The argument

The central argument builds on previous theories about the democratic dividend of civic groups (C. Gs) in mature democracies and on theories of political participation in Africa. In the literature, C.Gs. have been branded as training grounds where citizens learn to hone their democratic skills and build their civic virtues. These benefits come by through the intensity and scope of membership. Intensity of involvement refers to the amount of social interactions that occur

within civic groups. Several authors have demonstrated that during these face-tot-face interactions, citizens develop their civic skills by actively engaging in the organization, the planning, and execution of civic activities. Civic groups also offer safer areas that facilitate public deliberation (Areto, 1994; Habermas,1996) and social interactions with positive democratic outcomes. During these social interactions, C.Gs. have been found to improve citizens’ democratic attitudes and behavior. Many scholars have shown that membership in civic group enhance interpersonal and generalized trust. For instance, Paxton (2007), Putnam (1993) have found that sanctions upheld in these organizations and shared norms among members increase generalized trust and reciprocity. They also specify that this trusting relationship among members does not result from individuals’ proclivity to trust anyone, but it is generated from the social setting within which members interact (Paxton 2007, 53). Yet this claim has been challenged in two comparative studies. First, Norris (2000) and Widner and Mundt (1998) have found that membership in C.Gs in developing countries dampens generalized trust. For instance, Widner and Mundt (1998) report that interpersonal trust has a negative relationship with membership civic groups in Botswana and in Uganda. Kuenzi (2008) attributes the negative relationship between generalized trust and civic membership to low institutional trust. In her analysis, Kuenzi finds that institutional trust (i.e, political trust) is the catalyst that connects membership in civic group to generalized trust. In other words, C.G member’s interactions with formal and informal institutions also shape their attitudes. Secondly, Varshney (2003) also questioned the benevolence of community-based organizations. In her study about sources of ethnic violence in India, Varshney (2003) argues that formal organizations (such as unions and professional associations) are better proximate cause to peace than communal organizations on the ground that they have a cross-cutting membership. In contrast, communal organizations are filled with ethnic –driven membership and overlapping cleavage factors

(Varshney 2003, 23). Yet in a similar study of the relationship between violence and social capital in Africa, Bhavnani and Backer (2007) report that Varshney (2003)'s theory is challenged in Africa. Specifically, they show that membership in communal organizations are not driven by ethnicity. As a matter of fact, members of majority ethnic groups scarcely claim to belong to a civic group in Africa. It has also been established that membership in C.Gs contribute in shaping citizens’ behavior through the time-honored social influence. According to Huckfeldt and Prague (1995), “an individual is imbedded within a particular context, the context structures interaction patterns and political information is conveyed through social interactions and individual response is based upon this information” (36). This observation was first revealed by the Columbia School, which emphasized the idea that individuals are to be understood within the larger social aggregate of which they are a part. Aggregate behavior is to be understood as more than a simple accumulation of individual preferences.

Civic groups are mobilizing collective forces. Through social interactions, C. Gs become tools to disseminate information and increase political salience of issues (Olsen,1982). Furthermore, greater personal involvement due to collective decision making reduces the cost of mobilization. By reducing the cost of mobilization, CGs lessen the free rider problem. Knoke (1986) asserts that this is done through normative expectations of fairness among members (7). Similarity of goals and shared values and norms reinforce psychological bonds among members, leading individual members to yield to the group the direction of their behavior(Knoke,1986). As a result, CGs increase collective efficacy and provide a channel to communicate members’ preferences. As Olsen (1982, 32) explains it, collective efficacy is gained when members acquire info about relevant public issue, they pool together their resources and channel their preferences.

