Facts:
Calonqui was found guilty for two counts of rape. On January 1, 1998 about 2 am in Tagbong, Camarines Sur, Calonqui was able to rape the 13 year old girl Maricel in the latter’s house. On September 26, 1998 at about three in the morning, the accused again raped the victim. Both rape incidents were witnessed by the brother of Maricel.
Issue:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and relationship be appreciated against Calonqui and the latter circumstance as an alternative circumstance?
Decision:
Calonqui and Maricel live under the same shelter as they are first cousins.
At the time of the incident, both are living in the same house and in the same room. Therefore, the supposed aggravating circumstance of dwelling cannot be appreciated as there was no trespass to the sanctity of the house of the victim on the part of Calonqui, while the aggravating circumstance of relationship is likewise cannot go against Calongui, even as an alternative circumstance, as being first cousins is not within the concept contemplated in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. However, his conviction is nonetheless affirmed.
Joseph Oseo 2006-0350
People v. Marcos (G.R. No. 132392) Facts:
Prosecution, with the testimony of a lone eye-witness, who happened to be the son of the victim, along with the admission of guilt, found Cesar Marcos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder for the killing of his elder brother, Virgilio, as aggravated by the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.
During Appeal, the Solicitor General insisted that since the accused is a brother of the victim, the alternative circumstance of relationship must be considered in determining the imposable penalty.
Issue:
Whether or not the alternative circumstance of relationship shall be considered in the imposition of the proper penalty?
Decision:
In order that the Alternative Circumstance of relationship may be taken into consideration in the imposition of the proper penalty, Paragraph 2 of Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the offended party must either be the (a) spouse, (b) ascendant, (c) descendant, (d) legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or (e) relative by affinity in the same degree, of the offender.
Relationship is Mitigating in Crimes against Property, while it must be considered as Aggravating in Crimes against Persons where the offended party is a relative of a higher degree than the offender or when in the same degree or level, as in brothers.
Therefore, the Alternative Circumstance of relationship shall be considered as Aggravating.
Ray Nagrampa Jr. B.
2008-0061
Intoxication
Facts:
On June 24, 1998, at about eleven o'clock in the evening, Junilla Macaldo was sitting on a bench outside her house. While thus seated, Edlyn Gamboa came to her asking for the whereabouts of Yen-yen Ibuña. Junilla noticed that Edlyn was followed by accused George Cortes. Junilla then instructed Edlyn to go upstairs of the house. When Edlyn was about to go upstairs, accused followed her and successively stabbed her several times. Junilla tried to help Edlyn, but was overpowered by the accused. Junilla shouted for help and the accused run away. She was brought to the Babano Medical Clinic, where she expired.
On August 12, 1998, the provincial prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court, Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, an Information for murder against accused George Cortes y Ortega. Accused admitted that he stabbed Edlyn and enter the plea of guilty of the said crime. The prosecution presented evidence to prove the presence of intoxication as aggravating circumstances. The accused on the other hand presented evidence proving the alternative mitigating of intoxication.
On September 2, 1998, the trial court rendered decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and sentence to suffer the penalty of Death.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed by the accused was aggravated by reason of intoxication?
Decision:
Ordinarily, intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the circumstances attending the commission of the crime.
Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if it is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the contemplated crime; on the other hand, when it is habitual or intentional, it is considered an aggravating circumstance. A person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must present proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason. At the same time, that person must show proof of not being a habitual drinker and not taking the alcoholic drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime.
Accused argues that in the absence of any of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information and considering that there was one mitigating circumstance attendant, that of plea of guilty, the penalty imposable is not death but reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General agrees with the accused that "the only aggravating circumstance present was treachery which qualified the killing to murder and that there were two mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and intoxication, not habitual. The penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, not death, in accordance with Article 63 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6759
Ray Nagrampa Jr. B.
