaluate their thinking and learning.
These can therefore be characterized as approaches or programmes which:
● require learners to articulate and evaluate specific learning approaches; and/or
● identify specific cognitive and related affective or conative processes that are amenable to instruction.
(Thinking Skills Review Group 2004:1) Put more succinctly, these are programmes which specify both what is to be learned and how it is to be taught. While the majority of these have tended to focus on work with older children (and, as a result, tend to refer to teachers rather than other adults working with children), it is worth looking at the findings with regard to some of these, as well as those programmes which have involved younger children. McGuinness categorizes approaches into three ‘models for delivering thinking skills’ (1999):
1 interventions that can be directed towards enhancing thinking skills through structured programmes which are additional to the normal curriculum: for example Feuerstein’s Instrumental Enrichment programme (1980) or The Somerset Thinking Skills Course (Blagg et al. 1988);
2 approaches that target subject-specific learning such as science, mathematics, geogra-phy: for example, Cognitive Acceleration through Science Education (CASE) (Adey and Shayer 1994);
3 infusion across the curriculum through systematic identification of opportunities within the normal curriculum for thinking skills development: for example, Swartz et al.
(1998).
(Adapted from McGuinness 1999) Trickey and Topping (2004) also identify a fourth category, which they call ‘Multi-method’
programmes. They suggest that approaches such as Dawes et al.’s Thinking Together approach (2000), and Philosophy for Children (Lipman 2003, Lipman et al. 1980) can be Approaches to developing thinking 163
seen as multi-method programmes, fitting into more than one of McGuinness’ three categories.
There are a number of problems associated with evaluating the efficacy of such programmes, including whether any gains are long-term (McGuinness 1999), how soon they are evident (Adey and Shayer 1994) and the possibility of the so-called Hawthorne effect, where separating out the impact of a programme over and above that of any novel, enthusi-astically applied intervention may be difficult. Methodologically, the evaluations of some of these programmes have also been criticized (Claxton 1999b). All of these factors lead Trickey and Topping (2004) and Wilson (2000) to urge caution in interpreting the available data.
Are some models more effective than others?
Taking these caveats into account, some general conclusions are becoming evident. Coles and Robinson (1991a) suggest that the main criticism of the first approach in McGuinness’
categorization is that this skills approach is reductionist and fragmentary, with limited transfer of skills learnt to new contexts, a view with which Gardner (1993) concurs. This idea of transferability is seen as key – Leat (1999:388) describes it as the ‘Holy Grail’. It has proved to be a major challenge, with big claims sometimes being made for particular programmes, not always substantiated by evaluation (Claxton 1999b). McGuinness (1999) suggests that the more successful approaches tend to have strong theoretical underpinnings, well-designed and contextualized materials, explicit pedagogies and good teacher support.
In keeping with the accepted views on the value of embedding children’s learning in meaningful contexts (Donaldson 1978), the most successful interventions seem to be those which take an embedded approach (Whitebread 2000a). In particular, they are ones directed at ‘cognitive apprenticeship’, which includes scaffolding techniques and metacognitive and self-regulatory approaches (Thinking Skills Review Group 2004, Whitebread 2000a), simi-lar to those referred to by Swartz (2000) as infusion approaches. Characteristically, these are approaches which emphasize classroom talk and interaction (Thinking Skills Review Group 2004), where adult interventions such as scaffolding, modelling and questioning make their own thinking explicit to the children, and where the children themselves are required to articulate their thinking, and can enjoy ‘playing around with ideas’ (Whitebread 2000a:155).
An example of such an approach, Whitebread suggests, is Lipman’s Philosophy for Children (see later in the chapter). He also commends ideas such as the Thinking Books (Swan and White 1994) referred to in Chapter 5. Coles and Robinson (1991a) and McGuinness (1999) suggest that Lipman’s work, and Feuerstein’s Instrumental Enrichment programme have both been rigorously tested and evaluated and shown to work in a number of settings.
Lipman’s ideas, in particular, McGuinness (1999) suggests, may have an impact on the quality of discussion, on children’s abilities in forming questions, and on their self-esteem.
The Thinking Skills Review Group’s Systematic Review (2004) of the area concludes that a majority of the programmes they looked at demonstrate a positive impact as a result of the programme and none show a negative impact. Of these, the most impressive at age 16, in terms of transferability of learning and thinking to new contexts, is CASE (Adey and Shayer 1994). This Piagetian approach has been adapted for younger age groups, with one pro-gramme targeted at children aged 5 and 6 years, called Let’s Think! (Robertson 2004).
Robertson suggests that, as a result of the programme, children both developed their think-ing ability and learned more effectively across the curriculum. Critical success factors she identifies are that the programme is valued by the school as a whole, that collaborative work 164 Approaches to developing thinking
is supported and developed by the teachers and that teachers are prepared to respond positively to challenges about any preconceptions they have of children (Robertson 2004).
