Chapter 4 – Paradigm-theory
4.2. Data, Theory, Models and Paradigms
4.2.1. The Basic Paradigms of Inquiry
Now that a clear view about the process of inquiry and the apex thereof in paradigm establishment has been given, a description of the four basic paradigms of inquiry will be given. Paradigms of inquiry define parameters for the inquirer of what can be seen to fall within the realm of legitimate inquiry and what falls outside of it. The basic beliefs of any paradigm can be ascertained in accordance with what proponents of any one paradigm would answer to the following three questions: 51
50 Beholden to this definition, it would be safe to endorse Neurotheology as part of the ‘normal sciences’, due to it reliance on contemporary neurological assumptions.
51 Guba and Lincoln (1994:108) argues that the order in which these three questions will be elaborated upon reflects the most logical primacy.
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1. The Ontological question: “What is the form and nature of reality and, therefore, what is there that can be known about it?” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994:108). Guba & Lincoln gives the example that, if a ‘real’ world is assumed, then all that can be known about it is the ‘way things really are’ and the ‘way things really work’. Therefore, only questions relating to this real existence and real action are acceptable. Questions involving morality or aesthetics would naturally fall outside the scope of legitimate inquiry according to this paradigm.
2. The Epistemological question: “What is the nature of the relationship between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known?” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994:108). The answer to this question is necessarily constrained to the answer given to the ontological question. Staying true to the assumption of a ‘real’ reality, the attitude of the inquirer must be one that Guba & Lincoln calls, ‘objective detachment’ or ‘value freedom’. This disposition is necessary to discover how things really are and how they really work.52
3. The Methodological question: “How can the inquirer (would-be knower) go about finding out whatever he or she believes can be known?” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994:108). Regarding the first two answers, not just any methodology can be deemed appropriate. For example, an objective inquirer pursuing a real reality would be constrained by a mandate to control possible perplexing factors – this will be the case whether either qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods are used.5354 Lastly, methodology are not just a collective term for the
methods being used, but it determines the methods to be used.
52 If the epistemological question had primacy – a knower must be objectively detached – then the assumption would follow that there exits a ‘real’ reality to be objective about.
53 These three methodologies will be expounded upon later-on in 4.3.
54 If the methodological question had primacy and a manipulative method was chosen – e.g. experimentation, for argument’s sake – it follows that the inquirer should be objective and that there should be a ‘real’ world to be objective about.
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Guba and Lincoln (1994:108) argue that paradigms are ultimately the “the most informed and sophisticated view that its proponents have been able to devise, given the way they have chosen to respond to the three defining questions.” Thus, as human constructions, paradigms are not invulnerable to human error. As a consequence there are no incontestable arguments or assumptions in paradigms – rather, proponents of a certain view must rely on the persuasiveness and utility thereof, in arguing their position.
With all of this in mind, here are the four basic paradigms (Guba & Lincoln, 1990:19-27):
Positivism
- Ontology: Realist – reality really exist ‘out there’ and is driven by incontrovertible natural laws and mechanisms. Knowledge of these entities within reality are traditionally summarized in ‘time- and context-free’ generalizations. In some instances these generalizations could take on the form of cause-and-effect laws.
- Epistemology: Dualist/objectivist – the inquirer adopts a nonintrusive and objective stance toward reality. This way the influence of values and biases are factored out of the intended outcomes.
- Methodology: experimental/manipulative: propositions are made in advance in the form of questions and hypotheses. These proposals are then subjected to empirical tests in controlled conditions, with the intention of testing for falsification.
When committed to a realist ontology, an objective epistemology is the only option for the positivist. When an inquirer believes that there is a real world out there, he/she must be able to ask it direct questions from which he/she can expect direct answers . The inquirer takes up position outside of reality, looking in. in this instance the question can be raised: how can there be accounted for the possibility of inquirer bias, on the one hand, and nature’s ability to confound, on the other? For the positivist the answer lies in manipulative methodology and empirical methods to take the inquirer out of the equation, leaving nature unintruded and vulnerable.
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Postpositivism
- Ontology: critical realist – reality, although it exists really, can only ever be partially understood and never fully apprehended – thus the need for analogous models.
