revised attitude of the CFSU towards the Vietnam question no doubt would have been based on sensitivity to the CFC charge that the CPSU was failing to support national liberation movements, the
relatively small risk of a direct confrontation with the US, involved in supplying the requested armaments and acceptance of the inevitable cooling of USSR-US relations as being worth the propaganda benefits of being seen to be actively engaged in "opposing imperialism".
Among other considerations, the CFSU leaders were probably impressed by the dramatic and successful attack by the southern PLAF on the
large US air base at Bien Hoa near Saigon on 1 November,
The withdrawal of the Hoc Tap article was not firm evidence of a new CPSU stance, but this was soon forthcoming. On 25
November, an international conference of solidarity with the Vietnamese people opened in Hanoi, attended by both Soviet and
117. "Why Khrushchov Fell", Hongqi editorial of 21 November 1964, in Peking Review, Vol. VII No. 48 (27 November 1964), at p. 9 .
See e.g. China News Analysis No, 555 (12 March 1965) pp. 3-4, 118
C h i n e s e d e l e g a t i o n s . The c h i e f C h i n e s e d e l e g a t e a t t a c k e d t h e 119 p o l i c i e s o f t h e CPSU i n t h i n l y - v i e l e d t e r m s , and a mo n t h l a t e r h e t o l d a P e k i n g r a l l y t h a t t h e ’’o v e r w h e l m i n g m a j o r i t y ” o f d e l e g a t e s t o t h i s c o n f e r e n c e h a d ’’a n g r i l y r e f u t e d t h e r e v i s i o n i s t s * 120 v a r i o u s e r r o n e o u s a r g u m e n t s ” » - The S o v i e t d e l e g a t e , f o r h i s p a r t , t o l d t h e c o n f e r e n c e on 26 November o f an a u t h o r i s e d d e c l a r a t i o n f r o m t h e TASS News Age n c y o f t h e same d a y , i n w h i c h t h e USSR
s p e c i f i c a l l y condemned t h e a c t s o f a e r i a l a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t DRVN t e r r i t o r y , and s t a t e d t h a t i t was r e a d y t o g i v e t h e DRVN ’’ t h e
. . „
121 n e c e s s a r y h e l p . ~k it it On 22 D e c e mb e r , F e k i n g c e l e b r a t e d t h e NFL*s f o u r t h a n n i v e r s a r y by a r a l l y , and P r e m i e r Chou E n - l a i s e n t g r e e t i n g s t o t h e NFL*sP r e s i d e n t , Nguyen Huu Tho, i n w h i c h he c o n g r a t u l a t e d t h e F r o n t f o r ’’f o l l o w i n g a c o r r e c t p o l i c y and a f l e x i b l e s t r a t e g y ” , s o t h a t
122
i t was now ’’f a c i n g a n e x c e l l e n t s i t u a t i o n ” . " “ The p r e c e d i n g d a y , D e f e n c e M i n i s t e r L i n P i a o i n f o r m e d Vo Nguyen G i a p o f t h e P LA' s
’’g r e a t a d m i r a t i o n ” a t t h e f a c t t h a t t h e S o u t h V i e t n a m e s e p e o p l e w e r e ’’b e c o m i n g s t r o n g e r and s t r o n g e r " , “ Renmi n R i b a o ’ s e d i t o r i a l
g r e e t i n g t h e NFL’ s a n n i v e r s a r y a d d e d t h a t ” a f a v o u r a b l e s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h c i t i e s a r e e n c i r c l e d by v i l l a g e s " h a d a p p e a r e d , and t h e " s t o r m y ma s s and p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e s i n t h e c i t i e s ” had
124 " o p e n e d up a s e c o n d f r o n t ” . A l l o f t h e s e c o mment s b o r e t e s t i m o n y 1 1 9 . T e x t o f h i s s p e e c h p u b l i s h e d i n t h e r e c o r d o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f e r e n c e f o r S o l i d a r i t y w i t h t h e P e o p l e o f V i e t n a m A g a i n s t US I m p e r i a l i s t A g g r e s s i o n and f o r t h e e f e n c e o f P e a c e ( H a n o i : The B u r e a u o f t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f e r e n c e , 1 9 6 4 ) , p p . 1 6 8 - 1 7 7 . 12C. Se e t h e r e p o r t o f L i u N i n g - y i ’ s r e p o r t t o a F e k i n g r a l l y o f 22 De c ember 1 9 6 4 , i n P e k i n g R e v i e w , V o l . V I I No, 52 ( 2 5 De c e mb e r 1 9 6 4 ) , a t p . 10. 1 2 1 . I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f e r e n c e f o r S o l i d a r i t y
/T.,7«
OP« c i t . , p . 2 1 2 1 2 2 . NCNA 19 De c e mb e r 1964 ( i n SCMF 3363 o f 23 De c e mb e r 1964, p p . 3 7 - 3 8 ) . 1 2 3 . NCNA 21 De c e mb e r 1964 ( i n SCMP 3364 o f 24 De c e mb e r 1964, p . 3 3 ) 1 2 4 . I s s u e o f 20 De c e mb e r 1964; t e x t i n P e k i n g R e v i e w , V o l . V I I No. 52 ( 2 5 De c e mb e r 1 9 6 5 ) , p p . 1 1 - 1 3 .to the Chinese enthusiasm at the undoubted progress which had been made by the insurgents during the past six months.
