The next chapter provides detail of Maori resistance reSUlting from such colonial administration. It is sufficient to note here that the Maori response developed enough strength by the turn of the century to encourage colonial governments to at least pay lip service to Maori demands as a means to build national cohesion. In addition, incorporation within the colonial parliamentary system allowed a small number of influential Maori politicians, including Native Ministers such as James Carroll ( 1899 - 1 907) and Apirana Ngata ( 19 28- 1934) , to emerge. These men tried to balance Maori and Pakeha interests in their role as mediators between Maori and government. This created a rather more conciliatory period as governments attempted
to incorporate Maori demands into policy that aimed to benefit the country as a whole,
a goal also pursued in other settler societies at this time (see Erasmus 1993: 1 25) .
Issues concerning Maori land ownership and use illustrate this period of conciliation. The governmental response to concerns about the Native Land Court was the Maori Lands Administration Act 1 9 00, through which Maori gained control over what remained of their communal lands. But the Land Councils established by the Act, which had majority Maori membership and largely halted the state's grab for land, were abandoned by 1905. Regional Maori Councils, instituted at the same time, provided for 'self-governing' bodies to control health, welfare and moral well-being through bylaws and village committees. But they were similarly constrained by the state's desire to use the councils as a means to speed up detribalisation and assimilation, rather than to allow Maori to exercise autonomy and control (O'Malley and Hill 2000: 13- 14) . Instances such as the 1907 Tohunga Suppression Act, which outlawed the guardians of Maori knowledge and their indigenous methodologies, and restrictions on speaking the Maori language in the Native Schools system demonstrate that assimilation was still the driving force behind government assistance for Maori (Durie 1998a:76; Belich 200 1 :204; Walker 200 1a: 147) .
Member of Parliament (MP) and Native Minister, James Carroll, re-established the Department of Native Affairs in 1906. He aimed to take existing Maori programmes out of the Justice Department and create one more efficient and sympathetic to Maori needs. The new department tried to meet both Maori desires for control over their land and communities and the government's desire for efficient administration and utilisation of Maori land. The emphasis on each of these goals differed depending on who was assigned to lead the department over the following years (Butterworth
1989: 13).
Nevertheless, by 1 909 the Native Land Act was able to offer Maori owners greater protection and encouraged them to consolidate their land, allowing Maori communities to get more productive use out of it (Butterworth 1989: 14- 1 5) . Large scale consolidation schemes came into operation from 1 9 19 under the wing of Apirana
Ngata, a long-serving Maori MP and Native Minister (Brooking 1988: 1 09) . Through the 1920s and 1 930s, specialised Maori agricultural and community services were also extended to Maori land areas. In practice many of the social-services offered to Maori during this period were universally applied to the general population and did not recognise differences between the needs of the Maori, as colonised peoples, and those of the dominant group. In addition, the state began to indicate it was no longer interested in returning the small amounts of land it had offered to Maori; rather it wanted to improve the productivity of Maori land for the 'national good' (M. Durie 2000:6-7) . Nevertheless, there was a growing political commitment to Maori service development and the Native Affairs department grew in size and structure as a result (Butterworth 1989 : 16; Armitage 1 995 : 1 96;200) .
Growth in such political awareness gained ground when Aotearoa New Zealand's flrst social-democratic Labour government won the 1935 election, partly due to the support of Maori through its alliance with the Ratana church. Government generosity resulted from the political assistance Ratana gave Labour and later the loyalty shown by the Maori Battalion during World War 11. For example, in 1 946 Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, took charge of the newly-renamed 'Maori Affairs' portfolio, allowed Maori to be represented on the Board of Maori Affairs for flrst time and appointed the department's flrst Maori Under-Secretary (Butterworth 1989 : 1 7- 18).
This was an important period of transition, generally, with the welfare-state developing significantly under Labour's rule and offering Maori largely the same benefits as non-Maori (see Voet 1998:87-89) . But the welfare-state was based on the assumption that citizens faced a common set of social needs which could be remedied through the same set of programs responding 'equally' to the population as a whole. It was thus not only a powerful instrument of social equality, but also of social integration and national cohesion (see Banting 1999: 109).
The need for a Maori-specific emphasis on social welfare became obvious in the period following World War 11 . Maori soliders returned and needed to be rehabilitated, while the effects of Maori dispossession and government-sponsored programmes
resulted in a huge wave of Maori moving from rural lands to cities (see Chapter Three) .
Dealing with these adjustment problems became part of the Department of Maori Affairs' (DMA) role with the establishment of a social welfare division in 1 944. This soon expanded from assisting Maori in war-related industries to include job placement, education and family relocation within urban settings (Butterworth 1 989: 17- 18; Fleras and Spoonley 1999 : 1 1 8) .
The 1 945 Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act also included important provisions for returning Maori service personnel, the establishment of a network of Maori committees to allow input into community developments and a Maori wardens system to maintain law and order in Maori settlements and marae (meeting places) (Havemann 1999a: 39) . These were significant gains, but Fraser and Southern Maori MP, Eruera Tirikatene, had hoped the Act would allow the DMA to be relatively self controlling and autonomous and for Maori participation at top levels of government. Such aspirations were not, however, supported in Parliament (Ward and Hayward 1999:392). Thus, despite the Department's bureaucratic expansion and a degree of community-department negotiation, the programmes it administered were largely mainstream initiatives with Maori names.