In this Section I aim to define the use of contraception implants as a form of background relations.
In order to continue with analysis I will focus on intrauterine devices (IUDs) for birth control, which are a category of contraceptive implants, and just like the contraception pills are focused on the female body. The IUDs15 is a small, thin plastic rod that is inserted under the skin to prevent pregnancy. The rod slowly releases etonogestrel into the body over a three year period. Etonogestrel is similar to a natural hormone made in the human body. It works mainly by preventing the release of an egg (ovulation) during the menstrual cycle. It also makes vaginal fluid thicker to prevent sperm from reaching an egg (fertilization) and changes the lining of the uterus (womb) to prevent the attachment of a fertilized egg (WebMD, 2016b). Once again, there are certain side effects and certain precautions that the user of this technology much have in mind. I will not present these side effects and precautions here; I will limit myself by saying that more or less those can be compared with the side effects and precautions that the use of contraception pills entail.
The distinctive characteristic of the contraception implant is the fact that this technology when it is used, namely when it is inserted under the skin of the user, it lasts more or less for three years. Due to this reason, in order to understand this technology I will use the fourth kind of human-technology relations, as it was defined by Ihde, namely the background relations.
The two forms of relations that were examined in the above paragraphs, namely embodiment relations and cyborg relations are defined by Ihde and Verbeek as “focal ones”. According to Ihde’s analysis:
“That is, each of the forms of action that occur through these relations have been marked by an implicated self-awareness. The engagements through, with, and to technologies stand within the very core of praxis” (Ihde, 1990, p. 108[emphasis added]).
15
The IUDs for birth control can be divided to hormonal IUDs and copper IUDs. In both cases a small, T- shaped plastic device is inserted into its user’s uterus by her doctor. In the case of copper IUD, this plastic device is wrapped in copper; while in the case of the hormonal IUD, this plastic device contains hormones (WebMD, 2016b). As it is obvious this contraception technology is once again focused on the female body. As far as it has to do with side effects and bodily changes for the user, duration of use, efficacy and safety of these technologies there are not any major differences between these two contraception implants. Due to these reasons I consider that the different forms of IUDs can be analyzed and understood under the categorization of contraception implants; and that the following analysis can also apply to any form of contraception implants.
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In the aforementioned quotation, Ihde is mentioning the three forms of human-technology relations that he proposes, viz. embodiment, hermeneutic and alterity relations, when he mentions “engagements through, with, and to technologies” respectively. Until now, I only used the embodiment relations, in which the experience of the world around us is taking place “through” a technology.
Another point that demands clarification is whether or not the cyborg relations are “focal ones”, just like the embodiment relations. The emergence into a new entity, which is a distinctive characteristic of cyborg relations, may be understood against my choice to define cyborg relations as focal ones. However, I chose to define the cyborg relations, exemplified in this case in the use of contraception pills, as focal ones because their use demands the self-awareness of their users; the same can be said about the use of antidepressants16 that Verbeek uses in his article (Verbeek, 2008). In both cases, the users have to be self-aware that they have to take those pills, in a certain time and also under certain conditions. The fact that the user of the contraception pills takes these pills daily, and furthermore it is suggested that the pills should be taken also around the same time on each day, suggests that the use of this technology demands the focal attention of its users.
Contrary to embodiment and cyborg relations, in the background relations the technology does not demand our focal attention and becomes “a kind of near-technological environment itself” (Ihde, 1990, p. 108). The most characteristic examples that Ihde is using are placed in the home environment, such as the lighting, heating and cooling systems that are included in our home equipments. In each case, the technology, for example the heating system, remains in the background while we follow our daily routines.
However the use of contraceptive implants is aiming to our “inner selves” and not to our external environment, even though the efficacy of the technology itself is based on its background role.
Ihde himself defines the use of contraception pills as an example of background relations. He emphasizes the fact that contraception pills are what he defines as “edible technologies”, which are technologies that “arise from chemical transformations” (Ihde, 1990, p. 113). According to his analysis:
“Early users of the pill reported two results: they did experience bodily changes… and sometimes there were other side effects… But as with the previously noted fascination with the amplifying transformations of all new technologies, most such side effects were repressed in favor of the exultation over worry-free ability to engage in close-to-″natural″ or pregnancy-free sexual relations…The pill, once taken, functioned as a kind of internal background relation of the most extreme fringe type. As with all edible technologies, the ″I am what I eat″ phenomenon placed most effects at a distance or were delayed” (Ihde, 1990, p. 113[emphasis added]).
As I already made clear, I do not interpret the function of the contraception pills as a kind of “internal background relations”, as Ihde does, due to the fact that the use of contraception pills does demand the focal attention of the user, at least once a day. However, I do understand
16
I would like to mention here that I do not imply any form of comparison between contraception pills and antidepressants, since they are different forms of technologies. My remark here is only limited in the issue that both of them demand the focal attention of their users.
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contraception implants to function as a kind of “internal background relation” with the world, since once a contraception implant is placed in its users body it is going to fulfill its function for three years, and for this three years it does not demand the focal attention of the user; except from the case of malfunctions of course.
Ihde use the terms close-to-″natural″ and pregnancy-free sexual relations. What is defined as “close-to-″natural″ sexual relations” cannot be compared with what is defined as “pregnancy-free sexual relations”. In the cases when a sexual relation moves closer to being “natural” (viz. a sexual relation that does not include contraception technologies), the possibility that this sexual relation will end up to pregnancy increases. On the other hand, whenever we are talking about “pregnancy-free sexual relations”, the term itself implies that such form of sexual relations cannot be natural, since they include the use of contraception technologies. I think that the use of the quotation marks on the word natural, are used by Ihde in order to emphasize such an antithesis between what is natural and what is pregnancy-free in terms of sexual relations.
