The events of the Fringe universe(s) present us with counterexamples to both the animal theory and the psychological theory. In doing so they also suggest a hybrid theory of personal identity that some philosophers have embraced to capture the benefits of both of those theories while avoiding their weaknesses. According to such a hybrid theory, we are identical to neither purely psychological nor purely biological entities, but rather some conjunction of both (or a conjunction of parts of both). One such hybrid view that many contemporary philosophers have found compelling is what we will call the brain theory.
According to proponents of the brain theory, we are identical with psychologically functioning brains.14 Psychological functioning is central
to the brain theory. It is important to note that persons are not supposed to be identical with just any brain, according to the brain theory. For instance, an individual in a persistent vegetative coma lacks personal identity if the brain theory is true. This is because such individuals have a brain, but it is not a psychologically functioning brain. Thus individuals with vegetatively functioning brains are (presumably) not aware of themselves, as their brains have lost the capacity for psychology. In such cases, the person who was there previously, when his or her brain was functioning normally, has ceased to exist, if the brain theory is true.
The brain theory appears to be a more complete theory of the persons of Fringe than both of the previously considered theories, because it seems to provide tenable explanations for persons surviving as they do in Fringe that the other theories cannot. First, assuming that the brain theory is true allows us to explain the way in which John Scott survives the death of his body and brain. He lives on because his psychology is transferred to another
functioning brain, Olivia’s, which, at least temporarily, supports his contin-
ued existence. What happens there is—speaking roughly, and in view of the fact that we do not know the specifics of the physical procedure involved— like downloading an MP3 file (John) from an old, “dying” player (John’s brain) onto another player (Olivia’s brain). Thus, speaking analogically, his psychology can “play” in Olivia’s brain because Walter synchronized their brainwaves prior to John’s death, thus endowing Olivia’s brain with this
capability. Similarly, though the transfer process is more mysterious, Wil- liam Bell returns to life as a function of Olivia’s brain after his bodily death (season 3, “Lysergic Acid Diethylamide”). The brain theory is also consis- tent with Walter’s attempt to transfer Bell’s consciousness from Olivia into a host computer—a synthetic brain.
Furthermore, the brain theory appears to overcome the difficulties the brain transplant case presented for animalism. As we strongly intuit that we each go with our personal psychology in such hypothetical scenarios, it is consistent that we each go where our psychologically functioning brain goes. Since you are, according the brain theory, a psychologically functioning brain, it follows that you will go with your brain if your brain is transplanted into some other body. Thus the brain theory also implies explanations for both the actions of Newton’s soldiers in their frantic search for his frozen head and, equally, Newton’s apparent psychological continuity after having his head thawed and grafted onto a new body. Furthermore, assuming that the brain theory is true in the Fringe universe(s) suggests that the alteration in Walter’s personality results from his loss of brain tissue. Walter even sug- gests that he believes that some variation of the brain theory is true when referring to the effects of these procedures on his brain. For instance, he says to William Bell, “I’ve lost . . . seventeen years in a mental institution, William. Seventeen years! And, even now, I’m still incomplete. I forget things. Uh, names. Places. Connections that I used to be able to make so easily. They just . . . they just dangle, just outside of my reach. I know what you did to me. I know that you cut out pieces of my brain!” (season 2, “Over There, Part 2”).
It is consistent with the brain theory that alterations in the physical makeup of the brain will necessitate an alteration of its functioning and, ipso facto, an alteration of the person concerned. Moreover, the brain theory seems to fit with many of our intuitions about personal identity, both within the context of the Fringe universe(s) and also within the context our own world. However, this is not to imply that theory is not without its share of counterintuitive implications. For one thing, according to the brain theory none of us was ever a fetus, or even a very young child. Rather, if the brain theory is true we each came into existence much later, when our brains began to function psychologically. For another thing, if the theory is true none of us has ever seen ourself in the mirror or held a loved one in our arms. This is because according to this theory we are functions of brains, and brains and brain functions do not have faces or arms.
ments, because the theory’s advantages seem to far outstrip these worries. Equally, regarding the Fringe universe(s)—where there are human/creature hybrids, shape-shifters, doppelgangers, persons with superhuman powers, seemingly eternal children, and so on—these consequences of the view are tolerable. This is because assuming that the brain theory underlies the
Fringe mythology appears to allow us to explain each of the various means
by which people survive in the show.