FEW IS BETTER THAN MANY, AND TWO IS BEST OF ALL

alliance of 1894 is a better example, since it was formed by two previously antagonistic states in response to the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1879. Other examples would be the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact, and the Grand Alliance between the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union in 1942. These are all good hard confirmatory tests because they are examples which support a hypothesis—the recurrent formation of balances of power—drawn from a deductive theory. Another hypothesis is that states tend to imitate the behaviour of their rivals, which is borne out by the gradual subordination of ideology to national interest in twentieth-century Soviet foreign policy, and the Anglo-German naval arms race at the turn of this century.

FEW IS BETTER THAN MANY, AND TWO IS BEST OF ALL

Anarchy explains a continuity of behaviour (i.e. power balancing) despite unit-level changes and processes. It leads to testable

hypotheses concerning the extent and nature of inter-state co-operation over a range of issue-areas, and the balance of power as a process. Having dealt with anarchy, which is constant over time, Waltz moves on to consider the other structural component of international political systems, the distribution of capabilities. Whilst anarchy explains recurring patterns of behaviour over time, the distribution of capabilities changes across systems, not within them.

Indeed, since both anarchy and states do not change, the number of great powers is the only systemic component in the theory that varies. Waltz does not explicitly explain why it varies (i.e. the rise and fall of great powers over time); he is only interested in the consequences of its variation. In particular, he compares the stability of different systems, defining stability as structural endurance and the absence of system-wide wars among the great powers. ‘For the sake of stability, peacefulness, and the management of collective affairs, should we prefer some such number [of great powers] as ten, or five, or what?’ (p. 161). To answer this question, Waltz proceeds in two steps.

First, and once again by analogy with microeconomic theory, Waltz compares the stability of different oligopolistic markets. His main contention is that ‘economic stability increases as oligopolistic sectors narrow’ (p. 134). In this context, stability does not mean peace, merely structural continuity in the number of principle firms.

There are a number of reasons why greater oligopoly promotes stability as continuity, and Waltz specifies these by reference to a large body of microeconomic theory. They all substantiate his argument that, for the purpose of systemic continuity, a market dominated by a few large firms is to be preferred to one in which many small firms compete. Of course, he also recognizes that there is a tension between the stability of the market and the efficiency of its products. What benefits firms does not necessarily benefit consumers. Stability is often inversely related to efficiency, product quality, and low prices for consumers. However, ‘international political systems are judged more by the fate of the units than by the quantity and quality of their products…what is deplored economically is just what is wanted politically’ (p. 138).

Second, having argued that inequality among states is to be preferred to equality, Waltz tries to be more precise in specifying the optimum number of dominant states in the system. Before doing this, he devotes a large section to the ‘interdependence’ debate in the United States. Attacking those who believe that economic

interdependence is on the increase, as well as those who welcome this trend on the assumption that increased trade and inter-state contacts reduce the risk of war, Waltz argues that such claims confuse process with structure, and ignore the extent to which the former is subordinate to the latter. He argues that the political significance of interdependence in the system as a whole is unrelated to the level of sensitivity between particular groups or dyads of states, and among specific economic and financial sectors. The political importance of economic interdependence lies in the extent to which states are vulnerable to changes in these sectors originating overseas. As Baldwin points out, the idea of mutual vulnerability is much closer to the conventional usage of the term interdependence.⁶ According to Waltz, the international political system as a whole is less interdependent in the post-war era than in previous systems because the superpowers are relatively invulnerable to dramatic changes in global economic factors such as the supply and price of raw materials, agricultural and manufactured goods.

