THE BACKGROUND MANOEUVRES

Misinformation and gossip regarding an imminent invasion of East Timor become a constant, and leads an Australian broadcaster to announce on February, 24, 1975 that "Indonesia is preparing an attack of amphibious and anti-aerial troops to Dili [the capital of East Timor] and to Baucau [the second most important city] within a few weeks. As if to confirm such intent, the Indonesian Consul in Dili, Dr. Tomodok sends his family back to Indonesia.

Simultaneously, an Indonesian paper, “The New Standard”, controlled by President’s Suharto adviser on Security Matters, General Ali Murtopo, is publishing articles where it is stated that:

“East Timor cannot become independent because of a lack of natural resources and because an independent East Timor will be pried open to communist influences thus affecting the regional stability”.

In early March 1975, the Indonesian Command for Security Matters advises that West Timor is off bounds for all Indonesian and international journalists.⁵⁹ The author is actually forced to

59 The author, after an amnesty granted to all military personnel, by President Spínola, is finally authorised in December 1974, to leave East Timor on army’s long service leave in mid December, travelling to Bali and Java (Jakarta, Surabaya) before visiting Australia (Melbourne and Sydney), where he has contacts with the Portuguese diplomacy in those capitals, and tries to ascertain the full extent of the revolution of the carnations, and the popular opinion for the future of East Timor. Upon his return to Indonesia, on his way back to Timor, he is impeded to embark a Merpati Airline flight to Kupang - West Timor, because the territory is ‘off-limits’. Trying to insist and reiterating his position as a

[Portuguese] Army Officer, the situation is further aggravated and being suspected of being a spy, he is interrogated by the local Indonesian military authorities. Then, he decides to go back to Bali and when he finally tries again at the end of March, is finally allowed to proceed his flight to Dili, East Timor.

His untimely arrival signs the possibility of a court martial case, for desertion, as it is claimed in some conservative local quarters. However, due to the rarefied situation of army officers, the Head of the Supply Battalion has been trying to go back to Portugal, but has no immediate subordinate to succeed him. The author, is pardoned, his explanation of

overstay his long service holiday. This coincides with hard needed improvements on roads to the border with East Timor and with the preparation of the [future] invasion of the Portuguese colony.

March 1975 is a very eventful month for the future of the Timorese, but very few people know about it. In London, there is a secret meeting between Ali Murtopo and Portuguese

representatives, to discuss the future of Portuguese Timor. Unbeknown to most people, this secret meeting between Portuguese and Indonesian representatives takes place under a cloud of secrecy and treason.

Between the 3rd and 5th April, before Suharto visits East Timor, he has lengthy conversations with the Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam in the Queensland backwater city of Townsville. A whole set of unpublished events is taking place, without the interested parties having any knowledge that their future is being decided in typical colonial and paternalistic terms, by their colonial and imperial masters.

According to some secret reports from the Australian Foreign Office the situation changed drastically between January and April.

In a brief to an ANZUS ministerial meeting, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs presents the following statements, sometime in April 1975:

“Much of the urgency has been removed on this issue [Portuguese Timor]. The red lights that were flashing in late February, and which led the Prime Minister to send a personal message to President Suharto, now show a steady amber. The Indonesian(s) have assured us at all levels that they are not contemplating military intervention. There is a less strident tone to Indonesian propaganda. Latest intelligence reports reveal no preparation for “early military action.”

“The Portuguese, meanwhile, have reaffirmed their willingness to follow a very gradual timetable for decolonisation in Timor. This also seems to be acceptable to the political groupings on the ground, as well as to the Indonesian(s). Secret high-level talks between the Indonesian and the Portuguese took place in London early in March. These appear to have left the Indonesian(s) fairly well satisfied with Portuguese assurances that there will be no

immediate proclamation of independence (on the model of Mozambique) but that there will, in fact, be a long drawn out process of decolonisation (five to eight years) ending with a

Constituent Assembly decision on the future political status of the territory.

impossibility of flying back is accepted, and its ‘AWOL’ status revoked, he is also given a commendation for high merit and relevant services, and he is elevated to acting Head of the Supply Battalion.

