Assertiveness is usually associated with a communication from a subordinate to an authority (e.g. FO to captain) but in some situations, for example when the FO is pilot flying, the captain may have to intervene and this may also require assertion.
Although it is important to be assertive when an intervention is urgent or critical, assertive communication is not usually a first resort. This is because assertive communications can carry a risk of creating a difficult flight deck dynamic and adding to a problem. This is something that many pilots understand implicitly, but would prefer not to admit. Even when
CAP 737 Section A, Part 2, Chapter 15: Communication (communication, language, sharing mental models, assertiveness and verbal intervention)
done perfectly well with use of standard phraseology, a receiver of an assertion might see it as undermining their authority.
I had not enjoyed flying with this captain, and then during the arrival we levelled out, power went on, and it became clear that he had forgotten to close the speed brake. I waited, hoping that he would notice, but he didn’t. I recalled the procedure, and called “speed brake up” in the most respectful and professional tone I could. Nothing. I
repeated it. Nothing. Procedure at this point was to close it myself, so I reached across to do so. He slapped my hand away and admonished me, whilst closing it himself. Not a single word was said after that, other than standard calls. If we had had a go around or an emergency, the atmosphere would have been dangerous.
Most interventions are not urgent. In most cases skilful and experienced pilots will draw others’ attention to the critical issue or parameters in a way that specifically updates situational awareness without aggravating, shocking, or startling the other pilot, in order to help maintain the cockpit dynamic (obviously this may be inappropriate in very critical cases). Since the problem is often that one pilot has not noticed something, the specific need is to draw that pilot’s attention to the critical parameter to update their situational awareness. If done early enough, such an intervention need not be assertive or
challenging. It could take the form of a hint or question. Here are examples of both:
The aircraft was hot and high (had more energy than desirable): a stable approach is looking unlikely, and it may not make an ATC height restriction:
Hinting:
F/O: 'Looks like a bit of a tail wind'
Captain: 'Yes, let’s use a bit of speed brake”
Questioning:
F/O 'Looks like we are getting high – what's the plan?' Captain 'I'm going to take the gear early"
FO 'Thanks'
The questioning method communicates what the pilot is thinking (providing situational awareness) and encourages the other pilot to share his plan. This can have the effect of saving face for the receiver, who does not have to confront the possible discomfort of feeling ‘caught-out’.
When an intervention is really urgent or critical, the communication or action is far more important than the manner in which it is communicated. In such cases the momentary cockpit dynamic should be more resilient in any case (because of the shared threat).
If an urgent verbal intervention is required, an assertive comment should be de-personal, specific, and may contain brief information to update the others’ situational awareness. It will often contain an instruction or solution.
We’re not within the ATC height restriction, we need speed brake immediately
Of course, it would be hoped that an earlier intervention would have prevented the necessity for such an intervention. It is role-dependent and a matter of organisational choice (through procedures) whether such a communication should be accompanied by action (e.g. the monitoring pilot raising the speed brake).
Occasionally, even with direct and assertive comment of this kind, the verbal intervention may fail. This can be for a number of reasons, but the most likely ones are that the other pilot’s workload is high or situational awareness is poor, or a very poor crew relationship exists (for example where a captain has lost confidence in a first officer). These situations would be particularly difficult if the intervention was from the first officer to the captain. Some airlines have critical phrases (prefixes) to be used in such instances, such as “Captain you must listen…”. These can be very effective, but is important that they are only used in exceptional situations. Most interventions can be dealt with in the ways discussed, without resorting to these phrases (which do risk disturbing or undermining the crew dynamic).
Assertiveness and intervention training should help ensure that people speak out in the appropriate way at the appropriate time. It is as important for participants of such training to recognise that most situations require low-level intervention (drawing attention to something) so that it can be resolved, and this can and should be done early. Leaving interventions late, risks a more difficult and potentially disruptive verbal intervention. A trainer can use illustrations of incidents and accidents where team communication or functioning has been poor (or particularly good) to help reinforce their training.
The assertiveness of first officers has almost certainly increased since the widespread use of CRM training. This is probably due to role modelling as much as training. The formal role of the first officer is now strongly perceived to include speaking-up and sharing opinions, whereas this was not the case prior to CRM. Although probably a good thing, there is a danger that some pilots equate FOs speaking up and sharing decisions, to a flatter cockpit gradient. The difference between these two things should be emphasized in CRM training. First officers can speak up and share opinions, contribute to joint decisions and be responsible for part-tasks, but the commander must accept and be accepted as the leader and the final arbiter.
It is also important to note that there are two sides to assertiveness and intervention (in the same way that communication requires a sender and a receiver). As well as encouraging crewmembers to speak up when appropriate, pilots (particularly captains) should
understand that their behaviour when acting as the recipient of that assertion sends a strong message about the expected role (a good example is from the previous anecdote from an anonymous first officer). There have been many cases of inexperienced pilots
CAP 737 Section A, Part 2, Chapter 15: Communication (communication, language, sharing mental models, assertiveness and verbal intervention)
speaking up and being either admonished, ignored or patronised. These individuals are less likely to speak up in future. If the captain does not agree with the assertion, then he or she should still acknowledge it (if and where possible). In such a case it may be
inappropriate for the recipient to consider the best response in terms of relationships and climate in the moment, but in later debriefing they could show some appreciation of the communication (even if just to show that they value the other pilot making a sensible input). Such behaviour, particularly from a respected captain, can be very valuable in giving tacit information to junior pilots about how to appropriately carry out their role, and will pay dividends in the future.