C.C Too, Notes pp 16-17 59 Ibid , PP 28-30.

booklet, A Thesis on the Equal Distribution of Rubber Estates in the

Malayan Land Revolution, to prove in detail how well the agrarian economics of M ao’s 'New Democracy’ would apply in the 'Malayan Revolution’, and how fundamentally current policy differed from it. He was finally liquidated in May 1951.60

A third heretic of consequence was Lau Siew of the Kedah- Penang Joint State Committee, who was indicted by the Central Committee in May 1951 on three charges: First, that like Lam Swee and Siew Lau he doubted the leadership of the Central Committee and the legality of Ch ’ in Peng's election to the Secretary-Generalship. Second, that before he had the authority to do so, he announced details of the Loi Tek incident in two District Committee meetings in early 1948 while the Central Committee was still trying to keep the matter secret. And finally, that he refused to undergo ’retrospection'. He was dismissed from the State Committee, deprived of his personal carbine, and reduced to assistant stencil-cutter in his

State Committee's jungle printing press. Eventually, he surrendered to the government.s 1

Despite the heated dielectic which these incidents aroused, they are unlikely seriously to have affected the morale of the

organisation or its efficiency; certainly not with any immediacy.

Communications were so poor that even official instructions took a long time to reach the rank and file. Siew Lau's controversy was in any case highly esoteric. Moreover, the controversies themselves were prolonged: Siew L a u ’s for more than a year; while Lau Siew procrastined for more than two and a half years before he surrendered. Nevertheless, the Central Committee was concerned at the number of surrenders (398 in 1949-50 as against 56 in 1948) and in the table cited below (Fig. 8), 'Dislike of

Policy’ was the most prominent reason given by S.E.P.'s in the years 1949-52:

°° Ibid., p 30. There is something noble but also medieval in the way Siew Lau was called upon to recant, refused to do so, and was finally executed. The M.C.P, denounced him in counter-charges as a deviationist who had, among other things, made the fatal error of categorising

’rubber-workers' as ’agricultural’, and thereby deducing that they should have equal shares in the rubber estates. The M.C.P. held that rubber and tin must be regarded as industries which would be nationalised.

C.C, Too, Interview.

FIGURE 8

Reasons For Surrendering As Cited By S.E.P.'s

Date Dislike Internal Hope­ Impulse Hunger

of Policy Friction lessness (%) (%)

(%) (%) (%) 1949-51 58.3 20.9 20.9 15.8 0.0 1952 51.2 14.7 12.2 41.4 26.8 Jan-June 1953 38.8 20.8 29.6 34.0 25.0 Jul-Dec 1953 19.7 35.0 21.7 21.1 24.9 Jan-Mar 1954 18.7 16.2 25.4 41.4 26.6 Apr-Jun 1954 13.8 17.3 31.1 68.0 35.6 Jul-Sep 1954 8.3 19.5 33.3 50.4 16.7 Oct-Dec 1954 5.1 7.7 25.7 64.0 36.0 Jan-Feb 1955 0.0 14.3 35.6 85.5 28.5

Eventually, many of Siew Lau's ideas were to be incorporated in the Directives of October 1951, but by then Cominform strategy in South East Asia had been amended and the Central Committee could be seen to be loyally

reacting. Almost by accident, the Government was able to profit from the M.C.P.’s embarrassment. When Lam Swee surrendered on 27th June 1950, and published his ideas in the pamphlet My Accusation, the party published a counterblast to try and discredit him. Sub equent evidence from S.E.P.s and captured documents showed that counter-propaganda against Lam Swee was so vehement and extensive that many insurgents, previously ignorant of the case, obtained copies of My Accusation to find out what Lam Swee had said. A

number of his comrades in Pahang surrendered as a result.0 2

52 In the opinion of the writer the figures cited should be accepted as portraying trends rather exact circumstances; but even with this

qualification the differences are immense. It is particularly important to note the relative decrease in the figures for 'Dislike of policy' when compared with the increases for "Hunger' and 'Impulse*. In my opinion 'Impulse' equals generell disillusionment and lack of morale PLUS the greater ability of the Government through Templer's revised

psychological warfare campaign to communicate with the insurgents. Figures based on Ops Research Memo 6/55 pp 6-9

