From a historical and comparative viewpoint, the first decade after independence was largely one of slow transition in the trajectory of political clientelism as political leaders and citizens adapted to independent-state status, and as political parties sought to find new identities and develop new strategies for winning even more competitive elections. As such, it can be construed as a short but important formative bridge from the pre-independence phase of the emergence of party-based clientelism to the phase of intense expansion of clientelist practices that would follow in the 1990s. This section identifies the substantive elements of this bridging phase.
Key Changes in the Country Context
Economically, Belize’s birth as a new nation coincided with the global recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s, which contributed to the worse macroeconomic performance since the collapse of the forestry industry in the middle of the twentieth century. By 1984, after registering a gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate below one per cent in 1982 and huge budget deficits, Belize entered a belt-tightening stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Vernon, 1992: 44). Belize’s population increased from 145,343 in 1980 to 189,392 in 1990, representing a 30.3 per cent increase in intercensal population growth, compared to 21.3 per cent in the 1970s (Statistical Institute of Belize, 2007: 13-15). Social sector spending freezes, triggered by the recession and the stand-by agreement, tied the hands of governments seeking to deliver the national and human development that independence had promised to bring. The harsh socio-economic conditions contributed to a (1970s-1980s) wave of economic emigration of an estimated 20,000-30,000 Belizeans, mostly Creoles and mostly to the United States (Vernon, 1990: 8).161 At the same time, an estimated 30,000 political and economic migrants were flooding into Belize from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, further taxing the already stretched institutions and services of the new state (J. Palacio, 1995: 82). These mostly Latino immigrants also contributed to increased population growth and could eventually become new
161Vernon (1990: 34) estimated that by the late 1980s some 60,000-70,000 Belizeans were in the United States after over three decades of sustained emigration.
voters in the 1990s.162 Along with the easing of the global economic recession, increasing foreign investment, grant support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and some further diversification of the national economy, the IMF adjustments contributed to improving fiscal and GDP performance by 1989 (Gomez, 2007: 5). Importantly, it was in the 1980s that Belize begun to adopt the neoliberal economic policies that would gradually decrease the ‘size’ of the state and influence its capacity to address social problems.163
Key political system changes in the independence constitution included an expansion of the number of seats in the House from 18 to 28, the consolidation of the Senate, and the establishment of the British monarch as the Head-of-State (represented locally by an appointed Governor-General). Importantly, independence gave Belizean governments’ total control over the remaining activities not yet fully transferred under self-government—namely in national security, foreign affairs, fiscal matters and the public service. Another major step along the road of consolidating formal democracy occurred in the 1984 general election when the first and seamless change of party in government further consolidated the Westminster system. In that first post-independence election, the UDP won for the first time, with over 53.3 per cent of the vote and a ‘supermajority’164 of 21 of 28 House seats, under the leadership of Esquivel (M. Palacio, 1993: 10). Price himself lost his constituency seat in the UDP landslide. Most assessments of the PUP loss in 1984 point to the PUP being a
‘tired’ party without new ideas after 30 years in power, with an ideologically divided leadership and an inability to step up development programmes sufficiently due to the hard economic times.165It was indeed a ‘change’ election.
The ‘full’ arrival of the UDP as the ‘other’ political party further consolidated Belize’s two-party Westminster model, heightened the competitive level of party
162 Before being able to register to become voters, the new immigrants needed to attain Belizean citizenship after a period of residency. As such, their effect on the 1984 and 1989 elections was still minimal. However, accusations of using immigrants for electoral advantage began before the 1984 elections when the UDP criticised the PUP government’s refugee and immigration policies as too liberal and aimed at ‘Latinising’ the electorate (Premdas, 2001: 29).
163The term ‘neoliberal’ is used here to refer to economic policies that promote more open markets and private investment, less government regulation, privatisation and freer trade.
164‘Supermajority’ refers to a greater than two-thirds or three-fourths majority in the House, which allows for constitutional amendments without the support of opposition members.
165See, for example, the assessment by Shoman (1987: 36-37).
politics and launched a period (1984-2003) of the PUP and UDP alternating in power.
With independence no longer a national issue and with a defence guarantee secured from the United Kingdom in case of a military threat from Guatemala, the political parties were losing their traditional and distinctive policy profiles.