2008-0061
People v. Mondigo (G.R. No. 167954) Facts:
Ligas, Malolos, Bulacan. Anthony (damaso’s another son) joined the group. At around 6:00 p.m., Mondigo, using a "jungle bolo," suddenly hacked Anthony on the head, causing him to fall to the ground unconscious. Appellant next attacked Damaso. A witness who was in the vicinity, Lolita Lumagi, hearing shouts coming from the scene of the crime, rushed to the area and there saw appellant repeatedly hacking Damaso who was lying on his back, arms raised to ward off appellant’s blows. Damaso later died from the injuries he sustained. Anthony sustained wound on his left temporal area.Appellant was charged before the RTC with Murder and Frustrated Murder. TheRTC found appellant guilty of Murder for the killing of Damaso and Serious Physical Injuries for the hacking of Anthony, mitigated by intoxication.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in giving credence of alternative circumstance of intoxication to mitigate the crime?
Decision:
The trial court erred in crediting appellant with the circumstance of intoxication as having mitigated his crimes because "the stabbing incident ensued in the course of a drinking spree." For the alternative circumstance of intoxication to be treated as a mitigating circumstance, the defense must show that the intoxication is not habitual, not subsequent to a plan to commit a felony and the accused’s drunkenness affected his mental faculties. Here, the only proof on record on this matter is appellant’s testimony that before Damaso, Anthony, and Delfin attacked him, he drank "about 3 to 4 bottles of beer." The low alcohol content of beer, the quantity of such liquor appellant imbibed, and the absence of any independent proof that appellant’s alcohol intake affected his mental faculties all negate the finding that appellant was intoxicated enough at the time he committed the crimes to mitigate his liability.
Alexander Santos
Eugenio’s wife, Josephine Refugio testified she glanced to her left and saw Neil Batin standing at the gate to their compound, looking towards her and her husband. A few moments later, Neil went to one of the parked cars, opened its door, and took a gun from inside. She next noticed Castor going towards Neil as the latter stood at the side of the car and shouting: "Huwag!" Castor grabbed the gun from Neil. After the gun was taken from him, Neil just proceeded towards the right rear of the car. Castor followed Neil and handed the gun back to him.
When she shifted her glance from the Batins, Josephine heard Castor ordering his son: "Sige, banatan mo na." Neil responded by drawing the gun from his waistline, raising and aiming it at her and her husband, and firing twice from his eye-level. Both Josephine and Eugenio fell to the ground, the former, backwards, and the latter landing on top of her.
Neighbors testified that Neil went out to the street, went between the parked white car and yellow taxicab, aimed the gun at Eugenio and Josephine who were at the mango tree, and then asked Castor: "Tay, banatan ko na?"; that Castor replied: "Sige, anak, banatan mo na."
Issue:
Whether or not the statement made by the father made him liable as principal by inducement?
Decision:
The Court finds that Castor and Neil conspired in shooting Eugenio. This finding is inexorable because the testimonies of the Prosecution witnesses that Castor returned the gun back to Neil; that he instigated Neil to shoot by shouting:
"Sige, banatan mo na"; and that Neil then fired his gun twice – were credible and sufficed to prove Castor’s indispensable cooperation in the killing of Eugenio.
Accordingly, Castor was as much liable criminally for the death of Eugenio as Neil, the direct participant in the killing, was.
While Castor was indeed heard to have shouted "Huwag," this cannot be considered as reliable evidence that he tried to dissuade Neil from firing the gun.
cross-examination that Castor shouted "Huwag" while inside the car grappling for possession of the gun, and not when Neil was aiming the gun at the spouses.
As concluded by the trial court, the circumstances surrounding Castor’s utterance of "Huwag!" shows beyond doubt that Castor shouted the same, not to stop Neil from firing the gun, but to force him to leave the use of the gun to Castor. These circumstances only confirm the conspiracy between the Batins in committing the crime: after the Batins grappled for the gun and Castor shouted
"Huwag," Castor finally decided to give the gun to Neil – a crystal-clear expression of the agreement of the Batins concerning the commission of a felony.
Conspiracy may also be deduced from the acts of the appellants before, during, and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments.Even if we pursue the theory that the defense is trying to stir us to, the results would be the same.
Castor’s argument is that "(h)is alleged utterance of the words ‘Sige, banatan mo na’ cannot be considered as the moving cause of the shooting and, therefore, he cannot be considered a principal by inducement.
Inducement may be by acts of command, advice or through influence or agreement for consideration. The words of advice or the influence must have actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. We have held that words of command of a father may induce his son to commit a crime. The moral influence of the words of the father may determine the course of conduct of a son in cases in which the same words coming from a stranger would make no impression. There is no doubt in our minds that Castor’s words were the determining cause of the commission of the crime.
