Broader research implications

Owing to my narrow focus on the functioning of EU TG cooperation in the Eastern neighbourhood and a dearth of pre-existing theoretical research on the subject matter, my area of contribution is mainly empirical. My intention was to explore EU TG cooperation from multiple standpoints by relying on interdisciplinary theoretical frameworks and, in such a way, prepare the ground for further hypotheses, including more advanced theorisation of the EU’s involvement in the neighbourhood via TG channels. At a more modest scale, I aspired to benefit select debates in international relations, EU external governance, Europeanisation, and public administration scholarship by filling relevant gaps or refining current ways of thinking about EU TG cooperation under the ENP.

For example, how can we look in a new light at the debate on TG cooperation in the international relations literature, discussed at some length in the introduction?

(Section 3). First, what becomes noticeable is a somewhat asymmetric nature of EU TG cooperation. Whereas the ENP, and Twinning cooperation in particular, profess a voluntary approach to cooperation between the EU and the partner country, it is actually the EU’s laws and standards that need to be adopted by the beneficiary country, and not the other way around. Formally, of course, the actual participation of an ENP country in EU TG programmes is elective; however, once it chooses to engage, it faces some sticks and carrots from the EU, albeit less powerful than the ones under the accession frameworks. Because of that, it is hard to agree with the Europeanisation scholars considering EU technical assistance, of which TG cooperation is a part, a phenomenon of network governance.⁵ While being not a hierarchical mode of governance in a strict sense either, EU TG cooperation has these unidirectional dynamics, which put it in some contrast with the prevailing understanding of TG cooperation partners as equals. Second, my data on Twinning also show that the three-pronged typology of TG cooperation – embracing information, regulatory, and harmonisation networks – becomes somewhat blurred in reality.⁶ A typical Twinning project fosters exchange of information and best practices, transfer of regulatory standards, and harmonisation of the third country’s legislation with EU’s – all three occurring simultaneously.

In its communication on a harmonised approach to development aid, the European Commission called on integration of the concept of democratic governance “into each and every sectoral programme” in the neighbourhood

5 Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, “EU Rules beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External Governance in European Politics,” 897.

6 Slaughter, A New World Order; Lavenex, “A Governance Perspective on the European Neighbourhood Policy:

Integration beyond Conditionality?,” 943.

countries and beyond.⁷ My findings show that the Commission has actually delivered on this pledge in the case of Twinning projects in the Eastern neighbourhood. In order to systematically investigate to what extent EU TG cooperation or other instances of EU foreign policy include democratic governance, I introduced the concept of democratic governance substance and mapped out its ideal types according to the presence and configuration of transparency, accountability, and participation. Perhaps, one may argue that this is “just another concept” that further complicates the field already burdened with thick and often overlapping terminology. On the other hand, this concept pinpoints well the normative substance of what the EU is doing about democratic governance promotion and boasts of rather clear conceptual boundaries, permitting application in further studies. Finally, I was also inspired by the kindred applications of substance in other EU research programmes, such as those on EU democracy, good governance, and rule of law promotion.⁸

Another relevant addition to the studies of EU external governance and public administration literature is that the democratic governance substance of TG cooperation tends to vary with the technical complexity of the policy field. The more specialised the policy area is – the less of democratic governance substance is included in the relevant instance of EU TG cooperation. On the one hand, it points to some measure of incompatibility of democratic governance norms with the functional essence of TG cooperation in some policy sectors. On the other, it supports the sentiment found in the Europeanisation literature that increasing administrative capacity does not necessarily result in a more democratic government.⁹ Some interviewees to this study also concurred that narrow, technically complex policy fields might be less interesting for non-state actors and civil society to contribute.

My comparison of the added value by CEECs and the older MS might also be useful for the students of Europeanisation, EU development cooperation, and MS foreign policy. For example, I observe that different MS feature various comparative advantages and that EU TG cooperation offers a platform through which they can be realised and studied. The country- and sector-specific comparative advantages of CEECs and of the older MS influence perceptions of civil servants in the Eastern neighbourhood and often result in Twinning contracts. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the actual impact by CEECs on the outcome of EU TG programmes in the Eastern neighbourhood remains contested. In studying the effectiveness of

7 European Commission, “Governance in the European Consensus on Development: Towards a Harmonized Approach within the European Union,” 6.