- Epistemology: modified objectivist – objectivity remains the ideal means of acquiring knowledge, but it is no longer in an absolute state. Rather, it can be approximated by means of external ‘guardians’, such as the critical community and the critical tradition. - Methodology: modified experimental/manipulative – emphasis is placed upon critical
multiplism. The imbalances of pure experimental/manipulative methodology is addressed by doing inquiry in more natural settings, reintroducing discovery, using more qualitative methods, while depending more on grounded theory.
This paradigm seeks to undo the damage that has been done by the naïve realist posture55, by
redirecting it to a more critical stance. The rationale behind this shift is based on the imperfect sensory and intellectual mechanisms that humans use in the perception of reality – this notion is then factored into the research, which bids a critical stance toward what is uncovered. Epistemologically speaking, the assumption of being able to stand outside of reality and even outside of humanness for the duration of inquiry has been found to be absurd. It has been demonstrated that any and all ‘findings’ that may emerge from inquiry, come from the interaction between the inquirer and what is being inquired into. Thus, objectivity is a regulatory ideal which directs the inquirer to be as neutral as possible, but also to identify the predispositions the inquirer brings to the inquiry. Part of the methodological implications for this regulatory principle is an interaction with the critical community and critical tradition – to draw on as many sources as possible when inquiring into reality.
55 For a comprehensive history of the reasons for this paradigm-shift, please see Godfrey-Smith 2003: Problems and Changes
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Critical Theory
- Ontology: historical realist – a reality that was once ‘plastic’ is deemed apprehensible, as it was shaped over time by an amalgam of social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender factors. From these influence it crystallized into structures that are assumed to be natural and immutable – a virtual or historical reality (cf. Guba & Lincoln, 1994:110). - Epistemology: Transactional and subjectivist – the investigator and investigated object
are interactively linked by the values of the investigator, which inevitably influences the investigation. This purports to value mediated findings. This challenges the distinction between ontology and epistemology, in that knowledge of reality is only gained by interacting with reality.
- Methodology: dialogic and dialectical– due to the transactional nature of the inquiry, a dialogue between the inquirer and the subjects of the inquiry is necessary. This should be done in a dialectical fashion in order to transform ignorance and misapprehensions. (cf. Guba & Lincoln, 1994:110)
Guba deems the label ‘critical theory’ to be limited in the scope it is supposed to implicate. Rather, he states, it should be termed “ideologically oriented inquiry” (1990:23). This view stands opposed to the supposed value-freedom propagated by postpositivists. A paradigm, as a human construct, indubitably reflects the values of its constructors. All areas of inquiry, such as the selected problem, most relevant paradigm, instruments, analytic approaches, interpretations etc. are selected based on the specific values and assumptions of the inquirer. Value is the hermeneutic window through which reality is perceived. The problem in this regard is that certain inquirer’s values could become dominant, over and against those who have less influence in the same field – thus it becomes a political act whereby some are empowered and others are disempowered. The methodology of critical theory, therefore, is aimed at working towards transforming the world by raising consciousness among- and energising participants. A dialogical approach is then taken to rally participants to a common view.
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Constructivism
- Ontology: relativist – reality, its form and content, is based on multiple mental constructions, contextually based on the social, experiential, local and specific exposure of the inquirer. It should in actuality be distinguished from idealism and nominalism (cf. Guba, 1990:25).
- Epistemology: subjectivist and transactional – the inquirer and what is being inquired into are viewed as a single entity, producing findings deemed as the product of interaction between the two (cf. Guba, 1990:25).
- Methodology: hermeneutic, dialectical – with the aim of rendering a few constructions that enjoys substantial consensus, constructions are produced and refined using hermeneutics, and compared and contrasted in a dialectical fashion. The reason for this is because reality can only be constructed by the individual interacting with it, therefore interaction between respondents is vital (cf. Guba & Lincoln, 1994:111).
Based on what has been described already, it seems plausible that postpositivists and critical theorists could see their way open in accommodating each other’s paradigms. Conversely, constructivists feel that these paradigms are completely flawed and need to be replaced. Guba (1990:25) gives four reasons in this respect: 1) all facts are theory laden, 2) all theory is underdetermined, 3) all facts are value laden and 4) there is no escape from the dyadic nature of an inquirer/inquired-into relationship.56