“President Suharto reiterated to the Prime Minister in Townsville [3-5 April] that Indonesia had

“no expansionist ambitions and favoured a process of self determination for the Portuguese Timorese.” These assurances were welcome but in a very uncertain situation, the

Indonesian(s) will clearly remain very much on their guard against any signs that the outcome in Portuguese Timor may not be to their liking. It is clear that the Indonesian(s) remain unshaken in their resolve that, ultimately, Portuguese Timor should become part of Indonesia.

“The Indonesian(s) see the goal of incorporation being achieved through an Indonesian influenced act of self-determination and they believe (probably inaccurately) that they have won Portugal’s agreement to facilitate Indonesia’s covert efforts to this end. However, indications are that, in present circumstances, an act of self-determination would favour the pro-independence parties, no matter how much covert Indonesian involvement there was.

“At the same time, it is appropriate as well to recognise that FRETILIN is clearly not in the same class, in terms of representativeness and demonstrated ability to take over, as say, FRELIMO in Mozambique. Its alliance with the pro-Portuguese UDT is also a shaky one. The Indonesian(s) themselves consider, that given time, and the opportunity they believe Portugal has agreed to afford them, it will be possible by working hard, covertly as well as overtly, to build up APODETI into a strong force.

“These are the seeds of a more immediate problem in the apparent opposition of the

Indonesian(s) to Portuguese plans to move fairly quickly to establish a transitional government in Portuguese Timor which would gradually take over internal self-government responsibilities for the territory. While UDT - FRETILIN appear to accept a fairly protracted transitional period before independence, the coalition also clearly envisages a progressive transfer of real power to a functioning government firmly reflecting the political forces in Timor. Where does all this leave us?

"As long as Portuguese Timor remains quiet, no firm evidence of communist subversion emerges, and groups there do not allow themselves to be used by dissident groups from Indonesia itself, the Indonesian Government is likely not to take precipitate action in the territory but concentrate on developing its influence there.

“President Suharto is cautious and pragmatic. He prides himself on Indonesia’s responsible foreign policy and will search for a solution to the Timor problem consistent with it. Provided there are no untoward developments in the territory, the Indonesian might even come to accept the idea of an independent Timor and modify their policy objective accordingly. But there are certainly no signs that they have done so yet. In the final analysis, Indonesia’s decision will be based on how it sees its national interest and on the extent to which perceives

Portuguese Timor as a threat to its security. Australia is not directly involved. We believe that it is the responsibility of Portugal to bring the territory through what should be a long process of decolonisation, given the low level of political and social development.”

“The end product should be consistent with the wishes of the Portuguese Timorese people.

The best result from our point of view, would still be some form of association with Indonesia, but this is still unlikely to command popular support in Timor or to be easy for the

Indonesian(s) to contrive. The long-term prospects are for a rather sticky situation. The degree of Australian involvement will, it is hoped, be kept to a minimum.”

The Australian Foreign Affairs experts on Timor while accepting the Indonesian reassurances are trying to keep away from a potential conflict. In the meantime, the coalition is definitely on the brink of collapse. Lopes da Cruz, Secretary General of UDT on a visit to Indonesia during April, accuses FRETILIN of being communist, hinting of a new coalition with APODETI. Later, FRETILIN demands a retraction but UDT declines doing so. Immediately after his return from Indonesia, Lopes da Cruz refuses to join a coalition delegation to the African colonies. Such delegation comes out of a FRETILIN proposal to go to Africa in search of support from the African freedom fighters, which are preparing themselves to achieve independence from Portugal.

Lemos Pires (in a well meant or naïve gesture?) proposes to convene a meeting to debate the Summit between all parties to be held soon after in Macao. FRETILIN opposes this meeting, and calls it a pre-emptive action on the part of the Government, trying to create some

divisiveness in anticipation of the support the coalition could obtain from the African Liberation Movements.

A Portuguese lawyer, Dr. João Loff Barreto, gives an address at the World Court ⁶⁰, in mid-1981 where he provides a detailed report of that aforementioned secret meeting in London:

“Almeida Santos said that Portugal was well aware of the advantages of both the incorporation [of Timor] in Indonesia and the maintenance of links with Portugal, but that in his opinion, Portugal would never impose a decision contrary to the will of the population. He suggested that Indonesia should use the transitional period to

encourage the Timorese people to accept the idea of incorporation, fighting the hostility [of the Timorese] against Indonesia. For that to be achieved, they [Indonesia] should convince APODETI to co-operate in the decolonisation process, and offer economical aid to Timor.”

