Although Martin’s argument successfully avoids one of the pitfalls of the “Valued Ends” argument (the dubiousness of positing the unconditional value of a capacity
because it is the only source of conditional value), it still faces two related difficulties. Martin’s view, similarly to the “Valued Ends” view, rests status as an end-in-itself in the capacity to set ends for oneself. Although her argument gives us good reason to think that we have to think of ourselves as ends-in-ourselves, and thus that we have to treat other rational beings as if they are, it gives us less of a reason to think (1) that we actually are such ends, and (2) that we are uniquely ends-in-ourselves. Just as on the standard interpretation, Martin’s conclusion arises out of a commitment to the idea that the source of value in the world is the valuing of rational beings, and status as an end-in-itself (something with unconditional worth) depends on the capacity to do this. Both views, committed to this idea of value (since it is a core Kantian view), unravel the notion of an end-in-itself (or value-in-itself) from this initial starting point – value must come from, or be in some way related to, doing this. But Martin’s view, in avoiding the problem of explaining the value of valuing by identifying objective, unconditional value in the sources of value, gives us only a reason to think that we cannot deny to others the status we afford ourselves. But from the fact that we have to conceive of ourselves as, and set ends in such a way that we are, our own ultimate ends, it does not necessarily follow that we are ends of that sort.
The standard interpretation, in conceiving of sources of value as the explanatory link, gives us a reason (albeit a dubious one) to think that the capacity has to have value (if value is to exist at all). Martin’s view, of course, is similar in that she wants to say
that because value only comes from rational end-setting, valuing ourselves as the ultimate ends of all this valuable end-setting means that we must value others as such. Such a view avoids the pitfalls of positing some unconditioned, objective value. But since this account generates an obligation based on how we necessarily conceive of ourselves, it leaves open whether we, who necessarily conceive of ourselves this way, actually have the value that that implies (since this conception alone is what establishes the value- claim). From one perspective, this is an advantage of the account. But it is also one of the problems with it, since this essentially means that autonomous beings have “ultimate value” here by fiat – since they necessarily take themselves to be the ultimate ends of an end-setting process that alone establishes value, they must see all other end-setters as being ultimate ends as well.
One might simply deny that this fact is troubling, since whether or not rational beings have been shown to have unconditional value, the account succeeds in explaining the obligations that it is meant to. However, the fact that Martin’s argument does not establish the ultimate value of rational beings generates the second problem identified above. For even if the way in which we necessarily see ourselves establishes an obligation to others who necessarily conceive of themselves the same way, it does not rule out the possibility that there are others to whom such obligations are owed. Such an account establishes one ground of obligation on pain of inconsistency, but does not rule out the possibility that respect is owed to other sorts of creatures, too. Even if we assumed that our conception of ourselves as ends meant that we actually have ultimate value as ends, it could still be (on such an account) that we are not the only ones with this sort of value. Other beings that see themselves as ends are simply the ones who, on pain
of inconsistency, we must necessarily recognize as being ends and having whatever value that implies. But without the anchor of identifying valuing as the only conceivable unconditional value (as does the “Valued Ends” view), it seems arbitrary to identify autonomous beings as the only ends-in-themselves.
What these Kantian strategies share is the claim that value only enters the world through a specific source or process (rational end-setting), and this turns out to be the key to figuring out what the unconditional worth that respect recognizes is. Specifically, these strategies start from the intuition or idea that all human beings deserve basic respect, and then from there try to determine how or why this could be true. However, I think that the explanation that emerges focuses the issue incorrectly. Very basically, the explanation is that only rational beings can be the direct objects of the obligation because only their rational activity can generate it. But consider again what this means for the status of non-human animals -- they cannot be sources of value (or ultimate ends, to take Martin’s vocabulary) in the way that human beings are because they do not have the sort of legislative wills that human beings do. They do not reflect on, and revise, their choices – they do not see them reflectively as choices, as endorsements of something (or some action) as worthy of pursuit (i.e., as valuable). Because of this, they do not endorse their choices in a way that can be reasonably described as universal legislation. Since this ability alone is important for identifying value on the views just described, non- human animals just are not the sorts of things that are ends-in-themselves. The basic Kantian strategy focuses the question of who is owed respect (or of who has the value respect recognizes) on they way in which we are rationally required to view and treat those who are as rational as we are -- either as co-legislators, ultimate ends, or ultimate
sources of value. And this means that our obligations seem to end with other rational beings. This is counter-intuitive – no matter what obligations one thinks one has to non- human animals, the Kantian view cannot satisfactorily account for them. But I think this way of focusing the question is not the only way, nor is it the best way.