As the New Year of 1965 drawned, it seemed that it would only be a matter of time before the US would be forced to admit the untenability of its position in South Viet Nam and seek to retrieve itself from what had for more than twelve months been referred to as a "quagmire” . As if to underline the allegedly passive
position of the Saigon Government forces and their US advisors, FLAF cadres destroyed a seven-story bachelor officer quarters in
Saigon on 24 December, injuring over 100 persons. In a six-day
battle (from 28 December 1964 to 2 January 1965) at the village of Binh Gia, 40 miles from Saigon, the PLAF won their greatest victory of the war to date against South Vietnamese Government forces, and
the protracted engagement led to speculation that the FLAF might be
moving into the "mobile” phase of guerrilla warfare. Renmin Ribao*s
6 January 1965 editorial praised this "magnificent battle of
annihilation" which showed that the PLAF were "now capable of wiping out large numbers of the enemy's effectives"; the war initiative was now "entirely in the hands of the people's armed forces", and
the victory had revealed "a marked change in the relative strength 125
between the people and the enemy in South Viet Nam".""" The first units of the North Vietnamese army had by now arrived in South Viet Nam, and more were on their way via Laos. "We did not believe
that the armed forces of South Viet Nam could contain this expanding enemy military force", the then US military commander in Viet Nam
125 From the text in Peking Review, Vol. VIII No. 2 (8 January
126
wrote of the situation at the start of 1965, u Mao Tse-tung told American writer Edgar Snow on 9 January that he thought the NFL- FLAF forces could win victory by their own efforts, and that while
fighting in Viet Nam might go on for perhaps one to two years, the 127
US troops would then find it boring and go home. On 14 January, Renmin Ribao assessed that the US position in Viet Nam was that of
"a dying person who is sinking fast like the sun behind the western hills” , but the editorialist repeated a warning in a PRC statement of the previous day that if the US expanded or internationalized
the vrar, "then the Chinese Government and people will have to give further consideration to the duties incumbent upon them for the
123
defence of peace in this area” . The warning implied a willingness on the part of the PRC to tolerate the continuation of the conflict, provided that it remained confined primarily to South Viet Nam and provided that the level of involvement of the US and its allies was not significantly increased. In this situation, the initiative
seemed to lie entirely with the insurgents; the potential military threat to China would be decreased through the continuing attrition of US power; the eventual withdrawal of US forces, and the consequent victory of the insurgent forces, would serve both the general anti-
imperialist goal and the specific Chinese claim that people's wars could be victorious if only the people stood up to struggle in unity. The validation of the latter claim would also vindicate the CFC for their criticism of the CPSU's alleged faint-heartedness in support of "national liberation movements” , and thus constitute a major ideological victory. All of these considerations,
126. Report on the War in Vietnam A , , op. cit,t
127. First published in The New Republic, 27 February 1965, 128. Text in Peking Review, Vol. VIII No. 4 (22 January 1965)
however, were premissed on a recognition by the US leaders that further escalation or internationalization of the conflict would be disadvantageous in terms of prestige, military costs, growing domestic dissent, over-extension of military resources on a global scale, and the evident inability of successive Saigon Government leaders to inspire the majority of South Vietnamese into positive opposition to the VNWP*s attempt to annex the south by force of arms. As events were to show, such recognition came tardily,
it it it
In this context, there was little cause for suprise in the CFC-CC* s 2 February 1965 greetings to the ICP-VNWP on the occasion of its 35th founding anniversary. Extending "sincerest fraternal greetings", the CPC hailed the VNWP for "correctly integrating Marxism-Leninism with the revolutionary practice of Viet Nam", and
for having formulated "a strategy and tactics of revolutionary
struggle conforming to the realities in Viet Nam". Under its "wise leadership", the VNWP had "stood on the side of the Marxist-Leninist fraternal Parties" and made "outstanding contributions to the
international communist cause". For a long time, the message said, the two Parties and States had "consistently supported and assisted each other in their struggle for the common cause, linked their destinies and shared weal and woe"; thus friendship and unity would "surely be further consolidated and developed"."1' These sentiments
and assessments represented praise of a high order, and in fact expressed a warmth of attitude towards North Viet Nam that had been matched in the past only by the Chinese comments in July 1960,
