Key associates

At the next level down, based on Zabludoff’s estimates (cited in Clawson & Lee 1998:19), the Medellín Cartel had a small elite of c. 250 entrepreneurs or key associates who ‘supervise[d] every aspect of the cocaine business, including movement of cocaine from source countries to consumer markets, overseas distribution, and recycling of narcotics proceeds’. The key associates were the most trusted of the Medellín Cartel and formed close bonds with the leaders – most were childhood friends. According to Escobar’s brother, Roberto (Escobar R 2010:10): Many of the friends we made as children would end up in the business with us, among them Jorge Ochoa, who with his brothers built his own organisation…Vaca, the cow, my closest friend…our very close cousin Gustavo de Jesús Gaviria was the one who eventually started Pablo in the business and became his closest associate. Fragment 17: Medellín Cartel associate & Escobar’s brother

As well as their individual skill sets, most were hired based on trust, through a system where several people vouched for you and if you did not follow through, then you would not only pay with your own life, but with the lives of those who vouched for you (Eddy et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 2002). This system was particularly effective for those overseas, with no ready- made family ties in place. Some of the key associates that played a part in the

evolution of the cartel included Fernando Galeano (‘Galeano’) and Kiko Moncado (‘Moncado’), both Medellín based traffickers, and John Jairo Velásquez (also known as ‘Popeye’) who arranged security and was one of Escobar’s leading assassins (Eddy et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 2002). Others included family members, notably Gustavo, Escobar’s cousin as mentioned earlier and Roberto, Escobar’s brother, who was one of his accountants and also skilled in electronics. Of the key associates located overseas, Carlos Enrique Lehder Rivas (‘Lehder’) and Jung were instrumental to the cartel’s success. Lehder pioneered smuggling routes by private aircraft and even bought his own Bahamian island, Norman’s Cay, with a private landing strip for refuelling, only c. 300 kilometres from Miami (Eddy et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 2002). According to those who knew Lehder, he was described as highly intelligent, yet obsessive. In an interview, Juan Ochoa describes him as ‘a very adventurous, curious man. He was an adventurer’ (Frontline 2000e). As for Jung, as well-documented in his biography turned into the 2001 movie Blow, he became a key distributor of cocaine in the US. While some of the key associates came from different socio-economic backgrounds, ultimately, they all wanted to be rich, whether through desire or adventure, and they all brought something different, but important to the cartel. As such their interconnectivity strength is assessed as strong.

4. Professionals

One of the most important actor types in any criminal organisation, including its fitness landscape, are the professionals. They are often the key link between the licit and illicit worlds and many turn into informants or become key witnesses in criminal trials – often the accountants and lawyers. Based on Zabludoff’s estimates (cited in Clawson & Lee 1998:20), the Medellín Cartel had a group of c. 500 professionals, mostly freelancers. Given the extent of the Medellín Cartel’s operations, it is reasonable to assume that c. 75% (375) of these freelancers were active full-time workers and the remaining 25% (125) dormant, as and when needs arise. Included in this well-documented population were pilots (mainly Americans), chemists (including specialists from Germany), financial advisors, accountants, lawyers, brokers and realtors, both in Colombia and overseas (Eddy et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 2002). As with most professionals, these actors were not your typical low-life criminals or thugs, they

were experts in their field, from higher socio-economic backgrounds with higher levels of educational and professional training. They also often came across as personable, charming and articulate, which made it difficult to determine which side they were on. One such expert, and later turned DEA informant, was Adler Berriman “Barry” Seal (‘Seal’), an American pilot. Seal had been passionate about flying since childhood and at the age of 26 became the youngest 747 pilot in the US. However, following a run-in with some federal agents, his career took a decisive change – smuggling for the Medellín Cartel. As a testament to his expertise (Eddy et al 1988:304-5): He raised to an art form the so-called “sea spray height” flying technique, keeping his aircraft so close to the water that spray from the waves misted the windshield. He also pioneered a new aerial smuggling route that avoided both the Bahamas and Florida by exploiting what he called the “lax radar coverage” over the Gulf of Mexico…since most of the flights were at night, Seal equipped himself and his pilots with powerful night-vision goggles, at $5,000 a pair, that magnified available light 50,000 times. He and his men air- dropped duffle bags full of cocaine at predetermined locations in Louisiana, where waiting helicopters took them on to their final destination. Fragment 18: Investigative journalists

