Gaddafi's change toward the Soviet Union was not due to a change in his political or ideological view, but it is clear that it was the outcome of other factors dictated by international political conditions, and political changes in the Middle East in particular, as well as other changes on the Soviet side.
After the 1973 war between Egypt and Israel, the American administration began a new policy aimed at finding a new basis on which to base a comprehensive peace between the Arabs and Israel, and specifically between Egypt and Israel. This American policy energetically pursued Egypt to hold peace talks with Israel, and resulted in reaching in late 1978 the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. Gaddafi strongly rejected the peace process with Israel, and in particular the Sadat agreement with Israel. Gaddafi was very concerned and afraid of growing American influence in the region, especially the growing influence of America in Egypt, which
187
shares with Libya a very long border. In Gaddafi’s view this threatened his very existence in Libya. Moreover, after Egypt signing a peace agreement with Israel, Gaddafi got into a feud with Sadat which led to a skirmish on the Libyan-Egyptian border in 1976.
Therefore, the existence of a state on the eastern border of Libya in agreement with Israel and on good terms with America and even serving US interests in the region was undoubtedly a threat to the security of Gaddafi in Libya and a source of constant concern to Gaddafi. As for the Soviet Union, it lost much of its presence in the region, especially in Egypt, so the Soviets were looking to compensate for the losses in the Middle East and North Africa, especially in the Mediterranean region.
Unpublished British materials show that the change in Gaddafi's relationship with the Soviet Union, especially in the political arena, started in 1976. Gaddafi visited Moscow from 6 to 9 December 1976. In November, just a month before this, the Libyan General People’s Congress held a meeting and issued a statement strongly supporting friendship with all socialist countries and especially the Soviet Union.511 The statement said that ‘it was necessary to give this friendship its strategic dimension’.512 This put their
differences aside and showed a change from the hostility Gaddafi displayed towards the Soviet Union when he first came to power in September 1969.
Mr Ali Belkheir, Deputy Secretary General of the General People’s Congress of Libya said that ‘The masses of our people […] value highly their friendship with the Soviet
511 TNA, FCO 93-1001, Annual review, D. F. Murray, 10 December 1976
188
Union because both our countries are on the same side of the barricades in the struggle against world imperialism, Zionism and reaction’.513 Thereafter, from 1976 onwards, Gaddafi's attitude changed, on the surface, sufficiently for him to approve the formation of a Libyan-Soviet friendship society.514 Also, in November Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir,
the Commander in Chief of the Libyan Armed Forces, preceded Gaddafi’s visit to Moscow and visited the Soviet Union. Jabir delivered a message from Gaddafi to the Soviet Prime Minister, Kosygin, and held talks with the Soviet military authorities.515
One conclusion that can be drawn here is that the General People’s Congress and the recommendations that came out of it were to give a green light to some of the important decisions which were expected to be taken during Gaddafi's visit to Moscow. It seems
to be the case that these decisions had been made in advance and the meeting of the General People's Congress came to ratify it and to give legitimacy to the status of the statements which would be issued during Gaddafi's visit to Moscow. Thus, the visit of Jabir to the Soviet Union seems to have been a preparation for this. However, points of disagreement between the two parties continued. These disagreements were particularly based on the Middle East question. A change in Gaddafi’s political tone towards the Soviet Union was clear, as shown in the statement of the General People's Congress in November 1976, as well as the easing of Gaddafi’s criticisms of the Soviet Union.
513 Shvedov, A. and Podtserob, A., The Soviet Union and North African countries, International Affairs,
Vol, 29, No, 6, (1983), pp. 54-62.
514 TNA, FCO 93/1012, Gaddafi’s visit to Moscow, December 1976, letter from R. D. Lamb to Mr
Mannerman, 12 April 1977
189
Meanwhile, this change was not significant because of some other factors: first, Gaddafi's distaste for communism, his distrust of the Russians and in particular his resistance to the installation of a major Russian presence in Libya.516 Second, Libya's new nationalism, its highly individualistic style of leadership and its financial independence made its position strong and difficult to influence.517
A report by NATO said that:
No treaty of friendship was signed, but this has not prevented the Russians from sending a representative of the Libyan Arab-Soviet friendship to Tripoli for talks at the end of Gaddafi’s Moscow visit. Seen from here the results of the visit do not represent a significant drift to the East.518
The change of both sides in general and Gaddafi in particular was with regard to some of the regional and international issues of interest to both parties. These purposes were as follows:519
• The fact that the Soviet government and the Libyan government shared similar
attitudes towards many international questions, in particular those opposed to Western policies.
• Gaddafi had bad relations with all his Arab neighbours (perhaps apart from Algeria). In particular, Gaddafi's improvement in his relationship with the Soviet Union coincided with the decline of both countries’ relations with Egypt. By developing Libya’s relations with the Soviet Union, Gaddafi may have thought he was
516 TNA, FCO 93/1012, Gaddafi’s visit to Moscow
517 NTA FCO 93-1870, Libya/Soviet Union, letter from Mr Tomky to Mr Daunt and Mr Fergusson, 1979
518 TNA, FCO 93/1012, Letter from R. L. Balfour, Tripoli to G. R. Lawes, Nenad, FCO, 4 January 1977