The phrase ‘to become who or what one is’ is an adaptation of a line from Pindar’s Second Pythian Ode. It is something of a refrain in N, from GS on (see GS335, Z4.1, EHClever9, as well as the subtitle of the latter book). The individual is a ‘piece of fate’ (TIMorality6), meaning it cannot be fundamentally recast in the image of some external (i.e. moral) value. To do so would be a dishonest betrayal of oneself, a deviation or distortion of the life one is, resulting in all kinds of physical or spiritual degeneration. See for example the account of bad conscience at GM2.16–22 (although then N also calls this a ‘pregnancy’ at GM2.19); likewise GM3.14 or TIImproving2. Nor is it a question of choosing to fashion oneself in any way – for the individual does not have that freedom of will. In some sense, then, the individual already is what it is, or at least is already pregnant with itself. This idea of being pregnant with oneself is probably a reference to Plato’s
Symposium (see entry on beauty), and also to Leibniz (who uses
this metaphor frequently himself; see his Monadology). In EH, N somewhat disingenuously talks about needing to get out of one’s way, to not try to find out about oneself, and not to struggle, while the ‘governing idea’ within one grows (EHClever9). This idea of not knowing oneself – in contradiction to the Socratic maxim – is also found at GMP1. This not struggling, though, ultimately means to align oneself with the fate of oneself – and this in turn
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requires a certain honesty (although not necessarily a conscious one). This honesty will involve, if not self-knowledge, then at least the strength for truth more generally; also a certain act of creation (GS335), a questioning or critical attitude towards one’s age, and a refusal of external models of living (external to one’s alignment to fate), in favour of an internal adaptation (see note 1885.2.175). For this reason, also, Zarathustra requests that his disciples do not think of him as offering a way of life (‘guard yourself against Zarathustra’ he says at Z1.22.3).
bee
Biene. Symbol of industry (thus akin to ant), building (OTL1, 2) or
swarming (H1.285). Bees creating honey is a symbol of patiently extracting, accumulating and concentrating (H2.179, Z2.11, ZP1), indeed committed to such accumulation and unaware of anything else (GMP1). Gathering of honey is related to autumnal ripening or pregnancy.
Beer
Bier. For N, beer is particularly associated with Germany (along
with newspapers and Wagnerian music); beer thus becomes a symbol of a particularly German way of narcotizing (H2.324, BGE244, GM3.26).
being
Sein. N uses the concept of being in a way akin to Parmenides or
Plato: true being is that which is, eternally, and does not become (see Z2.2, TIReason4). Moreover, even with respect to everyday entities (things that we know are not truly permanent or self- identical) we still employ the concepts of being, as if they were true being (TIReason5). Belief in the existence of being is a key feature of metaphysics, and also carries a moral value. See becoming.
belief (opinion)
Belief [Glaube] has two different meanings in both English and German. (i) Belief in the sense of opinion, the largely unjustified or careless views that someone or a group happens to have. N will often use Meinung rather than Glaube for this (e.g. GS345). (ii) Belief in the sense of faith, often now in a religious sense. A religious sceptic would claim there is very little difference between them, but in many philosophical traditions (including the Kantian) there is an important difference: one can acquire evidence such that opinion becomes knowledge; but the object of faith could not in principle be an object of knowledge. N frequently takes up a position of the religious sceptic (e.g. UM1.3, H2.225). The notions of a disciple (e.g. Z1.22.3, TIAncients5), or of the ‘love of man for the sake of God’ (BGE60) should be understood as ways of rethinking the notion of religious faith in the absence of a transcendent or impossible object.
N also often (it is a particularly common theme in GM) writes about metaphysical or religious concepts as being objects of ‘faith’ – for example GM1.13, 3.20. He suggests that these individual items of belief are part of a system which serves one dominant faith, around which one builds a form of life. In this case, it is the faith of the weak that they someday will be the masters (GM1.15). Because these concepts are abstract, not the concrete expression of the life of a people, this kind of faith is universalizing and arises from
ressentiment. It refuses on principle to tolerate any other faith (or
form of life). At GM2.21, N puns on Glaube (belief) and Gläubiger (a creditor, who is ultimately God). (See also the ‘unconditional’ universality of the faith in the ascetic ideal at GM3.23.)
However, N also argues that opinions and beliefs are legitimated by the kind of person who holds them. At H2.325, he differentiates between the opinions of ‘most people’ and those of ‘exceptional men’. The idea is elaborated at Z2.14: those who live in the land of culture (modern Germans) have no beliefs, but this is because they are ‘unworthy of belief’. But a people capable of creating must have a prophetic belief in their future. Towards the end of BGE, N contrasts the South with the German North by saying the former have an existence that believes in itself (BGE255); something similar is said of the ‘masters’ at 260, and again of the noble at 287.
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