G.R. No. 124862 ll Dec. 22, 1998 ll Bellosillo, J.
107 332 Enad
Persons and Family Relations
FACTS:
Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos, married in the Philippines (1941). They got a divorce (filed 1950) in San Francisco, California, USA, and submitted evidence of their agreement to live separately & a settlement of their conjugal properties. Final judgment of divorce was on 1954, and Quita subsequently contracted 2 marriages, still in the USA, since then.
In 1972, Arturo died. Dandan, along with her and Padlan’s alleged 6 children claimed to be heirs of the intestate of Arturo. The trial court, without a proper hearing, decided in favour of the subsistence of the marriage of Quita and Padlan, stating that a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought & decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code was not entitled to recognition as valid in Philippine jurisdiction, declaring Quita and Arturo’s brother as the only heirs. Upon partial reconsideration, the Padlan children, except for one (illegitimate) were recognized as heirs, excluding the brother. Dandan was still not counted because her marriage to Padlan was contracted on 1947, which makes it bigamous, thus void ab initio. Dandan appealed, stating that the court erred in deciding without a hearing, because there was an actual controversy as to the lawful heirs of the deceased. CA affirmed appeal, declared null and void trial court’s decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Quita appealed to SC.
ISSUE:
WON case should be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
HELD:
YES. The provision states: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. There is no controversy as to the children, but the controversy lies as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. In Quita’s comment on her entitlement to inherit despite their divorce, she says that Arturo was a Filipino, and so they remained legally married. From this, the SC interpreted that Quita was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce— should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing establishing Quita’s citizenship. Her citizenship is important to determine, in light of the ruling in Van Dorn v Romillo Jr. Trial court based citizenship solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner’s citizenship at the time of divorce.
Quita became an American citizen in 1954, the same year final judgment of divorce was obtained. If proven that she was no longer a Filipino citizen, she will lose her right to inherit. SC emphasizes that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of Quita to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse, since Dandan’s claim has already been resolved (bigamous marriage). Petition denied. CA’s direction to remand the case for further proceedings affirmed. Emphasis on question of hereditary rights of petitioner.
Llorente v. CA
G.R. No. 124371 ll Nov. 23, 2000
108 332 Española
Persons and Family Relations
PETITIONER: Paula T. Llorente
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Alicia F. Llorente FACTS:
Lorenzo N. Llorente was a serviceman in the United States Navy, who married petitioner Paula in church rites in Camarines Sur in 1937.
Lorenzo left for the US before World War II broke out, leaving Paula behind in the conjugal home.
In 1943, Lorenzo was granted US citizenship, as well as leave to visit his wife after the Philippine liberation. Upon his return in 1945, he discovered that she was pregnant, and had been having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino.
Lorenzo refused to live with Paula, and in 1946 executed with her a written agreement wherein they decided that support from Lorenzo would be suspended, their marital union would be dissolved according to judicial proceedings, and that Paula will not be prosecuted for adultery, given she voluntarily admitted fault and peacefully agreed to separation.
Upon returning to the US, Lorenzo filed for and obtained a divorce in San Diego County, California. He traveled back to the Philippines, where he married respondent Alicia F. Llorente.
They lived together as husband and wife for 25 years and had three children. During such time, Lorenzo also executed a last will and testament, in which he bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, further designating her as sole executor of said will. Lorenzo died in June 1985.
In September of the same year, Paula filed for letters of administration over Lorenzo's estate in her favor, contending that she was the surviving spouse, and the property disposed of in the will were acquired during their marriage.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in her favor, holding that the divorce decree granted to Lorenzo is void and not applicable in the
Philippines, therefore also rendering his marriage to Alicia void. The Court of Appeals affirmed (with modification, to the effect that Alicia is declared co-owner of properties she and Lorenzo acquired during their 25 years together).
ISSUES
1) Whether a divorce acquired by a naturalized US citizen is applicable in the Philippines
2) Whether the will executed in favor of the second spouse is valid (minor issue) RATIO
The Court reversed the decision of the trial and appellate courts and remanded the case to the court of origin on the following grounds:
A. Divorce was applicable under Arts. 15 and 16 of the Civil Code.
The CA and RTC used the renvoi doctrine, which refers the case to the law of decedent's domicile - in this case, Philippine law.
