Key Aspects 1987-1996 1996-2007 2007-2010 Australian Public Service (APS) Cohesive Public service; central rules, standards – e.g., pay, classifications, terms of employment Public service downsized and balkanised; individual employment
contracts; heavy use of business consultants; departmental secretaries often on three-year contracts
Efforts to renovate public service, e.g., regarding policy skills; moves to re centralise some functions, e.g, procurement, pay grades Philosophy underlying Public Sector Management Substantial devolution to departments; central requirements, e.g., evaluation, to ‘make the managers manage’
Very high level of devolution ―‘let the managers manage’; reduction in red tape; much greater reliance on private sector
Some recentralisation, with heavy emphasis on encouragement; ‘let the managers manage’; further reduction in red Tape
Policy cycle Formalised, disciplined; heavy reliance on analysis by public service; Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) at centre of budget process
Much less disciplined; greater reliance on non- APS policy advice; many policy/expenditure decisions taken in Prime Minister’s Office; ERC relatively weak
Decision-making initially in hands of four key ministers; now greater reliance on budget/ERC processes; APS policy skills to be strengthened Role of the
Department of Finance (DoF)
Powerful, respected, high level of policy skills; heavily involved in scrutinising new policy proposals ― the ‘challenge’ function; responsible for budget estimates; heavily involved in evaluation
Severely downsized; small role in budget estimates and low financial management skills (until after2002); low policy skills; little or no evaluation involvement; passive oversight of Outcomes and Outputs Framework; strategic reviews managed by DoF (from 2006) Increase in staff numbers; refurbished financial management skills; role in reducing regulation and red tape; strategic reviews, and prospect of a rejuvenated evaluation approach
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Key Aspects 1987-1996 1996-2007 2007-2010
Evaluation Formal strategy and requirements (from 1987);enforcement by DoF;heavy utilisation in policy advice and by ERC;evaluation use by line departments
Evaluation deregulated; only a few remaining evaluation islands among departments/ agencies; small number of strategic reviews (from2006); no systematic use of evaluation in budget process Flurry of reviews after2007; continuation of strategic reviews; no systematic use of evaluation in budget process, and major investment decisions taken without benefit of evaluation; agency reviews to be conducted in future; possible rejuvenation of evaluation in near future Performance information (PI), programme objectives, accountability Programme budgeting (1986on); evaluations usually published; only late attention to performance indicators via reviews of PI, programme objectives(from 1994); federal/state reporting of service delivery performance(from 1995); formal reporting requirements(annual reports, PBSs) Programme budgeting abolished (from1999); new Outcomes and Outputs Framework for formal reporting, based on performance indicators (1999); principles-based, no quality control by DoF; accrual accounting (1999); evaluations rarely published; federal/state reporting of service delivery performance Outcomes and Programs Framework, based on performance indicators,and now including programme budgeting; evaluations rarely published; federal/state reporting of service delivery performance; citizen surveys planned
* Table 1 page 12, Mackay, Keith. ‘The Australian Government’s Performance Framework’. Evaluation Capacity Development Working Paper No25, World Bank, Washington, DC
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l ‘Outcomes’ were usually defined in a single sentence, in very broad,
aspirational terms, rather than trying to state in specific terms the desired impact of the government’s activity. There was a lack of performance information to tell if outcomes had been achieved or not (ANAO 2001a, 2007; SSCFPA 2007; Podger 2009).
l There were 200 outcomes in total, and so they had a high level of
aggregation. Departments and agencies did not have any shared outcomes; they each preferred to have their own outcomes, for which they alone were accountable (ANAO 2007; AGRAGA 2010).
l There were poor logical links between many outputs and outcomes
(Podger 2009).
l Targets or benchmarks were typically not specified for outputs (ANAO
2003, 2007).
l Departments and agencies tended not to report unmet targets, and often
did not discuss areas where performance was poor (ANAO 2003; JCPA 2004).
l There was insufficient performance information concerning efficiency and
effectiveness, and too much focus on activities undertaken (ANAO 2007).
l The majority of agencies with purchaser-provider arrangements did
not include performance information on them in their portfolio budget statements (ANAO 2007).
l The specification of outputs and outcomes differed between departments
and agencies, making comparisons very difficult (Blondal et al. 2008).
l Definitions continued to change over time, even a decade after the
framework was introduced (Blondal et al. 2008; Webb 2010).
l Portfolio budget statements reported the forward estimates of spending,
but presented no information concerning forward estimates of outputs or outcomes (ANAO 2007).
l There was no ‘clear read', i.e., there was a lack of corresponding and
comparable performance information between the performance promised in portfolio budget statements and the performance actually delivered and reported in annual reports (Murray 2008).
l The Senate found the outcomes structure confusing. It strongly preferred
programme-based performance reporting and budgeting (SSCFPA 2007, quoted by Mulgan 2008).
Outcomes and Outputs Framework – Significant Problems**
** Box 7 page 9, Mackay, Keith. ‘The Australian Government’s Performance Framework’. Evaluation Capacity Development Working Paper No25, World Bank, Washington, DC
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The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) has reached a historic Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations which establishes the overarching framework for the Commonwealth’s financial relations with the States and Territories. The framework represents the most significant reform to Australia’s federal financial relations in decades. It provides a strong foundation for COAG to pursue economic and social reforms to underpin growth, prosperity and wellbeing into the future. It also provides clearer specification of the roles and responsibilities of each level of government so that the appropriate government is accountable to the community.
The key features of the framework are:
a) Funding - The Commonwealth currently provides financial support for the States’ service delivery efforts through:
l National Specific Purpose Payments (National SPPs) and National Health
Reform funding to be spent in key service delivery sectors;
l three types of National Partnership payments - project payments,
facilitation payments and reward payments; and
l general revenue assistance, consisting of GST payments to be used by
the States for any purpose, and other general revenue assistance. The framework rationalised a number of payments made to the States, centralised payment arrangements and provides greater funding certainty and flexibility to the States. Earlier the Federal –State Agreements were based on Funding and Focused on Inputs & Outputs. But since 2008, Federal- State Agreements are now based on National Agreements where the Policy Reforms are based on National Partnerships. The focus of COAG is on National Performance Delivering Outcomes/Services in the selected Areas of National Importance such as Healthcare, Education, Skill & Workforce Development, Disability, Affordable Housing, and Indigenous Reform.
b) Greater flexibility - The federal financial relations framework gives the States greater flexibility to direct resources to areas where they will produce the best results in each State. In the Intergovernmental Agreement, the Commonwealth has committed to move away from prescriptions on service delivery in the form of financial or other input controls, which inhibit state service delivery and priority setting. Rather than dictating how things should