Still, several factors conspire to hander the positive impacts of CGs. As previously alluded to, informal grassroots associations in Africa suffer from lack of academic interest, scarcity of data, and their so-called ascriptive characteristics. For instance, Ekeh (1992) holds that grassroots in Africa are incongruous with democratic tenets because of their kinship driven membership. Another criticism leveled at CGs in Africa is the pervasive informal nature of these organizations. To this, Rosenblum (1998) replies that the richness of CGs does not lie in their level of formalization. CG may well be hierarchical in organization, exclusive in membership and still be able to foster self- respect in their members and expose them to contrary views (1998). Bratton et.al 2005, 143-301) go further than Rosenblum in their advocacy of informal organizations and actions of these voluntary associations. They argue that because informality is what characterizes political participation in Africa, specifically during the interelection period, scholars should make a space for activities that are done in these conditions. They enumerate two main activities that they find central to political participation on the continent: “communing” and “contacting.” Communing include all activities done by the community such as attending community meeting. According to Bratton et.al, (2005) communing is a distinctive aspect of political participation in Africa because it carries some normative expectations in regard to social interactions. Civic groups in Africa are first and foremost social venues where members come to socialize, share concerns, and set the community’s agenda (301). In these associations, Africans expand their political resources and deliberate in local arena about local and national issues. As for contacting, Bratton and his colleagues acknowledge the fact that Africans enjoy more face-to face interactions than any other forms of interactions (291). Perhaps the weakness of formal institutions has forced Africans to prefer this form of direct democracy by engaging directly office holders. Yet, the abysmal rate of contacts between citizens and MPs led Van De Wall (2003) to observe that only a small fraction –

the haves- that actually gets to contact political figures. The majority of citizens is alienated from the state and its representatives. In these cases, CG become the reliable medium through which citizens contact their representatives in Africa.

I argue that citizens use grassroots associations as intermediary channel to contact their members of parliament because their membership in these grassroots emancipates them from fear of replications and makes it easier to mobilize them in conveying their voices to representatives. Furthermore, grassroots associations offer safer social environment for its members to voice their concern because GA membership increases interpersonal trust among its members (Putnam,1993; Couto,1999; Paxon, 2002; Paxton, 2007). This increase in social trust is induced by widespread known norms and shared interpretations of the world (Putnam,1993; Couto,1999; Warren,2001; Paxton,2002). As a result, members’ sense of wee-ness increases, making every member's behavior and expectations predictable. Additionally, the sense of wee-ness of members promotes positive self-image, fosters openness toward other members and expends each member’s sphere of influence (Warren,2001).

Membership in GAs also helps citizens overcome their fear and encourage them to specifically contact their Members of parliament (Couto, 1999; Warren, 2001). One of the long- lasting legacy of authoritarianism and colonialism in Africa is political violence and its eroding effects on individual willingness to take political initiative (Grossman,2016). This has made GAs a

de facto intermediary channel to convey citizens’ preferences to their MPs. The grassroots membership becomes a springboard to move out from their fear. Grassroots membership in GAs in Africa can be assumed to mobilize easily their members in contacting their MPs because they reduce transaction cost, provide psychological bonding, and contribute in building civic skills (Fung 2003, 515-539). In societies where basic procedures are young and fragile, civic

associations organize, emancipate an empower individual citizens to contact their MPs (Baiocchi, 2002). The following two hypotheses are generated from the above theory.

2.3.1.3 Hypotheses

Hypothesis I Membership in GAs emancipate citizens from their fear and prompt them to get more involved in community affairs such as attending community meetings.

One can assume that getting together to raise an issue and discuss in a small setting refines the formulation of members’ concerns. This attitude of “joiner” is perhaps stronger in a place where community issues drive these “getting together” to raise issues (33% of active members contact formal leaders for community problems versus 23% for personal problems). Additionally, in a place where individuals rely on social interdependence to survive, social organizations spring organically and form grassroots associations. These grassroots associations cultivate psychological bonds among members, which enables them to open up and let the group serve as their motivator. Huckfeldt and Prague (1995) call this phenomenon “the effect of a time-honored process of social influence”

Hypothesis II: Membership in grassroots increases contact with MPs more than individual politically relevant characteristics. As Olson (1982) contends, with their similar preferences, GA membership fosters conditions where members pool together their resources to generate more potent collective influence greater than individual action:

Association membership broadens one's sphere of interests and concerns, so that public affairs and political issues become more salient to the individual. (2) It brings one into contact with many diverse people, and the resulting social relationships draw the individual into a wide range of new activities, including politics. (3) It gives one training and experience in social interaction and

leadership skills that are valuable in the political sphere. (4) It provides one with multiple channels through which he or she can act to exert influence on politicians and the political system (p.32).In short, membership in civic associations prompt citizens to attend community meeting and to generate collective efficacy necessary to contact their MPs.