Other less known professionals were military advisers and instructors, especially those linked to other criminal groups, mostly overseas. Given the nature of some of the tactics employed by the Medellín Cartel, especially as the group evolved, a key military adviser was known to be Yair Klein (‘Klein’). According to a declassified intelligence report (US Department of Defense 1991:10):

Yair (Klein) – retired Israeli Army Colonel, Mercenary and expert in Military tactics. Klein sent advisors to the Medellín Cartel to train the cartel paramilitary forces and selected assassin team leaders on how to unleash waves of terrorism in Colombia…Klein also facilitated the transport of weapons and ammunition…which eventually surfaced in the possession of the Colombian cartels and Colombian guerrilla forces.

Fragment 19: US declassified government document

Given i) the freelance nature of these professionals; ii) the alternative means of illicit income from other hiring groups or even licit income from their own professions; and iii) their strong bargaining power if captured of turning informant or key witness for state authorities, their overall interconnectivity strength is assessed as moderate for manifest actors (given their often full or part- time relationship) and weak to moderate for latent actors (given the periodicity as and when needs arise).

5. Assassins (sicarios)

In Colombia, trained assassins or sicarios are best described in a US declassified government document (US Department of State 1993a):

These young, lower-class killers can be hired by anyone from a jealous husband to Pablo Escobar to kill anyone from his wife’s lover to a presidential candidate. True “hitmen”, they are cold blooded murderers who will take on any contract if the price is right…The line between arch-enemy narco sicarios and guerrilla militiamen is a fine one. The two grow up and live in the same poor Barrios, and the acquisition of money is a driving force; both narco-traffickers and guerrilla groups pay a salary. Indeed, Colombian guerrilla groups earn a substantial portion of their livelihood from drugs. A Bogota newspaper columnist recently labelled all of Colombia’s violent as “sicarios”, no matter for whom they work. “Their profession is to kill. Their compensation is the money”.

Fragment 20: US declassified government document

Essentially, in Medellín, assassination became such a lucrative business that ‘an entire cottage industry’ sprung up and became a ‘sought-after skill’ (MacQuarrie 2015:4). While Zabludoff’s estimate of c. 500 Medellín Cartel professionals includes ‘assassins’, based on other sources, ‘some 3,000 hired killers reportedly worked on the cartel’s payroll’ as sicarios (Clawson & Lee 1998:53). In Medellín’s city with an estimated population of c. 2 million in the 1980s, 3,000 appears to be a more realistic estimate than Zabludoff’s few hundred (Mongabay 2016). Moreover, in a US declassified intelligence report, individual sicario gangs comprised c. 100 criminals each and there were numerous gangs in Medellín (US Department of Defense 1991). Based on this analysis, applying the same split between active and dormant actors as the professional freelancers, it is estimated that c. 75% (2,250) of sicarios were active with the remaining 25% (750) dormant. As for their interconnectivity strength, as pointed out by Strong (1995:155):

The adolescent contract killers preferred to live one minute as a somebody than thirty years as a nobody; and when they died, to be wearing Nike running shoes [as their hero Pablo] astride a shiny Japanese motorbike, while their mothers cooed over a new refrigerator. Killing became a way of life, however short that life might be.

Fragment 21: Investigative journalist

Furthermore, most of them came from marginal sectors, with little to no education to enable viable alternatives and match the same pay as a sicario, and often started as minors. They also joined to feel a sense of belonging and part of a community, and idolised Escobar, as their families had already benefitted from his generous provision of housing and facilities in and around Medellín that the state could not afford (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002; Escobar R 2010; Escobar JP 2016). Due to the

lack of alternatives, their sense of belonging and devotion to Escobar, it is reasonable to assign a moderate to strong interconnectivity rating for manifest actors and a moderate rating for latent actors due to the periodicity of their relationship.