129. Text in Peking Review, Vol. VIII No. 7 (12 February 1965), p. 5.
The warmth of the Chinese expressions of support to the VNWP contrasted with the continuing coolness of Chinese relations
with the Soviet Union. Travda had announced on 12 December 1964
that the CFSU proposed to press on with a preparatory meeting of fraternal Parties as a first step towards holding an international meeting of all Workers' and Communist Parties, but the initial meeting was now called a commission, and it was to meet in Moscow
on 1 March 1965 rather than 15 December 1964 as had been announced
before Krushchov's fall from power. At the end of January, it was
announced that a Soviet Party and Government delegation would shortly visit the DRVN, and when Premier Kosygin stopped over in Peking on 5 February en route to Hanoi, he was given a decidedly
cool welcome by the Chinese. The NCNA devoted only three brief
paragraphs to his visit, saying that after a banquet given by Chou En-lai and Chen Yi for their guests, "the two sides had a conver-
sation". The North Vietnamese for their part did what they could
to avoid taking sides; thus, both the CPC-CC and the CPSU-CC greetings to the VNWP * s 2 February anniversary were front-paged in the Hanoi
131 Party daily Nhan Dan on 5 February.
By late January 1965, according to an official US source, "there was widespread conviction among senior United States and Vietnamese military commanders and civilian authorities in Viet Nam
that the absence of a United States response to Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attacks against our personnel and forces in South Viet
132 Nam would further encourage anti-United States incidents"
130. Texts in SCMP 3394 of 10 February 1965, pp. 31-32.
131. VNA 5 February 1965.
and also, as the "Pentagon Papers” show, would do nothing to assuage the plummeting level of morale within South Viet Nam, already
severely shaken by the attack on the Bien Hoa base, the Binh Gia
13 battle, and the continuing crisis of political authority in Saigon, Flans for US air strikes against the DRVN had been contemplated by
the US leaders for several months. In particular, a plan for
retaliatory action - codenamed "Flaming Dart" - had been developed; on 7 February - the day after Kosygin had landed at Hanoi - the southern insurgent forces carried out a major raid against a US
airfield and barracks at Pleiku; and later the same day, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered that "Flaming Dart" be executed. A second and heavier reprisal raid, "Flaming Dart II", was executed on
11 February in response to an attack on US barracks at Qui Nhon; and on 13 February, US President Johnson authorised the start of "Operation Rolling Thunder", a sustained series of punitive bombings against the DRVN which was to continue with only brief pauses until 31 October 1968.
133. The New York Times, The Pentagon Papers, op. cit., especially
CHAPTER THREE
February 1965 - March 1968
The time-period to be discussed in this chapter is that of the sustained bombardment of the DRVN by the US, from the
execution of "Flaming Dart I" on 7 February 1965 to President Johnson’s announcement on 31 March 1968 that the bombing would be
substantially limited and that he would not be available as a candidate for re-election to the Presidency later that year. These three years constituted the major part of what the DRVN
leaders called the period of "limited war", as opposed to the earlier period of "special war" (from mid-1961 to February 1965). Whereas the US had relied primarily upon the armed forces of the Saigon Government to repress the insurgency in South Viet Nam