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(34) from the beginning to the end of the revolution.

CHAPTER IV COMMUNIST TACTICS

(34) from the beginning to the end of the revolution.

In Kerala this approach was to be eagerly applied by the K.C.P. It sharply rejected the anti-bourgeois line of the extreme Leftists, advocated a United Front which included sections of the bourgeoisie, and was also a new approach to peasant involvement. In an agrarian country like China

(33)'Problems of Independence and Autonomy within the United Front' Ibid. (34) Stuart R. Schram: The Political Thouoht of Mao-Tse-Tung (Penguin Books,

Australia 1969 - enlarged and revised edition) contains extensive extracts from Mao - pp.202-235 - on the role and imp. of the bourgeoisie.

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Mao had emphasised the importance of revolutionary bases among the peasantry, (35) and the significance of the peasantry in the establishment of Socialism. The new approach towards the bourgeoisie and the role it could play in the initial bourgeois-democratic revolution, enabled the Communist Party in

Kerala, in 1957, to claim to represent not only the exploited classes but the smaller capitalists, as well. They could claim legitimacy for their tactics by citing Mao's 'bloc of four classes' approach which was to result in the

(36) 'New Democracy' rather than move immediately to the Socialist Revolution. This 'bloc of four classes' strategy may be elaborated on at greater length, since it is particularly relevant to Kerala and to the strategies used by Namboodiripad. An ingenious expedient employed by Mao to make an appeal to national union, he evaluated the strength of the different classes exclusively on numbers, thus minimizing the influence of the bourgeoisie, and effectively answering any criticism that the 'New Democracy' would be

(37)

bourgeois dominated. The four classes that Mao refers to in the rural context are the middle bourgeoisie who constitute the small landowners, the petty-bourgeoisie who are the peasant-landholders, the semi-poletariat who are the peasants who own part of their land and rent the rest, while

(38)

the agricultural labourers were the proletariat. The fifth category Mao

isolated were the big bourgeoisie who were mainly the big landowners against whom the four other classes would unite. In Kerala the big bourgeoisie were identified with Congress interests.

(35) Mao-Tse-Tung: 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party'

in Chen Po-Ta: Mao-Tse-Tung on the Chinese Revolution p. 40.

(36) John H. Kautsky: 'Indian Communist Party Strategy since 1945' p. 148.

(37) Stuart R . Schram: The Political Thought of Mao-Tse-Tung p. 203.

(38) From extracts from Mao's article (Analysis of all the Classes in Chinese Society' in Stuart R. Schram: Ibid p. 211.

Maoism in international Communism, and Ranadive to the detriment of the Party approached Maoism as a reinforcement of the need for a violent revolution, and hence guerrilla warfare and sabotage. This resulted in the alienation mentioned before and the banning of the Party in Kerala, among other things. This militant line followed by Ranadive however further weakened the unity of the Party, already barely recovered from the

vacillations of the P a r t y ’s war policies. Not only was Ranadive's leadership

felt to be detrimental but controversy arose with regard to the P a r t y ’s

attitude to the Congress Government. The accepted Communist line up to the 1950's had seen the two major goals of democratic forces as freedom and peace - Britain and capitalism were the main enemies and India under the leadership of the I.N.C. was still regarded as being under imperialist control. At the Madurai Conference of the Party, it was decided that the British Government was the chief enemy of freedom, this in contradiction to the Nehru Government which regarded American imperialism as the main

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threat to India. Problems soon arose over the feasibility of this

approach. Nehru had improved relations with the U.S.S.R., while Panch Shila and Chou-en-Lais visit to India brought apparent peaceful co-existence

with China. Centrists within the Party such as A. Ghosh and E.M.S. Namboodiripad advocated some kind of co-operation with the Congress

Government. Ghosh for example, proposed either co-operation and criticism of

(39) Documents purporting to be those circulated at this Congress were subsequently published by the Democratic Research Service in Indian Communist Party Documents 1930-56 (Bombay, 1957) and Communist Conspiracy at Madurai (Popular Book Depot, Bombay, March 1954).

Ramamurthy, the editor of the New Age at this time, prepared in 1954, a slogan for a 'national platform for peace and freedom' that advocated support for any moves for peace, and attacked the U.S. as the chief

aggressor. Although at the time the Central Committee was sharply against (41)

what it termed 'reformism' within the Party, the climate of opinion

however was changing. R. Palme Dutt, of the Executive Committee of

Great Britain and a guiding influence on the C.P.I., argued the importance of the peace movement in the fight for national independence. He also hinted at a reappraisal of the Party's attitudes towards the Nehru Government, which while still mainly representing the interests of the

'big bourgeoisie', showed signs of limited opposition to the imperialists. Every step taken in the direction of anti-imperialism was to be welcomed

(42) by the Party.

With this single statement, the international Communist policy of irreconcilable hostility toward Nehru,

maintained for three years, was replaced by a policy of qualified opposition with the possibility that common ground might be found in the realm of foreign policy.(43)

Dutt also clarified the new line of a broader front, previously postulated

(40) New Aoe 24 Jan. 1954.

(41) Even E.M.S., a Centrist, in an official report to the C.C. stated:

'... there is no question of abandoning the struggle against the Congress Government or revising the slogan of replacing it by a Government of

Democratic unity.' Quoted in Marshall Windmiller: 'Indian Communism

and the New Soviet Line' in Pacific Affairs Dec. 1956, Vol. 29 p. 351. (42) R. Palme Dutt 'Situation in India' quoted in Gene Overstreet and Marshall

Windmiller 'Communism in India' p. 304. (43) Ibid.

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