The 2009 ice storm was the only major weather event in the United States at that time. Not only were all local personnel avail- able to help with the restoration efforts, Ken- tucky was the recipient of a great deal of mu- tual assistance from contract and utility crews throughout the region. Duke Kentucky states that the mutual assistance processes in which it participates “facilitated obtaining ad- ditional resources which decreased time needed to restore power to our customers.” Utility companies within the state also pro- vided aid to one other. Grayson RECC (headquartered in Carter County) said that after the ice storm hit, it determined that its own work crews could restore all of its system outages. Grayson RECC is a participant in
KAEC's mutual aid assistance program. So, believing that its contractors “were needed much worse” in western Kentucky, and, under the direction of its statewide safety coordinator, Grayson RECC made the decision to send its contractor crews to help Kenergy restore power to its customers. The 2009 ice storm restoration effort was a massive undertaking by any standard. The utilities employed hundreds of workers to get
the towers, poles, and wires back up and the power restored. The table on the following page shows the personnel used during the ice storm restoration per company, and the dates that each company reached a peak number of personnel used during the restora- tion period. These numbers represent the to- tal restoration workforce: company personnel, local contract personnel, and mutual assis- tance personnel from outside the state. Figure 12: During both the 2008 wind storm and 2009 ice storm, Kentucky received assistance from utilities in at least two dozen states. This map shows origin of assistance to the state’s two largest electric utilities.
Several utilities indicated that they had, for a variety of reasons, turned down offers of out- side assistance that were proffered outside of the usual mutual-aid channels. In some in- stances, the utility already had enough help. EKPC stated that it had enough outside crews already under contract and working to restore its system and thus declined any un- solicited offers of assistance. Owen Electric noted that, “[s]everal crews became available towards the end of our restoration process,” but that they “were many hours away and were not needed.”
Several other utilities stated that they turned down offers of assistance because they were not familiar with the contractor crews and their safety records or their quality of work. Farmers RECC said that it did ultimately turn down some offers for outside help, mainly because it did not have enough of its own employees to send with contractor crews to ensure proper restoration work is done: “Assisting crews must be accompanied by a Farmers’ representative with operational ex- perience to insure proper location of assigned work and proper completion.”
Inter-County Energy said that “[a]t the begin- ning of the event, crews from the state of Texas were turned down because of pro- jected cost and there was no knowledge of their work ethic.” Inter-County Energy further explained that the Texas crews estimated their costs at over 50% higher than compara- ble quotes, and that KAEC had already found a sufficient number of contractors to assist Inter-County Energy before the Texas crew called.
Salt River Electric said it was contacted by several independent contractors wanting to assist in the restoration effort, but it turned those offers down. Salt River Electric said that it “did not have a prior relationship with any of the companies, and therefore did not feel comfortable employing them.” Like Farmers RECC, Salt River Electric said that it had also “reached the point of saturation for being able to manage additional crews.”
Shelby Energy reported that it also turned down several offers from outside sources, because “we were not familiar with these companies and did not know if they would be trustworthy to work safely.”
Even Jackson Purchase Energy, which suf- fered some of the worst damage, also turned down some offers of outside assistance dur- ing the ice storm:
Offers of assistance made by contractors unfamiliar to (Jackson Purchase Energy) were declined following our initial re- quests for outside assistance. We did ac- cept a contractor’s assistance at the be- ginning of this event. Once the contractor was on site working, we discovered they were not familiar with our construction specifications and could not work effi- ciently. We replaced these crews with mu- tual-aid crews from other cooperatives as soon as possible. Following this incident, we were particular concerning the assis- tance we would accept to work on our system.
Meade County RECC was simply too over- whelmed by the task of assessing the dam- age from the ice storm to accept help from a Georgia crew that came “unannounced”:
On either the 29th or 30th of January [2009], a Cobb Electric crew from Georgia arrived basically unannounced with al- most 30 crew members and more than 20 vehicles. (Meade County) RECC did not have any electrical power to 90–95% of its territory, including to hotels, fuel sta- tions, or food suppliers. The Cooperative was still assessing the damage, working with the power supplier to restore power to the substations, and repairing some critical infrastructure and dangerous lines at that time. The crew traveled onward to Owensboro to assist Kenergy, where they did have lodging available in that city. (Meade County) RECC had also re- quested service crews at that time; how- ever, this crew was a construction crew with large bucket and digger trucks.
The Commission notes that turning away offers of assistance may create a public perception that a utility is not doing all it can to restore power. However, in the in- stances cited above, the Commission finds that utilities acted reasonably in de- clining assistance.