How can this ambivalence be understood? Ihde himself states that “with the biological technics, there is reached a new boundary between technology and life where the horizons of nature and artificiality are blurred” (Ihde, 1990, p. 114). By adding this remark to the above discussion about the use of the contraception implants, but also of the contraception pills17, the following can be said. The experience that a couple acquires when they participate in a “pregnancy-free” and at the same time “close-to-″natural″ sexual relation” could not have been possible without the mediating role of technology. These issues suggest that the definition of cyborg intentionality, as this was examined before, can be incorporated in the background relations, since this type of intentionality comes in accordance with what Ihde labels as an “extreme fringe type” of human-technology relations.
Apart from that, the comparison between “close-to-″natural″” and “pregnancy-free sexual relations” can trigger another discussion. This comparison demonstrates that what is defined as “close-to-″natural″ sexual relation” is not defined as such in accordance with reproduction. This means that in a sexual act between heterosexual couples that use contraception technologies, even in the case of condoms but with a bigger emphasis on the rest of the examined contraception technologies, not only the man and the woman that are engaged in this sexual act have a certain form of intentionality, but also the contraception technologies that they use. These technologies provide “a framework of action” and “do form intentionalities and inclinations within which use-patterns take dominant shape” (Ihde, 1990, p. 141).
It can be said for example, that this “use-pattern” includes the maximization of sexual pleasure during a sexual act, namely the moving closer to naturalness in terms of pleasure, and the minimization of the possibility of pregnancy, namely the moving away from naturalness in terms of reproduction. This is a form of technologically mediated intentionality, which reshapes and transforms the notions of sexual intercourse and reproduction. According to Ihde, “if one projects such inclination across many users, the result is closer to predictable at the large-scale social level” (Ihde, 1990, p. 142). In the examined case this means that people mainly have sex for a variety of other reasons (I mention sexual pleasure as one reason that should be placed
17
I do not mention condoms here, since condoms do not provide a close-to-″natural″ sexual experience to their users. The reasons why I choose to do so will be more evident in the paragraphs to follow, especially in the Section 2.7, in which I introduce empirical data about the use of contraception technologies.
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among many others) instead of doing so in order to reproduce, at least in the social and cultural contexts in which contraception technologies are used by the biggest part of society18.
The aim of the Sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 was to place the use of condoms, contraception pills and contraception implants under the rubric of human-technology relations, as those were defined by Ihde and Verbeek. The aim of this analysis was to emphasize the role of these technologies in the transformation of the “experience of” having sex between heterosexual couples. The main characteristics of Ihde’s approach towards philosophy of technology, which were mentioned in Section 2.1, are also evident in the analysis that took place in the aforementioned Sections.
Firstly, the analyzed contraception technologies should not be understood as isolated objects that are used as means towards the end of having the “experience of” close-to-″natural″ and pregnancy-free sexual relations. These technologies construct what it means to have the “experience of” close-to-″natural″ and pregnancy-free sexual relations, and as such they should be understood as constitutive parameters of this kind of experience.
Secondly, the contraception technologies do change the microperception of their users, which is the sensory perception of their users that is “immediate and focused bodily” (Ihde, 1990, p. 29) in the actual “experience of” having sex. In the same way, these technologies do change the cultural perception of their users in terms of the “experience of” having sex, which is defined by Ihde as macroperception, since microperception and macroperception are closely linked and intertwined with each other (Ihde, 1990, p. 29).
Thirdly, the examined contraception technologies form different kinds of human-technology relations, since there technological properties do differ, and as such they cannot be reified into Technology, which reification is “prone to overly metaphysical claims” (Ihde, 1990, p. 26).
Lastly, whenever we examine these technologies we have to keep in mind that the context in which they are used is important in order to understand the ways in which they are used, without reducing their technological properties.
In this Section I defined the use of contraceptive implants as a form of background relations and I also made some remarks in support to my choice to define the use of contraception pills as cyborg relations. In addition to these issues, I also connected my analysis in this Section with the strong points of Ihde’s approach.
The aim of the following Section is to analyze the examined contraception technologies in the light of empirical data. It has to be mentioned here that one of the basic premises of the Section 2.7 is that technological artifacts have a certain form of multistability. This multistability strives from the nature of human-technology relations and from the “complexities of the technology-culture” (Ihde, 1990, p. 146) in which these human-technology relations take their shape. In that sense, the following Section does not aim at describing a situation that will hold sway in any context in which these technologies are used. The aim of the following Section is to describe one possible way that these technologies were actually embedded inside a cultural and social setting. In that sense, I will present certain empirical data in order to emphasize the fact that contraception technologies play an important role in the formation of technological mediated intentionalities and they can be used for different purposes, and not only in order to help their users to avoid and unwanted pregnancy. Additionally, the aim of the following Section is to understand how the use of contraception technologies shape the sex lives or their users, not only
18
This conclusion can be connected with my argumentation and conclusion in Section 1.3 of the 1st Chapter, in which I presented how contraception technologies shaped normative practice in respect to sex and reproduction.
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in regards to the connection between the “experience of” having sex and reproduction, but also by focusing on their bodily and sensory involvement in the “experience of” having sex itself.