60 Permanent Court of International Justice, established under the auspices of a covenant of the League of Nations in 1921, whose functions in general were taken over by the International Court of Justice in The Hague, now part of the United Nations.

According to Loff Barreto, the Portuguese delegation asks an Indonesian representative to attend the Macao summit, to take place in June 1975. Important is the fact that, most probably wilfully, Indonesia leaks the results of the London meeting to FRETILIN, as part of a vast plan of boycotting the decolonisation process. This opinion expressed by Loff Barreto will force FRETILIN to withdraw from the Macao Summit.

As previously mentioned other sources confirm such points. For Michael Richardson, the secret deals result in a verbal agreement between the two delegations. In an article in the Melbourne

‘The Age’, Richardson publishes:

“Portugal accepted as the easiest way for the decolonisation of Timor, the incorporation of Timor through an internationally accepted act of self-determination, avoiding at all costs the internationalisation of Timor’s situation in the United Nations.”

Hamish Macdonald, in the book “Suharto’s Indonesia”, published by Fontana in 1980, mentions that, in a secret report emanating from OPSUS [The Indonesian Special Operations Unit of BAKIM, headed by Ali Murtopo], it is alleged that “Portugal hopes that Indonesia accepts the idea of incorporation through a self-determination act, and that Indonesia coerces APODETI to take part in the process. For that purpose, Indonesia’s image has to be improved, since a great part of the neighbouring population of Timor considers it to be a hostile enemy.”

Regarding this point, the Indonesians will later invoke assurances from Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves to general Ali Murtopo, that “it was irrelevant for Portugal if Timor continued [or not]

under Portuguese sovereignty.” This point leads up to the conclusion that the subtle manoeuvres lead by the Portuguese backfire. From the very moment when they engage themselves in secret dealings with the Indonesians, the Portuguese are trapped. They cannot avoid the international public opinion (or the Portuguese one for that effect) of the Indonesian intentions. They had been terribly compromised by the Indonesians.

The only possible alternative in those early days is discussed by Major Vítor Alves, Dr. Mário Soares and Dr. Jorge Campinos (the leading negotiators) but unanimously rejected. Such alternative is to abandon all bilateral talks [with Indonesia] and appeal to the United Nations to avoid the invasion. Some people in the Portuguese leadership defend such an option: Major Melo Antunes, Lt. Col. Lemos Pires (the last Governor of Portuguese Timor), and the local representatives of the Decolonisation Commission, Majors Jónatas and Mota, but their efforts are defeated by Almeida Santos and Vítor Alves.

There is an insidious coincidence between what happens later [the Indonesian annexation in July 1976] and the situation, back in 1941 with the Japanese invasion. Although the latter

happened during World War II, the former takes place in a period of vast political agitation and deterioration of power in Lisbon. The common point is that in both instances the Central Government of Portugal is totally unable (if not, altogether unwilling) to muster enough resources to maintain its authority in the same colony.

Until April 1975 there is not much else to report on the continuing struggle of the Timorese, apart from the bellicose radio campaigns waged by Indonesia. These are conducted through Radio Kupang and the newspaper of the Armed Forces “Berita Yudha,” in which FRETILIN, UDT and the Portuguese Armed Forces and its Commander Lt. Col. Lemos Pires, are accused of being “communist agents.” The threat of invasion gains new ground.

With the unexpected coalition [of UDT and FRETILIN], APODETI becomes the common enemy.

UDT is solidly behind the idea of total independence, as initially demanded by FRETILIN, and any talk of integration in Indonesia is considered as treason. The local geopolitical interests represented by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Australia are less than homogenous, and are being seriously threatened by internal fighting in Borneo and in the Philippines.

