C ONCLUSION AND REFLECTION

In this chapter findings based on the systematic analysis in the previous chapter will be presented. First, I discuss overall findings regarding the content in the forty assessments. This includes general impressions on shape and size of ten years terrorist threat to the Netherlands. Secondly, based on the theoretical framework of Baldwin (1997) I will present extent to which the security problematique is specified. This concerns the earlier mentioned seven questions, being; ‘security for whom?’, “security for which values?”, ‘‘how much security?’ ‘from what threats?’, ‘by what means?’, ‘at what cost?’ and fina lly, ‘in what time period? Moreover, the way in which the specifications developed over time will be described. Finally, I reflect on the analysed material as a whole and will formulate suggestions how to further develop the DTN as a communication tool. This is followed by suggestions for further research.

5.

1G

ENERAL IMPRESSION

Nature of the DTN.

Using the framework of Baldwin (1997) to observe how the terrorist threat assessment Netherlands has evolved since its establishment in May 2005, and what has been communicated to the public, this thesis has shown a comprehensive variety of elements that fit in the theoretical specifications applied. A first finding that should be mentioned prominently is that the DTNs are the product of very complex documents. The complex nature of the assessments is noticeable in Abels’ (2008) statement that DTNs are not risk assessments, but, however, in Dutch the translation of terrorist threat assessment is literarily ‘threat image’. Are the documents in its current form just qualitatively descriptive documents or do they assess a threat? This question seems hard to answer, especially when the attached threat levels indicate some sort of risk-assessing. This complexity might also influence the public perception of what the DTN actually is.

Focus.

Both the qualitative research and the quantitative findings indicate a strong focus on ‘jihadism’. The term is amongst the top three most frequently used words. Increasingly, the term is used in relation to ‘foreign fighters’, of which various similar terms including ‘jihadism’ are used (table 6 & 7). Also, a strong international focus is noticeable. This will be further described in 5.2.

72 Communication.

In essence, the DTN functions as communicative tool. The assessments are well-read by the public and often published in combination with a press-release (Bakker, 2015). For that reason it seems important to make sure that there is no misunderstanding on the material that is discussed and the way in which the NCTV interprets certain terms. Therefore, it is striking that there is no list with definitions attached to a DTN to explain interpretations of complex concepts such as ‘salafistic jihadism’, ‘polarization’ and ‘international terrorism’.

73 TABLE 8, OVERVIEW

2005 - 2015 Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely Practically never

For Whom? 2005 - 2015

For which values? 2010

2005 - 2006 2009 - 2011 2012- 2015 2007 - 2008 2013 - 2014 How Much? 2005 - 2006 2009 2007 - 2008 2010 - 2011 2012 - 2013 2014 - 2015 Means? 2005 - 2006 2007 - 2008 2009 - 2010 2011 2015 2012 - 2013 2014 Cost? 2005 2008 2006 – 2009 2010 - 2011 2012 - 2013 2014 - 2015 Threats? 2005 - 2015 Period? 2013 2005 - 2006 2012 - 2015 2007 - 2010 2011 - 2014 2008 2009

74

5.2S

PECIFICATION OF THE SECURITY PROBLEMATIQUE

In this part, the research results in relation to Baldwin’s seven questions will be discussed. Two of them are clearly answered in each and every DTN. These two are highly specified throughout ten years DTNs and will be mentioned first.

5.2.1 For whom?

First and foremost, the DTNs demonstrate an extensive quantity in amount and specification regarding the specification ‘security for whom?’ In the assessments the Netherlands is of central interest. In addition, numerous other countries are mentioned, of which a majority were within Europe. This is not the only illustration of the international scope of the DTNs. The assessments have a very strong international character due to the ‘high international profile’ of the Netherlands. This observation is supported by the quantitative findings, which demonstrate that ‘international’, ‘countries’ and ‘European’ are amongst the most frequent words used in the assessments 15_{. Interesting in this perspective is a statement made by the} NCTV in 2005, in which it states that concerning domestic factors, developments could only be rightly interpreted in the context of global radicalization processes, which is based on the assumption that similar global social processes take place in all Western countries. Also, the broad spectrum of actors reach far beyond a direct connection with Dutch interests abroad. Almost any international event presented is linked to ‘the West’, ‘Western countries’ or ‘Europe’, which leaves room for interpretation regarding to what extent this directly can affect the Netherlands in particular. Furthermore, actors often came in the form of individuals, non-state actors, terrorist organizations or extremists.

