Facts: Four criminal cases were filed against Sergio Baladjay and others in the municipal court (now city court) of Ozamiz City, for illegal possession of instruments for committing counterfeiting or falsification, 2 counts of estafa, and for theft. The judge dismissed the case for failure of the prosecution to finish the presentation of its evidence and on the basis of accused right to speedy trial. The case had been pending for more than eleven years.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the four criminal cases after it had dismissed them on the ground of failure to prosecute and the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial.
Rule: We hold that the four dismissal orders, although provisional in character, which were issued upon motion of the accused and on the basis of his right to a speedy trial placed him in jeopardy. The dismissal was equivalent to an acquittal. The reinstatement of the cases would place him in double jeopardy (Esmeña vs. Pogoy, G. R. No. 54110, February 20, 1981, 102 SCRA 861, 867).
The rule that the dismissal of a criminal case upon defendant's motion will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense as said dismissal is not without the express consent of the defendant, has no application to a case where the dismissal is predicated on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial.
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The "provisional" dismissal of a criminal case for failure to prosecute ... is not truly a dismissal but an acquittal because the prosecution failed to prove the case when the time therefor came.
A judgment of acquittal becomes final immediately after promulgation and cannot thus be recalled thereafter for correction or amendment
It is relevant to note that because Baladjay was denied a speedy trial, he would even be entitled to relief in a mandamus proceeding to compel the dismissal of the informations (Conde vs. Rivera, 45 Phil. 650).
The lower court's order of April 20, 1966, reinstating the four criminal cases against Sergio Baladjay, is reversed and set aside and its four orders dated January 24, 1966; provisionally dismissing the said cases, are affirmed. Almario v. CA, 355 SCRA 1
Facts: Petitioner is one of the accused in a criminal case for estafa thru falsification of public document, and for estafa, with respondent RCBC as the offended party in both cases. After petitioner’s arraignment, pre-trial was held, which was terminated. Thereafter, the cases were scheduled for continuous trial in December 1994, and in January and February 1993, but the hearings were cancelled because the Presiding Judge of the court was elevated to CA and no trial judge was immediately appointed. The hearing set for June 21, 1995, was postponed for lack of proof of notice to all the accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, upon request of private prosecutor, and without objection on the part of petitioner’s counsel, postponed to July 24, 1995. However, for lack of proof of service of notice upon petitioner, the hearing set for July 24, 1995, was likewise cancelled and the cases were reset for trial.
On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to appear despite due notice. Hence, upon motion of petitioner;s counsel, respondent court ordered the dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute and considering that accused is entitled to a speedy trial.
However, upon motion of the private prosecutor and despite the opposition of petitioner, respondent court reconsidered the Order of September 8, 1995 stating in part that
“... there has been no vexations, capricious and oppressive delays, or unjustified postponements of the trial, or a long time is allowed to (e) lapse without the party having his case tried which would constitute, according to the above case, violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial… There were only three settings from the date of termination of the pre-trial for the prosecution to present evidence and the same were postponed with valid reasons.”
“….the dismissal, therefore, in the Order dated September 8, 1995, did not result in the acquittal of the accused since the right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated, and its dismissal having been made upon the motion of the accused there is no double jeopardy.”
Petitioner appealed with CA but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON double jeopardy had set in so that petitioner's constitutional right against such jeopardy had been violated.
Ruling:
Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
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sustain a conviction and after the accused had leaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
x x x
Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial was made upon motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance of the accused before the trial court, and with his express consent. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial.9 Double jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.
Here we must inquire whether there was unreasonable delay in the conduct of the trial so that violation of the right to speedy trial of the accused, herein petitioner, resulted. For it must be recalled that in the application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Both the trial court and the appellate court noted all in all, there were only three re-setting of hearing dates, all of which were grounded on valid grounds.
There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought, we concur with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that petitioner's right to speedy trial had not been infringed. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial had not been violated, there was no reason to support the initial order of dismissal.
It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy when that order was reconsidered seasonably. For as petitioner's right to speedy trial was not transgressed, this exception to the fifth element of double jeopardy - that the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused - was not met. The trial court's initial order of dismissal was upon motion of petitioner's counsel, hence made with the express consent of petitioner. That being the case, despite the reconsideration of said order, double jeopardy did not attach. As this Court had occasion to rule in People vs. Tampal, (244 SCRA 202) reiterated in People vs. Leviste,17 where we overturned an order of dismissal by the trial court predicated on the right to speedy trial -
……..It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were thus not in error when they allowed reinstatement of the cases against petitioner.
WHEN WILL SECOND OR DOUBLE JEOPARDY SET IN?
“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.” A. When you are prosecuted for the Same Offense
In order to determine whether the 2 charges are identical, one test used is the Same Evidence Test: Whether the evidence needed in the one case will support the conviction in the other.
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Illustration: For the same act of issuing a bouncing check, accused was prosecuted first under Section 1 of BP Blg. 22 and next under Art. 315, par 2 (d) of the RPC. He pleads double jeopardy. Decide.
The two laws (not merely ordinance) punish 2 distinct offenses. The evidence required to prove one offense is not the same as the evidence required to prove the other. Hence, there is no double jeopardy. (Ada v. Judge Virola, G.R. No. 82346-47, April 17, 1989.)