This new menace coming from Timor cannot be accepted under any circumstance, or else it might spread as an infectious disease. It is not hard to imagine how such a political group will oppose the Timorese coalition. The ideological backbone of FRETILIN makes it almost

impossible to fell prey to any attempts of sabotage, leaving UDT as a possibility in terms of recuperation to the dissimulated neo-colonial imperialism. Socially the background of FRETILIN and UDT leaders is basically the same, middle class, public service, colonized elites, Régulos, other traditional leaders, and land owners. Logically such coalition is destined to fail, the rank and file of UDT oppose most of FRETILIN aims, because they will be deprived of their influence.

On the other side of the political fence, APODETI presses the Government for a public referendum during March 1975, under the threat of an Indonesian invasion.

The political climate in Jakarta is definitely anti Portuguese, as I have the ‘privilege’ of noticing in March 1975. All contradictions about a referendum, the lack of commitment from Lisbon to proceed with it and the excessive democratic balance of the local government trying

desperately not to favour any party, cause the downfall of the coalition. UDT decides to ask for more guarantees from the Portuguese Government while FRETILIN presses hard on the independence issue. It is under this very peculiar context that we have to understand the progressive approach between UDT and APODETI, noticeable after April. Such a political realignment tries to fill the void created by the lack of massive appeal of UDT ideological line.

This group tried to re-orientate itself towards a classical concept of guaranteed independence, under a neo-colonial guise, as the only means of maintaining the support of its sympathisers,

most of who lack political allegiance, whatsoever.

The population has gradually adjusted itself to the notion of independence rejecting any thoughts of integration. This has the strong advantage of giving the Portuguese government a feasible escape from the problem and a very logical one in such a complex decolonisation process. These behind the scene secret deals assume a new dimension when an Indonesian delegation headed by the President Suharto visits Timor. During such an unusual visit in April 1975, it is stated: “The government of the Republic of Indonesia will accept the independence of Timor if such is the universally expressed will of the people of Timor.”

The three main parties are invited to pay back the visit, thus making them more divided than ever. Back in Australia, the avid press has been publishing reports since February of intelligence

“leaks” on the planned Indonesian invasion of East Timor.

Major Vítor Alves, a leading figure in the Armed Forces Movement and one of the major ideologist of the Portuguese Revolution is appointed as special envoy of the Lisbon

Government. He is to go to Indonesia, Timor and to represent the Portuguese at the Macao Summit. The visit to Indonesia occurs in May amid some unmistakable signs.

The author is temporarily living in Jakarta at the time. The Portuguese Ambassador has long left the country for consultations in Lisbon, never to return. The Portuguese delegation is being managed by a young career diplomat, Chargé d’affaires Souza-Girão⁶¹, a young foreign corps officer not weathered in the meanders of international diplomacy.

The visit of Major Vítor Alves is decided on the spot and less than 24 hours later he is flying to Jakarta, arriving almost at the same time as the telegram sent to the Portuguese Embassy advising of the impending arrival.

A similar problem is witnessed by the author in January in Australia, after some contacts with the Portuguese Consul General in Sydney, (the late) Dr. Deolindo Encarnação and the Honorary Consul in Melbourne, (the late) Mr. John Dowd, who complained immediately after Ramos Horta visits Australia that they have no directives from Lisbon on any measures to be taken.

This shows the lack of organisation of the Portuguese decolonising powers.

In Lisbon, the Government publicises the Summit where FRETILIN, UDT, and APODETI will take up their claims for the future of Portuguese Timor. A document prepared in Lisbon during May

61 Later, being a diplomat in West Germany, in the mid 80’s, he is charged with corruption and sentenced to eight years imprisonment for issuing illegal and fraudulent passports to non-Portuguese citizens.

1975 is presented to the three major political parties of East Timor regarding the

self-determination of the territory. Formal negotiations follow in June, between representatives of the Central Government in Lisbon and East Timor political parties.

Thus comes into effect the Law Decree 7/75 of 11 July 1975 stating that:

‘1. A General Parliamentary Assembly of East Timor will be elected in October 1976, to define its future political statute and

2. Allowing for a three year transitional period, between the end of Portuguese sovereignty in October 1978 and then,

3. The power transfer to the new Independent State or to Indonesia.

May, 27, [1975] UDT unilaterally cuts its link with the coalition established in January 20 with

May, 27, [1975] UDT unilaterally cuts its link with the coalition established in January 20 with