5.2.2 From what threats?

The second question that was answered for every year, was ‘from what threats?’ The threats were often mentioned and specified, covering lengthy descriptions of the threats in almost all assessments. O ften, the majority of those threats were directly applicable to the security of ‘the Netherlands’, ‘Europe’ and/or ‘the West’. Various forms of unprecedented and persistent threats have been mentioned including the ‘known’ threat versus the ‘unprecedented threat’, the ‘conceivable threat’, ‘potential threats’ and ‘concrete threats’, ‘internal’ and ‘external threats’. Regarding the specification of threats, similar (conflict) situations throughout multiple years were reflected upon and specific updates were provided. Furthermore, the

75 threats were in terms of the theoretical framework well represented and often included detailed specification throughout the years. The threats described in an international development were dominant.

5.2.3 For which values?

Values were often described in the assessments. However, as indicated in the analysis these were predominantly limited to the effects of radicalization and polarization. The societal values presented in the aforementioned publication of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2014) that served as indicators were not mentioned specifically. Baldwin (1997) emphasized the important role of values in his article and therefore this needs improvement in this regard. However, in the interpretation of Baldwin (1997) indicators for values “may include physical safety, economic welfare, autonomy, psychological well-being”, and thus would be better represented than within the operationalization of this particular thesis (p. 13). The NCTV provides no guidance concerning values at all.

5.2.4 Means?

Furthermore, the content of the DTNs concerning ‘means’, came for example in the form of (counter) measures, projects, initiatives and programs directly related to (counter) terrorism and beyond. The description of such means was often detailed, and is valuable to the reader to understand what is possible and conducted against terrorist threats. Presenting these means directly in the same document contributes to the context.

5.2.5 At what costs?

The specification ‘At what costs?’ concerns financial indicators or indicators that involve sacrificing other goals in the pursuit of security. In several cases there were indicators present which demonstrates the cost involved in programmes and measures regarding (counter) terrorism. This positively contributes to specification from Baldwin’s perspective. A decrease of representation of such cost has been noticed, which can be explained with the separation between measures and implications from the public version summaries of the DTNs. The period for which the assessment applies for continues to be neatly presented, sometimes with added indications for short and long-term goals, threats or developments.

76 The quantification of security in terms of ‘how much security?’ is not continuously answered, and often absent. According Baldwin (1997) for most purposes meaningful scientific communication would seem to require at least some indication of how much securit y is being sought for which values of which actors with respect to which threats (p. 17). In this regard it should be noted that sometimes ‘some indication’ is provided, but indicators quantifying the level of security were absent. One would expect that when a threat level raises or lowers, a shift in terms of how much security, perhaps through means, would be noticeable. However, this seems not to be the case.

5.3H

OW DID THIS DEVELOP OVER TIME

?

The final table presented above illustrates the overall development concerning the specifications. Various observation in relation to these developments can be made.

5.3.1 Actors

First of all, I notice a strong consistency in the description of actors, concerning ‘security for whom?’ This continues to be specified over time. As the overall table illustrates the question is answered and specified in all DTNs.

5.3.2 Threats

The same is applicable to the content related to threats, which is mentioned extensively in many forms throughout the ten years. Actors and threats remain to be a central theme in all DTNs.