The Court interpreted Arts. 15 and 16 as applying only to Philippine nationals. Only they are covered by the policy against absolute divorces. Aliens, meanwhile, may obtain absolute divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to law. Thus, they upheld the validity of Lorenzo's divorce.
B. The Court did not decide the will's inherent validity and the actual inheritors, since according to his nationality, these are issues best proven by foreign law.
However, the question of whether will was executed in accordance with formalities required was resolved based on Philippine law. The Court decided yes, thus leaving to the court of origin the
Garcia v. Recio
109 332 Falcone
Persons and Family Relations
responsibility of determining the intrinsic validity of the will and successional rights of the parties.
Garcia v. Recio
110 332 Falcone
Persons and Family Relations
FACTS:
March 1987 – Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon Rizal
May 1989 – Australian family court decreed a divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage
January 1994 – He married petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio in Cabanatuan City.
In their application for marriage license, he declared himself as “single” and “Filipino”
Starting October 22, 1995 – he and petitioner started living separately without prior judicial dissolution of marriage.
March 1998 – petitioner Grace Garcia filed a petition for a Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, saying that when they got married, Rederick still had a subsisting marriage. She said she only learned of this in 1997.
Respondent claims that his first marriage had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia, making him legally capacitated to marry petitioner back in 1994.
July 1998 – While the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending, Rederick secured a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney because the “marriage had irretrievably broken down”
Trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines, NOT due to his alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry.
ISSUES: (Karichi says it’s Issue #2)
1. W/N the divorce between Rederick and Editha Samson (first wife) was proven 2. W/N Rederick was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner. HELD:
1. YES.
• Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. It is
insufficient to just present the divorce decree.
• Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.
• If the document isn’t kept in the Philippines, the copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed in that foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office • Divorce decree between respondent
and Editha Samson appears authentic. But appearance isn’t sufficient. Compliance with the rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
• Fortunately, when the divorce decree was submitted, it was objected by the petitioner’s counsel not for its inadmissibility but because it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court then ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner’s qualification. Hence it was admitted in evidence and given weight by the judge as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia because the petitioner failed to object properly.
• Compliance with articles 11, 13, and 52 of the Family Code that the petitioner quoted isn’t necessary as respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws. (He acquired Australian citizenship in 1992)
Note, just in case Ma’am asks: in civil cases, defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
Garcia v. Recio
111 332 Falcone
Persons and Family Relations
2. NO.
• Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, validly admitted in evidence, adequately establishes his legal capacity to marry under Australian Law.
• BUT there are types of divorces: 1) Absolute (terminates the marriage) and 2) Limited (suspends the marriage and leaves the bond in full force) • There is no showing which type of
divorce was procured by him
• The Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: “A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy”
• This shows that the divorce he obtained MAY be restricted.
• This doesn’t establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
• No proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws. Petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent as null and void on the ground of bigamy wasn’t granted because it may turn out that under Australian Law, he was capacitated to marry to marry as a result of the divorce decree. Hence, the case was remanded to the trial court to receive evidence which show petitioner’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. If there’s none, then they may declare nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy, as there’s already evidence of two existing marriage certificates.
Republic v Obrecido
112 332 Hermosisima
Persons and Family Relations
NATURE:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the RTC
RULING:
Petition by RP GRANTED. Assailed decision set aside
FACTS:
Orbecido married Lady Villanueva 1981. 1986 wife left for the US. A few years later his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen
2000 Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and married an Innocent Stanley
Cipriano filed w/ trial court petition to remarry invoking Par 2 Art 36 of the Family Code--> Court granted
OSG says that par 2 article 26 covers marriages between a Filipino and an alien. Proper remedy they say should be annulment or legal separation. A matter of legislation ISSUE:
Could Paragraph 2 Article 26 be construed to include Filipinos who have naturalized? HELD:
Records of family code deliberations showed that intent of par 2 of art 26 is to avoid absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Does same principle apply to this case? Cites Quita v CA. The Court therein hinted, by
way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Phil law and can thus remarry.
Court held that Par 2 Art 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who at time of marriage were Filipinos but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains divorce--> To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice
2 essential elements:
1) Valid marriage celebrated between Filipino citizen and foreigner
2) Valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry reckoning point not citizenship at time of marriage, but citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry
For case to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen-> Before a foreign divorce can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.--> such foreign law must be proved also--> must also show that divorce decree allows former wife to remarry
No sufficient evidence submitted. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent's submission of aforecited evidence