The reasoning is simple. States are interdependent ‘if the costs of breaking their relations or of reducing their exchanges are about equal for each of them’ (p. 143). These costs vary in proportion to the amount of trade as a percentage of GNP, and the ease of substitution between suppliers of essential imports and export markets. Interdependence is therefore a relation among equals. In the system as a whole, it varies with the distribution of capabilities. The contemporary bipolar system is one of extreme inequality between the superpowers and other states. As the number of great powers declines, their size increases. Concomitantly, they are less dependent on trade with other state than vice versa. From a systemic perspective, interdependence in the present system is lower than ever before. Although Waltz recognizes that it has increased somewhat since 1945, this is only to be expected given the destruction which the war caused to international trade and the industrial capacity of Western Europe and Japan. Not only is Waltz convinced that systemic interdependence is low, he also argues that this is a good thing. In contrast to domestic society, where specialization and the division of labour takes place within a framework of central control, international politics is a self-help system. As a result, given the unequal distribution of capabilities, rising vulnerability among states increases the likelihood of conflict among them. Echoing Rousseau,

‘close interdependence means closeness of contact and raises the prospect of occasional conflict…interdependent states whose

relations remain unregulated must experience conflict and will occasionally fall into violence. If interdependence grows at a pace that exceeds the development of central control, then interdependence hastens the occasion for war’ (p. 138).

However, although Waltz’s views on interdependence emphasize the virtues of inequality in the system, he argues that the optimum number of great powers cannot be discovered simply by noting that interdependence varies with the relative size of states, for size does not correlate precisely with numbers. For example, if Western Europe were to unite politically and China was to emerge with a modern economy, both would be highly self-sufficient. The system would then be composed of four great powers, relatively equal in size. Interdependence would remain low in the system as a whole, even though a bipolar system had become a multipolar one. The reason why two, and only two, great powers is the optimum number is strategic, not economic. In this context, stability is defined as peace, or the absence of war among the great powers. In complete contrast to Morgenthau, who believes that contemporary bipolarity is the most unstable balance of power, Waltz claims the opposite.

This claim rests upon his argument that the balance of power operates differently in multipolar and bipolar systems. In the former, the politics of power are external. States rely on alliances to maintain their security. Alliances are formed on the basis of certain common interests among their members to ward off a common threat.

However, such a system is inherently unstable, because ‘there are too many powers to permit any of them to draw clear and fixed lines between allies and adversaries and too few to keep the effects of defection low’ (p. 168). Thus, no state can be completely sure who is more threatening to whom. Military interdependence forces each state to subordinate its national interests to maintain the co-operation of its alliance partners. However, by doing so it may be dragged into war against its wishes. ‘One’s allies may edge toward the opposing camp’. Among a small group of militarily interdependent states, there is always a danger of miscalculation and defection between alliance partners, both of which may drag all the states into conflict.

Waltz illustrates all these drawbacks by focusing on the alliance diplomacy in the years before the First World War. In contrast, Waltz argues that, in a bipolar system, military interdependence is low. The inequality between the superpowers and everyone else, including their alliance partners, compels each of them to maintain the balance by relying on their own devices. The United States and the Soviet

Union do not depend on anyone else to protect themselves.

Consequently:

Internal balancing is more reliable and precise than external balancing. States are less likely to misjudge their relative strengths than they are to misjudge the strength and reliability of opposing coalitions. Rather than making states properly cautious and forwarding the chances of peace, uncertainty and miscalculation cause wars. In a bipolar world uncertainty lessens and calculations are easier to make.

(Waltz, 1979, p. 168) In the present system, defection among allies is less likely to lead to war through miscalculation. The loss of China to both superpowers has not altered the central balance. Similarly, the French withdrawal from NATO in 1966 was annoying, but not drastic. The rigidity of alliances in a bipolar world allows greater strategic flexibility by the superpowers. Miscalculation is minimized, both by the clarity of threats and the self-reliant means with which each superpower must develop a strategy to cope with these threats. Furthermore, in a bipolar system, the rivalry between the two superpowers is global in geographical scope and comprehensive across all issue-areas.

Not just military preparation but also economic growth and technological development become matters of intense and constant concern. Self-dependence of parties, clarity of dangers, certainty about who has to face them: these are the characteristics of great-power politics in a bipolar world.