For a short period up to the 1989 general election, there were some serious intra-party debates about ideology and development visions. For its part, the UDP had long been clear that it was ‘right of centre’ and decidedly free enterprise and anti-communist in orientation, and it governed as such in the 1984-1989 term. The PUP, although never publicly against capitalism, had working-class origins, and Price had tried to cast the PUP as a progressive party that strived for a ‘mixed economy’.166 After a brief and failed attempt by left-wing elements to win control after the 1984 elections, the PUP started to present itself as a centrist and business-friendly party. When the PUP was returned to power in 1989, it embraced—and then expanded—on the UDP’s free-enterprise model and policies. In this period, party politics in Belize continued to develop in such a manner that no one party dominated in terms of geographic, class or ethnic advantage. As argued by well-known Belizean newspaper publisher, Evan X Hyde (2011b),167 “The two-party system played a major role...politicians from different ethnicities and administrative districts have to work together over long periods of time to establish the national credibility a political party requires in order to win elections”. Consequently, the PUP and the UDP, without any strong distinguishing national visions, continued to consolidate identities as multi-class, multi-racial, multi-gender and multi-ethnic parties, and they received support from all these groupings across urban and rural communities.
Another relevant change in the country context was the significant spike in the number and scope of work of civil society organisations (CSOs) in the last half of the 1980s. Byrd (2003) related this growth to the greater availability of international development funding and found that by the turn of the decade,
166This summary of ideological developments is based largely on Shoman (1987 and 1993), and on this author’s interviews with politicians.
167 It is not always possible to give page numbers for quotations retrieved from online newspapers.
However, the relevant Uniform Resource Locater (URL) is listed in the bibliographic entry.
NGOs, community groups and charity groups were working in all districts of Belize and in almost every thematic area, including community development, political reform and social policy.168 These organisations were beginning to help fill economic and social development gaps left by state institutions, and also to provide Belizeans with additional alternative opportunities to participate and receive benefits outside of political party relationships.
Political Clientelism in the 1980s
After independence in 1981 and in the lead up to the PUP’s first loss in 1984, Price’s weekly political clinics continued unabated and the clinic practice continued to spread slowly at the constituency level.169For instance, a review of inter-ministerial communications (IMC) from this period, although showing that the types of requests remained similar, indicates a further institutionalisation of clientelism in the first decade of independence. Representative examples from the GPAC include:
Letter from Price to Minister of Lands Briceño requesting house lots be allocated to 16 specific citizens in Belize City.170
Minister of Housing Shoman to Price requesting assistance for $10,000 housing loan for a constituent.171
Price to Deputy Minister for Housing Usher requesting assistance to procure a house for an individual.172
High school principal to Price requesting paint.173
Citizen to Price requesting help with loudspeakers for an event.174
Price to Shoman requesting repair of a roof.175
Price to Minister of Energy Briceño requesting action on a complaint that a utility bill is too high.176
Price to Attorney-General Courtenay requesting assessment of prospect of reducing the length of a prison sentence.177
Price to Minister of Sports Musa requesting that an individual be given a job.178
Price to housing agency requesting that a loan be written off for individual.179
168 Bryd showed that the spate of new CSOs was partly related to ‘new’ international development financing triggered by independence and to the investments in the NGO sector made by USAID.
169Interviews with Price and Hunter.
170IMC, Price to Marin 20 May 1982.
171IMC, Shoman to Price, 5 June 1981
172IMC, Price to Usher 29 January 1981.
173Letter, Carlos Castillo, Principal, Wesley College to Price, 3 October 1980.
174Letter, John Bo to Price, 1 October 1980.
175IMC, Price to Shoman 22 November 1984.
176IMC, Price to Briceño, 6 November 1984.
177IMC, Price to Courtenay, 8 November 1984.
178IMC, Price to Musa 20 November 1984.
179IMC, Price to Reconstruction and Development Corporation, 10 December 1984.