Alexander Santos 2006-0205
People v. Vasquez (G.R. No. 123939) Facts:
The appellant drove the passenger jeepney with his cohorts on board looking for Luable and Geronimo. When the appellant saw the two going in the opposite direction, the appellant drove the vehicle and sideswiped Geronimo.
And when Geronimo fled, the appellant, armed with a bolo, pursued him. When the appellant failed to overtake the victim, he returned to the passenger jeepney and drove it to where his cohorts ganged up on the victim. The appellant urged them on to kill Geronimo. Thereafter, he left the scene along with his cohorts, leaving the hapless Geronimo mortally wounded.
After trial, the court rendered judgment acquitting Ramon, but convicting the appellant of murder for the killing of Geronimo, and attempted homicide for attempting to kill Luis.
The appellant avers that he and his brother Ramon had no motive to kill Geronimo. The appellant contends that the witnesses for the prosecution were not in agreement as to who killed Geronimo. The appellant noted that according to the testimony of the witness, the appellant stayed in the jeepney and merely yelled to his companions who ganged up on Geronimo, "Sige patayin ninyo, patayin ninyo na, at huwag ninyong iwanang buhay!"
The appellant further posits that the prosecution witnesses were not even in accord as to where Geronimo was stabbed to death. The appellant argues that because of the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution, it failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. Hence, he should be acquitted of the said charges.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant when the witnesses testimony didn’t confirm who chased and stabbed the victims?
Decision:
Whether Domingo Vasquez chased the deceased with a bolo was averred by Luis Luable or whether the accused merely incited his companions in the jeepney to kill the deceased as averred by Luisa Abellanosa, is immaterial in the
In order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy."
The Supreme Court, likewise, stressed that where there are several accused and conspiracy has been established, the prosecution need not pinpoint who among the accused inflicted the fatal wound. Where conspiracy has been established, evidence as to who among the accused rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and character of their participation because the act of one is the act of all.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more person agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicting a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design.
Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in
conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit. When a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them."
All the foregoing constitutes evidence beyond cavil of conspiracy between the appellant and the principals by direct participation. The appellant is, thus, criminally liable for the death of the victim, although there is no evidence that he did not actually stab the latter.
Alexander Santos 2006-0205
People v. Dacillo (G.R. No. 149368) Facts:
Appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of murder for the death of Rosemarie Tallada, with aggravating circumstance of recidivism with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and sentenced to the extreme penalty of death.
In his defense, appellant admitted complicity in the crime but minimized his participation. Appellant alleged that he only held down Rosemarie’s legs to prevent her from struggling and, after the latter was killed by another man he identified as Joselito Pacot, he encased the corpse in cement.
He claimed that Pacot, a co-worker at Davao Union Cement Corporation (DUCC), was looking for a house where he and his girlfriend Rosemarie could spend the night. He offered his brother’s house which was under his care. In the evening of February 6, 2000, he and Joselito Pacot brought Rosemarie to the house at Purok No. 3, New Society Village, Ilang, Davao City.
After accompanying the couple there, he went home to take supper. Later that evening, he returned to the house with the bottle of Sprite Pacot had ordered. When he arrived, Pacot and Rosemarie were already grappling with each other and Pacot was strangling the girl. He told Pacot to stop but instead of heeding him, the latter ordered him to close the door. Pacot told appellant that he was going to be implicated just the same so he closed the door as ordered and helped Pacot "(hold) the feet of the woman" as "her feet kept hitting the walls."
The two men stopped only when Rosemarie was already motionless.
Pacot wanted to dump the body into the sea but appellant told him it was low tide. Appellant then suggested that they entomb the body in cement for which Pacot gave appellant P500.Pacot left the house at dawn the following day, February 7, 2000. At past 10:00 a.m., appellant brought the concrete mixture and cast the dead body in cement.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant is liable as a principal?
Decision:
The rule is that any admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof to hold him liable therefor.
Such admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or no such admission was in fact made. There was never any such disclaimer by appellant.
Moreover, despite appellant’s self-serving, exculpatory statement limiting
Moreover, despite appellant’s self-serving, exculpatory statement limiting