Is it appropriate to mix qualitative and quantitative research?

This discussion has focused on the theory behind combining qualitative and quantitative data and how they can be successfully integrated. It has not looked at whether it is appropriate to combine the two types of data. Many would argue that it is not, since quantitative and qualitative research strategies start from two philosophically opposed ontological and epistemic positions.

The traditional view of research originating from the physical and natural sciences is based on the ‘positivist’ or ‘postpositivist’ philosophy. This postulates that there is one world or objective reality and knowledge about that world can only be gained through experience. That experience could be gained via a variety of methods, organised hierarchically according to their ability to access what are regarded as universal truths. Large-scale experiments

generating numbers that can be manipulated mathematically are considered the most valuable tools; the softer qualitative approaches are at the other end of the scale, with a case study strategy at the bottom of the pile because of the limited number of participants involved and, therefore, the inability to generalise from the single case to the wider population.

This view began to change in the second half of the 20th century with the rise of what is known as ‘constructivism’. Constructivists assert that there is no single, universal world ‘out there’, but that each of us perceives reality in a slightly different way based on our beliefs and experiences – that is, we each construct our view of reality. In this context, qualitative methods increase in value as they go to the heart of how the research subject perceives an issue; to move from what semioticians term the signifier to the signified, the object or experience behind the word.

This is where debate over the validity of mixing methods arises. It is logically impossible to have both a universal reality and multiple realities. If using quantitative methods implies a postpositive approach and conducting qualitative research suggests a constructivist stance, then, for methodological purists, it is impossible to combine the two approaches – a conclusion which resulted in the so-called ‘paradigm wars’130.

However, as Tashakkori and Teddlie point out researchers have been combining both qualitative and quantitative approaches in their research for years131. And they have had many different reasons for doing so132, suggesting that the strategies are not as incompatible as the purists maintain and that there is a logical philosophical basis for mixed methods research; this philosophical foundation is pragmatism. The original pragmatists were a group of 19th century philosophers: Charles Peirce; William James; and John Dewey. They believed that ideas did not

130 _{See Denscombe, ‘Communities of practice’, p. 271 and Tashakkori and Teddlie, ‘Preface’, in}

Tashakkori and Teddlie (eds.), Handbook of Mixed Methods, p. ix

131

Tashakkori and Teddlie, ‘Major issues and controversies in the use of mixed methods in the social and behavioral sciences’, in Tashakkori and Teddlie(eds.), Handbook of Mixed Methods, pp. 5-6

132

constitute a pre-existing ‘foundation’ which would allow us to arrive at knowledge about the world, as with the positivist and constructivist views – hence the term foundationalism, which is often used to describe pragmatism. Instead, ideas act as instruments and are only as good as their practical consequences.

As Plowright notes:

Pragmatists argue that if statements about the world do not lead to consequences or actions that are instrumental in enabling us to make appropriate decisions, take effective action and successfully get things done, then those statements or beliefs will not count as knowledge133.

Other mixed methodologists caution that practicality alone cannot justify the choices that a researcher makes during research. In a government-sponsored project, a decision may be deemed practical because it suits the aims of the sponsor; it may not be in the best interests of the research subjects involved134. Moreover, justifying decisions on practical grounds may limit appreciation of the complexity of the research problem which is the reason for choosing the mixed methods approach in the first place. Instead, the research project should be courting different theoretical perspectives to ensure a rounded view. As Mason points out, ‘…if the social world is multi-dimensional, then surely our explanations need to be likewise?’135.

It is important for a researcher to acknowledge that those perspectives are social constructions in themselves. Our conclusions and our beliefs about what constitutes knowledge are reliant on how we investigate an issue; different methods reconstruct the same experience in

133 _{Plowright, Using Mixed Methods, p. 184} 134

See House and Howe quoted in Donna M. Mertens, ‘The Transformative-emancipatory perspective’, The Handbook of Mixed Methods Research, p. 137

135 _{Jennifer Mason, ‘Mixing methods in a qualitatively driven way’, Qualitative Research, Vol. 6, Issue 9,}

different ways136. For example, how successful we ultimately determine French film to be, relies on our definition of French film. Many would not view the films of Luc Besson as French because they provide Hollywood-style entertainment and are often shot in English with Hollywood actors in the main roles, but they qualify for subsidies on the basis that the director, the production team and much of the crew are French. Consequently, they will be classified as French in the CNC figures. If stricter criteria were used to define a film as French, the smaller the number of movies classified as French and the more likely we are to conclude that the industry is struggling.

For Greene and Caracelli, it is acceptable to mix paradigms along with methods to access the heart of an issue from a range of perspectives, so long as the researcher is explicit about the theoretical position adopted. In so doing, the researcher exposes any underlying assumptions to scrutiny, such that the end results themselves also stand up to inquiry and are not undermined because an initial statement was not tested137.

In terms of the cultural exception, it makes sense to examine the issue from both a qualitative and a quantitative perspective because trade negotiators have employed abstract concepts and industry statistics to justify their point of view as and when it suits their defence, but not combined the approaches to provide a rounded view of the issue. To examine the extent to which France can continue to defend the cultural exception from only one or other approach would be to potentially miss some very important aspects. By way of an example, looking only at the proportion of French films available on demand may lead us to conclude that the French film industry is underrepresented. Exploring filmmakers’ views on licensing their work for digital distribution may give us an entirely different view; there may be more than enough

136 _{Sarah Irwin, ‘Chapter 20: Data Analysis and Interpretation – Emergent Issues in Linking Qualitative}

and Quantitative Evidence’, in Nagy Hesse-Biber and Leavy (eds.), Handbook of Emergent Methods, p. 418

137 _{Jennifer C. Greene and Valerie J. Caracelli quoted in Creswell and Plano Clark, Designing and}

content available to fill the channels, but filmmakers are reluctant to release their work that way because it facilitates illegal sharing of films.