It is interesting, but not surprising, that most historical assessments of the first PUP loss make no direct link to the possibility that macro-economic constraints in the first three years of independence restricted the PUP’s opportunities to maintain or expand its clientelist appeals to the electorate. Nor was this possibility mentioned in any of the interviews conducted for this study. Although not making a direct connection in this regard, Shoman (1987: 36-37) argued that the economic crisis “caused significant loss of support for the PUP”
because it was unable to maintain its land reform and infrastructure development programmes, especially in rural parts of the country. Based on the aforementioned examples of party-based patronage related to such government programmes, the diminished clientelist opportunities was likely at least one of the contributing factors in the change of government in 1984.
Overall, accounts from politicians interviewed for this study paint a picture of a gradual but not dramatic increase in clientelist activity in the UDP’s first term of office (1984-1989). Importantly, the stint in government gave the UDP its first experience of the many challenges and advantages of incumbency in terms of the distribution of public resources and favours. Esquivel recalled that after the election and on becoming prime minister (1984), “I was unbelievably naive to be surprised that campaign volunteers began coming to collect, saying...we helped you to win so we deserve something.”180 Esquivel, albeit never as natural a clientelist politician as Price, continued the Price tradition of holding a weekly Wednesday national clinic at his office in Belmopan and occasionally in Belize City.181The use of political clinics by other UDP politicians expanded slowly, but they were still clustered around election campaigns. Esquivel recounted that in the late 1980s most handouts were in-kind and that monetary gifts were still quite rare.182 A UDP political insider supported this view: “After its first election the UDP had tasted power and the flow of public money...by 1989 there was vote-influencing...not so much with money then, but more so with government resources like land lots and land leases.”183 Esquivel estimated that the
180Interview with Esquivel.
181Ibid.
182Ibid.
183Interview with Robert Pennell, former constituency campaign manager (UDP), 8 February 2011, Punta Gorda Town.
constituency stipend had increased to circa $3,000 and that the cost of a constituency campaign was circa $15,000-$20,000 by the end of 1990.184
Although ‘helping’ was still seen as the primary motive for handouts by politicians, other changes in the political context did affect the evolving relationships between politicians and citizens. An important development, highlighted by several interviewees, was that the late 1980s was the time when
‘big money’ began to trickle slowly into Belize’s political parties. This had some direct relationship to the spread of neoliberal economic policies during this decade. On the demand side, Esquivel related the increase of money in politics in part to the advent of television and expanded radio advertising in Belizean politics.185 However, in addition to the growing costs of campaigns, parties and politicians also began to spend more on improving the organisation of national and constituency canvassing and on particularistic appeals to voters. This was especially noteworthy in a handful of precedent-setting constituencies. One that was singled out frequently by interviewees was the 1984 campaign of the young business man Derek Aikman, who had dealt Price his first general election defeat. As former Prime Minister Said Musa (1998-2008) noted, “There was the Aikman phenomenon...he took campaigning to another level of glitz, propaganda, communications, organisation...and money, and to compete, others followed that lead.”186 Several interviewees also pointed to the 1984 ‘big money’ contest in the Queen’s Square constituency of newcomer Dean Barrow, who was financially supported by one of Belize’s richest local businessman at the time,187 in a contest against a wealthy PUP newcomer and businessman, Ralph Fonseca.
Ralph Fonseca, who was defeated by Barrow in 1984, went on to win in another constituency in 1989 and became one of the main architects of the re-branding of the PUP in his capacity as national campaign manager.188 Fonseca noted that he had come away from his 1984 loss with the lesson that “people don’t
184Interview with Esquivel.
185 Ibid. Amendments to restrictive colonial broadcasting laws contributed to the rapid expansion of television and radio media in the 1980s.
186Interview with Said Musa, parliamentarian, former prime minister (1998-2008) and former party leader (PUP), 26 November 2010, Belize City.
187Interview with Barrow.