Swartz, similarly, suggests that his infusion approach supports transferability, and steers a path between the abstraction of the structured approaches extra to the normal curriculum, which he describes as teaching of thinking, and methods which, while they promote deep understanding of the curricular content, do not emphasize the processes of thinking, an approach he labels teaching for thinking (Swartz et al. 1998). In his infusion model children are supported in raising questions and drawing inferences that might be useful in any context, not just the particular one they are engaged in at that moment.
Finally, the Thinking Skills Review Group caution that the impact of thinking skills approaches may not be the same for all children. Their review suggests greater impact on
‘low attaining pupils, particularly when using metacognitive strategies’ (2000:39). However, they do cite one study which suggests the opposite, finding the greatest impact on higher attaining children. Overall, they suggest that a long-term view needs to be taken, and that more general emphasis by adults working with young children on making aspects of teaching and learning, particularly reasoning, more explicit may be as beneficial as any particular programme. Similarly, McGuinness (1999) emphasizes the benefits of creating and supporting dispositions for good thinking, and an atmosphere where talking about thinking is actively pursued. In Chapter 6 Carr’s ideas about positive dispositions as being the inclination to be ‘ready, willing and able’ (Carr 2001:21) were discussed. Perkins and Tishman (http://pzweb.harvard.edu./Research/PatThk.htm) emphasize the key importance of children being ready, willing and able to think.
Philosophy for Children
What is Philosophy for Children?
Philosophy for Children (P4C), sometimes referred to as Philosophy with Children (PWC), is one of the most widely known types of intervention to support children’s thinking.
Philosophy for Children was the idea of Matthew Lipman in the United States (Lipman 1991, 2003, Lipman et al. 1980). Concerned at what he saw as the low levels of thinking skills of college students, in contrast to the questioning, enquiring minds of young children, he felt that action was necessary to tackle the issue from early in life. The aim of Philosophy for Children is ‘to promote excellent thinking: thinking that is creative as well as logical, inventive as well as analytical’ (Lipman 1991:35). He further describes excellent thinking as
‘multidimensional’, combining critical thinking, creative thinking and ‘caring thinking’, a mode he suggests is usually seen as ‘falling in the affective rather than the cognitive camp’
(Lipman 2003:201), but which he sees as of equal importance to the other two modes.
Similar aims underpin the work of others who have developed ideas of philosophical think-ing with children. In the United Kthink-ingdom, one of the best-known advocates is Robert Fisher, who suggests that it exposes children to ‘the skills and habits of higher order thinking’
(Fisher 2001:67).
Looked at in relation to McGuinness’s earlier categorization of interventions, Lipman suggests that Philosophy for Children steers a middle path between the two very different models that thinking is either best taught through specific subjects or best approached through an autonomous course in thinking. He suggests that this middle path involves direct-ing the skills learned in the independent course to the ‘basic’ skills of readdirect-ing and writdirect-ing.
Approaches to developing thinking 165
He believes that, in so doing, children will then transfer the added critical reflectiveness of their reading and writing to other subjects and areas of learning (Lipman 2003). Other advocates, including Costello (2000), Fisher (1998) and Haynes (2002) all emphasize the potential transferability of thinking as a result of a philosophical approach. The principal vehicle for the development of this critical reflection is discussion, drawing on ideas of Socratic dialogue. It is seen as closely related to Vygotskian principles (Fisher 1990, Lewis and Rowley 2002) and to sociocultural concepts such as Rogoff’s (2003) idea of guided participation (Lipman 2003).
The practice of philosophy with children
Lipman’s approach to supporting children’s thinking was to develop a series of stories, for use with children of different ages. Each story features characters who are depicted dis-cussing ideas. For example, when turn taking comes up as part of the story, characters are shown discussing underlying principles of sharing and reciprocity. The stories intended for young children focus on the practice of reasoning and inquiry skills whereas those for older children move on to underlying principles and broader application (Lipman 1991). A typi-cal session devoted to children’s thinking begins with the reading of such a story, or part of it. Lipman suggests that this story reading is shared, with children being allowed to ‘pass’ if they do not wish to read aloud. Costello (2000) suggests that the practice of ‘passing’, which may tend to be done by less confident readers, can serve to make these children feel less par-ticipant, and alienate them from the activity. With younger children, this may be particularly the case. In Costello’s view, the reading is best done by the adult. The adult then asks the children for their comments, what they would like to discuss about the story and the ques-tions they want to ask, using open-ended quesques-tions and prompts, such as ‘What puzzles you? What interests you? What do you like about this passage?’ (Costello 2000:41–2). As a result of this, a particular topic is selected for exploration by the group, facilitated by the adult. The aim is to create a community of enquiry, or ‘habitat’ (Lipman 2003:157) for thinking, in which there is a readiness to reason, mutual respect and an absence of indoctri-nation (Lipman et al. 1980). Rules for discussion are developed, including listening, turn taking and not interrupting (Fisher 1990), showing respect for others and the avoidance of ridicule (Haynes 2002).