8 Wetzel and Orbie, The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion: Concepts and Cases (Governance and Limited Statehood); Burlyuk, “Variation in EU External Policies as a Virtue: EU Rule of Law”; Börzel, Pamuk, and Stahn,

“The European Union and the Promotion of Good Governance in Its Near Abroad. One Size Fits All?”

9 Youngs, “Democracy Promotion as External Governance?,” 902.

Twinning projects in Ukraine, I find no evidence to support the claim that Twinning projects with the participation of CEECs are more effective than the projects including partners from the older MS only. Here I should also concur with Szent-Iványi and Tétényi, who argue that the new MS are “yet to capitalise” on their comparative advantages.¹⁰

In contrast to a majority of works, which view norm adoption and application (implementation) as two consecutive processes, my study shows that EU TG cooperation is capable of achieving legal and institutional convergence in parallel.

Even more so, the cases of institutional convergence seem to be more than those of legal convergence. The necessary condition of policy fit hints that the EU may be effective despite the multiple setbacks, if only it properly factored in the administrative needs and specifics of the beneficiary administration. Even though I could not undertake a comprehensive comparative study of the EU’s influence on the neighbourhood with and without a membership perspective, the analysis of TG cooperation under the ENP and my personal observations point to many similar problems with such cooperation during accession and then under the ENP. Those problems include lack of political commitment by the domestic authorities, a “one-size-fits-all” approach to different partner countries, and the mere incompatibility of institutional templates in MS and those in the beneficiary administration.

Nonetheless, convergence with EU norms as a result of TG cooperation does occur even without a membership perspective, which makes me question whether such perspective is necessary in the first place.

While the existing studies of Twinning have covered to some extent the period of the EU’s Eastern enlargement, when the accession conditionality was strong, they did not provide a satisfactory answer to the question, “How effective are Twinning projects?” The literature on the ENP, including policy studies mandated by the European Commission, has also failed to produce the satisfactory answer. Owing to the thick empirical data I gathered on Twinning projects in Ukraine and the methodological approach capturing only the most practical aspects of effectiveness, I find that Twinning projects in Ukraine have been effective 50% of the time. That means every second Twinning project in Ukraine has resulted in the legal or institutional convergence of the respective policy sector with the EU’s norms.

Given a lack of studies employing the same methodological lens, it is hard to say if this number is low or high, as compared to the performance of Twinning projects in other EU’s neighbours or under alternative EU’s foreign policy frameworks. Yet, in light of the general scepticism over the ENP’s ambitions and the lack of membership perspective for the EU’s Eastern neighbours, I view that figure with reserved optimism. As said above, legal and institutional convergence occurred

10 Szent-Iványi and Tétényi, “Transition and Foreign Aid Policies in the Visegrád Countries: A Path Dependant Approach,” 582.

in every second case despite the missing membership perspective, thanks to a good policy fit of the Twinning agenda with the needs and capacities on the ground.

Finally, because the literature on Twinning during the accession period reported many similar shortcomings to those we find under the ENP, i.e., lack of political commitment, communication difficulties, or high politicisation,¹¹ the role of EU membership perspective in the EU’s ability to bring about change in the neighbourhood becomes less obvious. In light of the relatively effective implementation of Twinning in Ukraine and its potential to carry norms of democratic governance, it may serve as another EU tool to advance its democratic values in the neighbourhood, in addition to its main goal of technical approximation.

Speaking of the methodological contribution, this work brings together multiple analytical viewpoints on a single empirical phenomenon and constructs bridges between the deterministic and probabilistic methods of causal inquiry. This inclusive approach also means to contribute to the growth of quantitative and mixed methodologies in EU studies, which are currently skewed heavily towards the qualitative analysis. In addition, I also attempted to address the problem of Eurocentrism and excessive reliance on the EU’s frames of reference in modern EU scholarship.¹² Particularly beneficial in that regard were my personal experiences growing up in the post-Soviet political and cultural context, as well as the command of the Ukrainian and Russian languages. Those advantages have granted me access to a wealth of data and people not readily available for outsiders. Moreover, the use of probabilistic (statistical) methods, more common on the North American campuses, may have contributed to the alleviation of Eurocentrism in terms of data analysis techniques.