Block’s Misrepresentation Objection

Block (2011a, 2011b) objects to the HOT theory by arguing that the conditions the theory says are necessary and sufficient for conscious states actually lead to

conflicting predictions about whether someone is in a conscious state or not in empty HOT cases. In light of this fact, Block argues that the theory’s explanation of conscious states fails and so the HOT theory should be rejected.

To demonstrate this, Block summarizes the theory’s necessary and sufficient

conditions as follows: “…an appropriate higher order thought is sufficient for a conscious

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9 _{Rosenthal also writes, “If I consciously take something I see to be a cow when it’s actually a horse,} phenomenologically it’s as though I consciously see a cow. Similarly, if I am conscious of myself as being in a P state, it’s phenomenologically as though I’m in such a state whether or not I am. If I’m not in a P state, that will make a difference to my overall mental functioning… But the phenomenology is determined solely by the way I am aware of things…” (Rosenthal (2004), p. 35). Here we see not only Rosenthal’s claim that the phenomenology resulting from veridical and misrepresenting HOTs will be subjectively indistinguishable, but also his suggestion that these subjectively indistinguishable differences might be detectable by other means (for example, they might make a difference to one’s overall mental functioning). For further discussion of this point see Rosenthal (2005), p. 29-30 and Rosenthal (2011).

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state and…being the object of an appropriate higher order thought is necessary for a

conscious state” (Block (2011b), p. 443, original emphasis). Block then argues that in empty HOT cases, such as the third case described above, it’s clear that the condition sufficient for there to be a conscious state is satisfied. Since there is an appropriate HOT formed in the empty HOT scenario, and since the presence of such a HOT is sufficient for there to be a conscious state, the theory dictates that there will be a conscious state in the empty HOT scenario. As we discussed, Rosenthal says there will be something it’s like for the subject in this case - it will seem to her that she is seeing a green apple - so Rosenthal seems to agree that the subject will indeed be in a conscious state in such cases. The trouble, argues Block, is that the condition necessary for there to be a conscious state is, at the same time, not satisfied.

Recall that, according to Block, the necessary condition dictates that a mental state must be the object of an appropriate HOT if there is to be a conscious state. In the

empty HOT scenario, however, this is precisely what is stipulated not to be the case.

Since the HOT is empty, there is no actually instantiated first-order state that can be said to be the state that the HOT represents. Barring a dramatic shift in the theory to

something more like a self-representational theory (i.e., to a theory wherein the HOT

somehow represents itself10), there is thus no candidate for being the state that is

represented and hence no candidate for being the state that is conscious. Thus the condition necessary for there to be a conscious state fails to be satisfied in empty HOT

cases and hence the theory also predicts that there will not be a conscious state in these

cases.

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10 _{For accounts from philosophers endorsing this sort of view, and their discussions of how accepting this} view allows them to avoid the Misrepresentation Objection, see Gennaro (2012), especially Ch. 4 and Kriegel (2003), especially pg. 119-120. Obviously Rosenthal does not endorse a self-representational view.

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As it turns out then, in empty HOT cases the condition sufficient for there to be a conscious state is met while, at the same time, the condition necessary for there to be a conscious state is not satisfied. The theory therefore predicts both that there will and that there will not be a conscious state in these cases. Therein lies Block’s problem with the theory. Since the HOT theory explains conscious states by providing conditions that are supposed to be necessary and sufficient for conscious states, and since those conditions turn out to be incompatible in empty HOT cases, Block argues that the HOT theory cannot have provided an adequate explanation of conscious states after all. He concludes that the theory therefore fails and should be rejected.

To summarize the concern slightly differently, the problem boils down to the following: When a HOT is empty, and thus when there is no instantiated lower-order mental state that can be said to be the apparently necessary object of the HOT, it seems that there also must be no candidate lower-order state that can be said to be the state that is conscious. However, Rosenthal clearly allows that there is something it’s like for the bearer of empty HOTs, thus he appears to allow that there is indeed a conscious state in such cases. The problem then becomes one of reconciling these two facts – the fact that there is something it’s like for the bearer of an empty HOT and the fact that there is no lower-order state that can be said to be the conscious state the bearer of that HOT is instantiating. Thus we are left with an apparent tension within the theory. We are now ready to see my solution to this problem.