Lipman, and others such as Fisher (1990, 1998, 2001) have focused the discussions in the community of enquiry around specially written stories from which moral and philosophical points are drawn and debated. Costello (2000) suggests the value of video material with young children. Haynes broadens the possible range of stimuli, emphasizing the value of
‘carefully structured exploration of a variety of narratives found in story, myth, poetry, news, drama, music, painting, photography’ (2002:45). Adult choices from these stimuli are made on the basis of their power ‘to express ambiguity, to produce puzzlement, or to evoke a deep response’ (Haynes 2002:22). This includes the use of picture books, for example, of the kinds suggested in Chapters 5 and 8, which may include multilayered, parallel and ambigu-ous narratives. Haynes summarizes the process of such philosophical enquiry, pointing out that it should be seen as a flexible process, admitting diversions and discussion over often long periods of time:
● getting started: this may involve discussion of rules, meditation or silence as preparation;
● sharing a stimulus to prompt enquiry;
166 Approaches to developing thinking
Approaches to developing thinking 167
● pause for thought: children may think alone, in groups, and they may draw or write notes;
● questioning: questions are recorded for everyone to see;
● connections: links are made between questions, in the process of which children draw distinctions;
● choosing a question to begin enquiry: the adult needs to ensure that this is a fair, inclusive process;
● building on each other’s ideas: discussion;
● recording discussion: notes, webs, concept maps, for all to see;
● closure and review: summarizing what has been discussed; ‘Resolution is rare – new questions are more common’ (Haynes 2002:30). This aspect includes reflection on the process.
(Adapted from Haynes 2002:29–30) The discussions use the children’s own generated questions as starting points, a factor which Papaleontiou-Louca (2003) suggests involves a high degree of metacognitive involvement.
Haynes concurs, believing that ‘Philosophical enquiry addresses the ground of metacogni-tion as part of the ground of philosophy’ (2002:45). The role of the adult in managing the discussion is to both listen responsively and intervene tactfully, to treat all children’s contributions as legitimate, to encourage risk-taking and speculation and to avoid pursuing their own interests (Haynes 2003). Fisher emphasizes the importance of good feedback to the children, in ways which demonstrate that adults are not looking for ‘right answers’
(1990:170).
Discussions will, in Fisher’s view, often revolve around some key themes: fairness, freedom, friendship, truth, knowledge and judgement (1990:174). This has obvious similarities with the three themes of friendship, fairness and fantasy which Paley (1986) identifies as so important to children. As MacNaughton and Williams (2004) suggest, such philosophical discussions often have moral and ethical dimensions. Paley’s work often seems to implicitly combine such issues. A good example is her initiative of presenting the children with a new classroom rule: ‘You can’t say you can’t play’ (1993), to avoid the exclusion of some children from play. A brief extract of the children’s discussion is shown in Box 10.1.
Costello (2000) also emphasizes the relationship of philosophical thinking to the development of citizenship in children.
Is it philosophy?
While this is not the place for protracted discussion about whether or not young children can engage in philosophy, it is worth highlighting that there are differing views about this issue.
White (2002), commenting on the growth in popularity of programmes under this umbrella term, points out that encouraging children’s questions is undoubtedly valuable, but that not all questions are philosophical ones, and that merely asking questions does not make a child into a philosopher. Haynes, reflecting on this idea of the philosophical potential of questions, asks whether questions such as ‘How do cats kiss?, Why do men have nipples?, How are rivers made?’ (Haynes 2002:82), all asked by 4- and 5-year-olds, belong in philos-ophy. Costello (2000) relates the arguments of, among others, Mary Warnock and Roger Scruton, that philosophy is not an appropriate subject for study by children, and best left
White (2002), commenting on the growth in popularity of programmes under this umbrella term, points out that encouraging children’s questions is undoubtedly valuable, but that not all questions are philosophical ones, and that merely asking questions does not make a child into a philosopher. Haynes, reflecting on this idea of the philosophical potential of questions, asks whether questions such as ‘How do cats kiss?, Why do men have nipples?, How are rivers made?’ (Haynes 2002:82), all asked by 4- and 5-year-olds, belong in philos-ophy. Costello (2000) relates the arguments of, among others, Mary Warnock and Roger Scruton, that philosophy is not an appropriate subject for study by children, and best left