5.3.3 Values

Descriptions related to ‘security for what values?’ shift between ‘sometimes’ and ‘rarely’. There is no increase or decrease throughout the years regarding this specification. As mentioned above, this is mainly the result of approaching societal values thro ugh the topic of radicalization, and leaves opportunity for improvement.

5.3.4 How much?

Quantification in terms of ‘how much security’ is necessary in the p ursuit of fighting terrorism remains to be underexposed over time. Up until 2009 there sometimes was an undetailed indicator present, but these lacked ever since.

77 5.3.5 Means

Interestingly, the means described in ten years DTNs were rather clearly specif ied and often came with detailed updates regarding initiatives in the form of national or international countermeasures, especially since 2005 up to 2012. However, after 2011 the NCTV decided to separate these from the DTNs and publish these in an external document that covers the policy aspects in counter terrorism. In terms of the DTN, this means for this particular research that a decrease is noticeable. However, one could argue that publishing these separately might be beneficial to the level of detail with regards to Baldwin’s (1997) framework.

5.3.6. Costs

In the first year of the publically available DTN (2005) indicators concerning specification ‘at what costs?’ were present. This negatively advanced throughout the years, frequently without any reference to this specification.

5.3.7 Period

In contrast, the period for which the DTNs, initiatives and measures were accountable, were continuously described. However, the level of detail and specification did shift; in the first few years from ‘frequently’ to ‘rarely’ back to ‘sometimes’ and in 2015 back to ‘frequently’. There seems to be a positive trend with regards to this specification over the years.

5.4R

EFLECTION

Consistency.

Finally, regarding Baldwin’s specification of the security problematique, I observe the seven questions are to a large extent answered in the DTNs. Although sometimes not in detail this overall shows a decent level of specification, particularly when one realizes the purpose of the assessments is not per se intended to describe an all-encompassing security situation of the Netherlands, but merely serves as an informative tool in communicating (counter) terrorism. Threat levels.

Furthermore, although various national and international changes in terms of political and administrative alterations has taken place in the past 10 years, it is perhaps most interesting and striking at the same time to state that ever since May 2005, the differences in assessments

78 are limited. Furthermore, it seems appropriate to mention the attached threat levels while reflecting on ten years threat assessments. The threat levels, containing four choices, serve to represent the threat(s) described in the DTNs in one word. As the thr eats are often measured against the bandwidth of the assessed threat level, one can be very critical to what this level actually means regarding the information and context provided in the assessments. Some indicators of what such level comprises is provided by the NCTV (table 1). However, one could question whether four of these levels for the NCTV compromises sufficient bandwidth to categorize the complex and constantly changing threat, especially since in practise, although theoretical possible, only two levels principally could be applied (limited/substantial). The threat level ‘critical’ shall in practice most likely only be applied after an attack or subsequent to an attack after which one or more (known) suspects or accomplices are still wanted, providing (prior to such circumstance) only two options in terms of levels. I highly question whether such categories are sufficient to display significant changes in the terrorist threat against the Netherlands. One of the former heads of the NCTV, Tjibbe Joustra, already mentioned the term ‘substantial plus’ in 2008, to indicate a more serious degree of the assessed substantial threat. Ultimately, one could question to what extent the threat levels are of added value to the DTNs since the document aims to provide an image of the threat rather than asses the actual threat. This offers an interesting theme for further research. Furthermore, I think that a pre-determined publication date, quarterly, of an assessment does not per se adds to the quality of the product. When one realizes the limited changes over a ten year timeframe, it might be beneficial to the relevancy of the product to publish a DTN when necessary in terms of changes in threat. It might be interesting to research why Denmark only publishes an assessment at regular intervals or in the event of sudden and significant changes in the nature and scope of the threat, in level, or if required in the light of events to inform its citizens. Finally, the DTN proved to be a valuable , well- specified communication tool for both the public and its partners. Nonetheless, it would not be a bad idea to put more effort in specifying what values are at stake.

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In document Communicating Terrorism: terrorist threat assessments in the Netherlands (Page 71-79)