(Waltz, 1979, pp. 171–2) As a result, Waltz argues that the post-war bipolar system is preferable to multipolarity. When reduced to two superpowers, it seems, the balancing process culminates in a stable outcome. The dangers to peace in this bipolar system arise from two sources—

overreaction and nuclear competition. The absence of geographical peripheries in the Cold War means that ‘anything that happens anywhere is potentially of concern to [the United States and the Soviet Union]’ (p. 171). The Korean war, the Cuban missile crisis, Vietnam—these and many other examples demonstrate the dangers of overreaction in a bipolar world. Which is worse, miscalculation of the central balance leading to war, or overreaction? Waltz claims the

former, since the above examples illustrate that overreaction ‘is the lesser evil since it costs only money and the fighting of limited wars’

(p. 172). Moreover, although Waltz acknowledges the dangers of overreaction, he argues that as the superpowers become socialized to the system, they have also become more conservative and less inclined to overreact to the threats posed by the other. Rhetoric aside, the superpowers have learned to co-exist as adversarial partners in global hegemony. Mutual animosity has gradually given way to a cautious and everfragile recognition that they have certain common interests. These have been formally recognized in the shape of arms-control talks, implicit sphere-of-influence agreements, and mutual acknowledgement of the limits to their rivalry in the Third World. Consequently, in comparison to multipolar systems, the contemporary bipolar system is relatively stable, encouraging the superpowers ‘to act in ways better than their characters may lead one to expect’ (p. 176).

As far as the ever-present threat posed by nuclear weapons, Waltz is much more optimistic than Morgenthau ever was. Whilst Morgenthau laments the spiralling arms race and the move towards war-fighting military strategies involving these weapons, Waltz does not regard these tendencies with undue alarm. On the contrary, he argues that the leaders of the superpowers are not oblivious to these dangers either:

It is highly important, indeed useful, to think in ‘cataclysmic terms’, to live in dread of all-out war, and to base military calculations on the forces needed for the ultimate but unlikely crisis. That the United States does so, and the Soviet Union apparently does too, makes the cataclysm less likely to occur.

(Waltz, 1979, p. 186) As long as mutual nuclear deterrence rests on the existence of secure second-strike forces available to both sides, and Waltz sees no prospect of their being made technologically redundant, the irrationality of nuclear war ensures that the security dilemma will not result in the use of force. The condition of bipolar deterrence encourages caution on both sides, despite the economic costs of the arms race, and the catastrophic consequences if these weapons were ever to be used in war. However, given the stability of deterrence,

‘military forces are most useful and least costly if they are priced only in money and not also in blood’ (p. 187).

Finally, Waltz turns to the management of international affairs, which embodies global issues and problems that transcend territorial boundaries. These require inter-state co-operation if they are to be solved. However, apart from identifying some of these problems, which Waltz calls the four p’s—proliferation, pollution, poverty, and population—he has very little to say in substantive terms.⁷ Instead, he confines his attention to the likelihood of their being coped with in the contemporary system. Given the condition of anarchy, attempts to manage transnational problems through international organizations and supranational agencies will only be marginally successful. ‘Great tasks can be accomplished only by agents of great capability’, i.e. states (p. 169). However, sovereign states invariably place their national interests above international ones. Nevertheless, in a bipolar system, the superpowers will be more interested in maintaining the system, and their hegemony within it, than in transforming it. When each defines its interests in global terms, they have an incentive to maintain global order and to provide for the defence and stability of other states within their spheres of influence. The provision of collective goods—such as peace, regional defence, and a stable political framework for the expansion of world trade and economic development—is undertaken by the superpowers, who pay disproportionate costs for their provision. In particular, the United States has been responsible for the establishment and institutionalization of global management in a wide variety of economic, financial and social issue-areas. In comparison with domestic society, co-ordination among states to solve common problems will always be small and incremental.

Without the support and leadership provided by the great powers, and the United States in particular, it would be even smaller. ‘If the leading power does not lead, the others cannot follow. All nations may be in the same leaky world boat, but one of them wields the biggest dipper’ (p. 210).

LAWS, THEORIES, AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF