Because of the differences between them, we should not be surprised that the pattern of outcomes of interstate conflicts in the Canadian-American case contrasts with that in the Australian-American relationship. We shall show that part of the difference is accounted for by the political processes of complex interdependence present in the Canadian case. At the end of the chapter we shall show how, even in Canadian-American relations, structural and economic process models contribute part of the explanation of outcomes and regime. First we must decide how closely the two cases approximate the conditions of realism and complex interdependence and demonstrate how the political processes predicted by each ideal type affected the pattern of outcomes of political conflicts.
CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE
In general, Canadian-American relations fit closely the three conditions of complex interdependence set forth in Chapter 2. Military force plays only a minor role in the relationship.4Two early American military invasions of Canada are regarded today
Canadian-American Relations and Complex Interdependence 145
as ancient history. Though occasional fears of American military invasion lingered until the eve of World War I, the fear of military threat was probably over by 1871, and certainly by 1895. The last official Canadian military contingency plan for defense against an American invasion was an historical curiosity by the time it was scrapped in 1931.5
As we argued in Chapter 2, the absence of military force as an instrument for achieving positive goals does not mean that military force has no role. Since World War II, the Canadian-American military alliance against external threat has been a source of both close cooperation and serious friction. Some of the most far-reaching steps toward continental cooperation occurred during wartime.6Similarly, one of the most serious crises in postwar relations, and one that led to the fall of a divided Canadian government, was over the nuclear arming of missiles involved in joint Canadian-American defense against the Soviet military threat. But military threats, or even threats of withdrawing military protection, have not characterized the bargaining process.
We also noted in Chapter 2 that military force can sometimes play a latent role. Its possible use can set significant structural limits on the political process. Such limits, if they exist, are extremely broad and not very constraining in the Canadian-American relationship. One might stretch one’s imagination and conceive of situations in which military force might be used, but such speculations are hardly credible. They only remind one of the Red Queen telling Alice in Wonderland that she could think of six impossible things before breakfast every day.
Canadian-American relations are also notable for the multiple channels of con-tact between the two countries. Each country is the other’s most important trading partner. Each year some 38 million Americans travel to Canada and some 34 million Canadians visit the United States. In the 1970s there were between 20,000 and 30,000 permanent immigrants in each direction. American magazines and television capture a large portion of Canadian attention. In the late 1960s American residents owned about 29 percent (by value) of Canadian corporations involved in manufac-turing, energy, mining, railways, utilities, and merchandising. In manufacmanufac-turing, the figure was 44 percent.7Moreover, as Table 7.1 shows, many of these societal connec-tions have increased since 1920.
The two governments, as well as the societies, have multiple points of contact.
About thirty-one American federal agencies and twenty-one Canadian counterparts deal directly with each other, as do some states and provinces.8A study prepared for the Canadian Parliament found that in 1968 there were about 6,500 visits back and forth across the border by government officials from the two countries. Only 139 of these visits were to or from the Canadian Department of External Affairs.9The telephone is another channel of direct contact. In one week in November 1972, there was a daily average of 340 calls between the United States and Canada on the United States government’s Federal Telephone Service toll-free lines.10The classical image of governments interacting through their foreign offices is clearly inappropriate in the Canadian-American case.
Finally, the agenda of Canadian-American relations shows a broad range of issues without a preponderance or domination of military security concerns. Because
TABLE 7.1 Selected Transnational Processes: United States–Canada Immigration
Year U.S. to Canada Canada to U.S.
1920 40,000 90,000
1938 6,000 14,000
1953 9,000 46,000
1962 11,000 44,000
1971 23,000 23,000
Visits (millions)
Year U.S. to Canada Canada to U.S.
1920 Nd nd
1938 Nd nd
1953 28 23
1962 32 30
1971 39 34
Trade ($ millions)
Year
Canadian exports to U.S.
Percentage of total Canadian exports
U.S. exports to Canada
Percentage of total U.S. exports
1920 581 45 921 12
1938 279 33 460 15
1953 2,463 59 2,940 19
1962 3,608 57 3,970 22
1971 11,665 66 10,951 21
Investment
Year
U.S. long-term in Canada ($ billion)
U.S. as percentage of foreign investment
1920 1.6 (1918) 36
1938 4.2 (19399) 60
1953 8.9 77
1962 19.2 77
1971 28.0 (1967) 81
Source: M. C. Urquhart, ed., Historical Statistics of Canada (Toronto: MacMillan, 1965);
Statistics Canada, Canada Year Book (Ottawa: Information Canada, various years); Statistics Canada, Canada’s International Investment Position, 1926–67 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971); United Nations Statistical Yearbook (New York: United Nations, 1961, 1971).
Canadian-American Relations and Complex Interdependence 147
TABLE 7.2 Interstate Interactions with Canada, 1920–46
1920s (n = 64) 1930s (n = 92) 1940–46 (n = 119) Issue Area (government objectives)
Military 3% 5% 44%
Political 8 10 20
Social 16 20 6
Economic 72 65 30
Level of Attention in United States
President 12.5% 15% 16%
Cabinet officers 75 34 20
Other officials 12.5 50 64
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1920–46).
of the multiple contacts described above, it is virtually impossible to map the entire agenda of relations, but for 1920–46, we can map the relationship described in diplomatic documents (see Table 7.2).
The documents show a high preponderance of economic issues on the interstate agenda (except for the war years); and a tripling in the average number of annual interactions from 6.4 per year in the 1920s, through 9.2 per year in the 1930s, to 17 per year in the early 1940s. As the agenda became more complex, the proportion of issues coming before the president increased somewhat, but the most dramatic change was the decline in the proportion of issues handled by cabinet officials (primarily the secretary of state) and the rise in the proportion handled by the bureaucracy. If we limit ourselves to the president’s public agenda, indicated by Public Papers of the President, we find social and economic issues comprising a major portion of the annual references to Canada except in wartime (Table 7.3).
Not only have socioeconomic issues been prominent, but it has often been dif-ficult to establish and maintain a consistent hierarchy among issues. In the experi-ence of an American official,
Neither country has found it possible to list formally, with meaningful consen-sus, its priorities toward the other in any specific form. It could not be done without simultaneously applying corresponding priorities to aspects of domestic policy, and consequently to constituent groups. . . . “Country papers,” “policy analysis and resource allocation papers,” and so forth have some disciplining value when the components are principally active in foreign affairs. They can be little more than bureaucratic exercises when intended to discipline as well some of the major “domestic” departments and regulatory boards.11
Although high-level attention from the president or a preponderant cabinet official such as Treasury Secretary Connally in 1971–72 can temporarily impose a set of priorities on the agenda’s multiple issues, it is almost impossible to maintain the high level of attention necessary to enforce coherence and consistency. Thus the realist assumption of a consistent hierarchy of national goals with security at the top does not fit the Canadian-American case.
Ever since World War II the Canadian-American relationship has been governed by a regime based on alliance, constant consultation, and prohibition of overt linkage of issues. Although the regimes that govern bilateral country relationships are much broader and more diffuse than those which affect the issue areas we discussed in Part II, the weakness of the formal institutions in a relationship such as that between the United States and Canada does not signify the absence of a regime or of international organization in the broad sense in which we have defined it. On the contrary, diplomats and close observers were quite able to describe the expected procedures and rules of the game. Indeed in 1965, at the behest of President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson, ambassadors Merchant and Heeney summarized the procedures for consultation within the alliance that came to be called quiet diplomacy.12And the avoidance of overt link-age is described in the words of another experienced diplomat: “marginally you may shade a deal to create goodwill, but basically each deal must stand on its own.”13
This postwar regime is not immutable. In the prewar era, although force was not used and economic issues dominated the agenda, the procedures in the relationship were quite different. Moreover, both sides frequently linked unrelated issues for bargaining purposes, although the Americans did it more successfully. The postwar regime, with its symbolism of a common cause and its constant consultation, developed in response to the German threat in World War II and the subsequent Soviet threat during the Cold War.
Again in the early 1970s, it seemed that the regime norm against linkage would be altered. In the later 1960s, the doctrine of quiet diplomacy had come under considerable criticism from nationalistic elements of the Canadian public. As we shall see, the increasingly nationalistic and assertive Canadian bargaining approach of the 1960s TABLE 7.3 Economic and Social Issues as Percentage of Annual References to
Canadaa
Period
Total number of
references to Canada Percentage
Roosevelt to 1940 16 80
World War II 16 23
Truman after 1945 36 65
Eisenhower 36 55
Kennedy-Johnson 52 55
aPurely pro-forma and goodwill statements were excluded.
Source: Public Papers of the President (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933–69).
Australian-American Relations and Complex Interdependence 149
had positive results, at least in the short run. Outcomes of issues increasingly reflected Canada’s position. But in response, the United States Treasury in 1971–72 took the lead in “getting tough with Canada,” politicizing trade issues, linking them to other concerns, and attempting to control the transgovernmental contacts of other agencies. At the same time, the Canadian government was itself trying to exercise greater control over transnational and transgovernmental relations.14Somewhat surprisingly, the efforts on both sides to politicize issues and centralize bargaining did not persist long enough to alter the regime fundamentally. Transgovernmental interactions continued, and overt linkages again became rare. For example, a 1971 effort by the United States Treasury to link American acceptance of Canadian oil to Canadian willingness to renegotiate the auto pact now seems as striking in its rarity as in its ironic timing. We shall explore the relationship between regime and outcomes in greater detail later in this chapter.