But by now, a further change in strategy was needed. It appeared in the October Directives of 1951.6lf

The October 1951 Directives

These were in the form of two booklets; the Directives proper, and a publication entitled, Struggle For Greater Victory In The Warn65 They begin with an explanation that the Central Committee had over­

come 'rightest opportunism’ in 1947, and continued to oppose the rightest trend by the June Resolutions of 1949. However, this had been carried too far, leading to ’leftist deviation’, which had prevented a more 'successful development and accumulation of the Party’s might’. For example, orders in December 1948 to concentrate forces and establish bases had made it

necessary to rely entirely on the masses for food and its instructions that they should be ’led forward' by force had placed too heavy a burden upon them. Similarly, the policy to counter resettlement, announced in 1950, had further harmed and alienated the masses.66

In its June Resolutions of 1949, the Politbureau had accused itself of failing to distinguish 'the incorrigible big bourgeosie' from the exploitable 'medium bourgeosie’, so that the latter, who should have been won over to the united front, were antagonised. Leftist deviation had also

appeared in aggresive activities near towns where the enemy was strong. Activities in such areas should be confined to subversion and infiltration conducted by the masses organisations.

64 Brimmell’s opinion is that it was extremely unlikely that the change in strategy was occasioned by instructions or advice from Peking. By this time (late 1951) the Thought of Mao Tse Tung had approximately equal standing with the Thought of Stalin. Again, it was in 1951 that the Vietnamese Communists dropped the facade of leading a purely nationalist insurrection, and performed the few adjustments necessary to align their revolutionary organisation with the Chinese norm. Brimmell; O p .Ci t ., pp 326-327. Whilst my own evidence can demonstrate that the M.C.P. received regular copies of the Cominform's Journal, and also monitored broadcasts from the New China News Agency, I cannot substantiate that external direction or instruction was the reason for the change.

OJ An abridged version of the Directives proper is contained in Hanrahan; Op .Cit., pp 130-133.

°6 The Directive went on to reprimand the party for the mistake of 'absolute emphasis upon the basic interests of the revolution and discarding the existing interests of the masses' - which is the same criticism Siew Lau had made two years before. C.C. Too, Notes.

In general, the rectification of errors was to be achieved by studying M a o ’s thought, and uniting theory with practice. More particularly, there were seven urgent tasks: (1) In masses work, the supreme criterion was to be ’whether the activities undertaken were supported and accepted by

the broad sections of the masses’; (2) the armed struggle was to be developed and weapons were to be captured from the enemy, attacks being confined to platoon scale, with ambush as the main tactic; (3) vigilance against spies was to be improved; (4) the workers’ and peasants’ struggle was to be

developed by means of illegal trade unions in rural areas and the

infiltration of legal trade unions in urban areas; (5) the united front was to be expanded and 'the medium capitalists' were to be won over;

(6) development work was to be conducted among 'the enemy and pseudo-elements’, and attempts were to be made to infiltrate the Police, Home Guard, Malay

Regiment, and Civil Service; and (7) procurement of 'material and food supplies' was to be put on a sound basis, in which regard the masses were still the main sources of supply, cultivation by the insurgents was to be stepped up to take over from the masses if necessary, and food dumps were to be extensively created.67

Finally, attacks upon the masses such as seizing identity cards, slashing rubber trees, burning religious buildings, sanitary trucks, Red Cross vehicles and ambulances were to cease.63

The Directives had a dual purpose. First, by invoking Mao's 'new democracy', and widening its class appeal, the party hoped to widen its mass base. Secondly, by ending indiscriminate terrorism and by turning to agriculture, the party hoped to lighten its pressure upon the masses, thus enabling them to view its political program more favourably.

The program involved increased scope for the Min Yuen, who were to infiltrate the 'bastions of capitalism in the towns'; the schools and labour unions. The 'big bourgeoisie', in areas where the party could take action, were ordered to improve their attitude towards their employees, but they were only to be assassinated if completely reactionary.03

67 Ibid., pp 24-26.

63 Hanrahan; O p .Cit., p 130.

63 In particular, Chinese owners of mines, plantations and businesses who,