188Fonseca served as PUP campaign manager from 1987 to 2008 and had great influence on the financial management of the party and, when the PUP was in power, of the country.
care what you know until they know that you care” [i.e., by delivering targeted resources and favours], and he set out to create a business-model national party machine.189 Fonseca attested that he had observed how modern political parties operated and campaigned while studying and living in Canada, and he applied some of these basic business principles to the PUP. Former Prime Minister Musa, another architect of the new PUP, recounted that, “After independence we could not identify clear aspirations that grabbed people’s minds...before it was freedom...how can you top that?”190 A senior political operative contended that a key aspect of the re-branding was the deliberate
“paradigm shift to a new PUP political strategy in which a more centrist and capitalist approach was accompanied by more money in campaigns and the move from volunteerism to payments...and one result was that street campaigning began a shift from ‘what does your constituency need?’ to ‘what do you want?’”191 Expressing similar views, another senior PUP operative marked the 1989 election as the political moment the PUP “stopped being a movement and began its transition to a commercial entity.”192
With the gradual diminishing of distinguishing party identities and visions in an increasingly competitive electoral context, both parties also had added incentive to raise more private money to strengthen and expand particularistic politician-citizen relationships. This not only facilitated the entry of more wealthy candidates into electoral politics, but also led to both parties competing to make larger appeals to big business for donations. As the first party leader of the UDP reflected, “Handout politics did start to grow in the 1980s as more money flowed in and as the electorate realised that they could get more out of the game.”193 And even though volunteering for parties continued, payment of party and campaign workers was creeping into party operations. For example, one interviewee informed that during the national re-registration of voters that transpired in 1988-1989, PUP party workers were paid per head for the number of voter application forms completed, and he added that this helped to “fuel the
189Interview with Ralph Fonseca, former minister and former national campaign manager (PUP), 31 March 2011, Belize City.
190Interview with Musa.
191Interview with Leslie.
192Interview with Courtenay.
193Interview with Lindo.
payment culture” that later became the norm.194 By the time 1989 general election campaign commenced, it was rather clear that any hopes that may have existed that the first change of government would break the precedent of gradually expanding clientelist politics were all but dashed.
The UDP Sets Some Precedents
Indeed, in addition to continuing the practice of weekly clinics, expanding the monthly constituency stipends to representatives and continuing party-based patronage with government resources and programmes, it was under the 1984-1989 UDP government that three other specific developments occurred that affected the future evolution of political clientelism. The first development raised the bar for the open use of publicly funded resources for targeted programmes by an incumbent political party before a general election. In the year leading up to the 4 September 1989 election, the UDP government launched a large
‘community development projects’ programme, in which each of the then 28 constituencies was targeted for the allocation of a portion of the funds (Coye, Swift, Ermeav, and Lopez, 1990).195 Although the exact budget allocated is disputed (the opposition PUP alleged it was over $8,000,000), the records of the House of Representatives (Hansard, 1989), shows that $1,800,000 of Capital II funds was allocated for small constituency projects, such as electrification, water supply, streets and drainage, and housing.196 The opposition PUP accused the UDP of using public funds for its campaign and alleged that accounting officers in the public service were either being by-passed or pressured by UDP candidates to break accounting rules.197
The post-election Commission of Inquiry (appointed by the PUP government) into the use of the funds opined that “the community development funds were driven primarily by a political agenda at the expense of public accountability for expenditures borne by taxpayers” (Coye, et al., 1990: 1-2). Even as it conceded that some funds were used for targeted community-level projects such as road
194Interview with Courtenay.
195This refers only to the executive summary of the Report of Commission of Inquiry. The full report was never publicly released.
196This is the amount that the then prime minister, Esquivel, recollected as accurate (Personal communication with Manuel Esquivel, 2 May and 15 May 2012). At $1,800,000 the average total per constituency would have been circa $65,000.
197UDP Uses Public Funds for Campaign. (1989, April 6). Belize Times. p. 1, A.
works in the constituencies, the Commission claimed to have unearthed evidence of significant misappropriation and waste. Esquivel, the prime minister at the time, strongly refuted all allegations of misappropriation and insisted that no funds were allocated directly through UDP candidates.198 However, the allocation of funds via established public sector channels does not negate the possibility of direct influence (by politicians) over which particular group or individuals are targeted within a constituency.
The second key development relates to amendments made to election laws that would have significant implications for the management of future elections in general, and for the control of political clientelism, specifically. A 1988 constitutional amendment (No. 26 of 1988) allowed the majority party to appoint
The second key development relates to amendments made to election laws that would have significant implications for the management of future elections in general, and for the control of political clientelism, specifically. A 1988 constitutional amendment (No. 26 of 1988) allowed the majority party to appoint