The CA evolved from Amartya Sen’s reflections on the informational basis of traditional welfare economics (Anand et al., 2009). His critical ideas about established ways of measuring human development were influenced by those of Aristotle and Marx, just like Martha Nussbaum’s thinking on the topic was (Nussbaum, 2000). The dialogue between the two scholars finally led to the creation of a development ethic which has been discussed by researchers from various fields (Anand et al., 2009). Yet, the CA debate preserved one center piece which can be ascribed to the CA, namely the importance of freedom for human well-being (ibid.). Instead of focusing on utility or some sort of commodity4, Sen and Nussbaum focus on human well-being as the universal goal for human development, which depends on a person’s freedom to choose. The CA is not a theory though, that is able to explain poverty, inequality and deprivation but it serves as a framework with whose help it is possible to conceptualize and assess the latter phenomena (Robeyns, 2006). It thus promotes development as enhancement of certain human functionings and the expansion of human capabilities to function (Crocker, 1992; Sen, 2012). Within the CA framework, human functioning is to be understood as “parts of the state of a person – in particular the various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life” (Sen, 1993, p. 31). Capability, on the other hand, refers to “the alternative combinations of functionings the person can achieve, and from which he or she can choose one collection” (Sen, 1993, p. 31). Since quality of life and well-being of a person depends on her freedom to choose, her individual set of capabilities provides the primary informational base for the CA (Sen, 1993, p. 38). So, when trying to assess and compare the individual states of well-being, the CA focuses on an individual’s alternatives, she can choose from, saying on her capabilities instead of looking at her utility or resource base.
Capabilities can also be derived from functionings, since it is possible to trace back to the various alternatives, a person is able to choose from through observing what a person is actually doing (Sen, 2012). If someone appears to be healthy, the functioning of being healthy may be based on the person’s capability to be in good health, her ability to choose to care for her health status.
Alternatively, in the context of the CA, not being able to choose to care for one’s health, in other
4 Crocker (1992) indicates that both, Sen and Nussbaum criticize approaches to evaluating human quality of life based on commodities, since there is a danger of ‘commodity fetishism’, meaning that an intrinsic value is ascribed to goods which, according to the two scholars, should only be seen as means to the end of achieving well-being. They also point out that the effect of a commodity on an individual’s life is highly variable just like the way in which people tend to use a commodity. Moreover, the CA is a counter draft to welfare approaches like utilitarianism, because it focuses on agency and freedom to choose as measures of well-being instead of mental states that might not be able to depict the actual deprivation of an individual. A seriously deprived person might still think of herself as well-off.
words not being able to care for one’s health on one’s own terms, serves as a sign of deprivation.
Due to informational problems or measurement constraints, it may prove to be very difficult, at times even impossible, to measure capabilities in the field and deriving them from observed functionings may be the best available option (Robeyns, 2006). Also, when the researcher tries to measure “well-being achievement”5 (Sen, 1993, p. 35) in her study, which is the case for this thesis, the individuals’ functionings will serve as an adequate basis for this evaluation. Nonetheless, functionings and capabilities form the evaluative space of the CA (Sen, 1993). Furthermore, individual capabilities are created by making use of goods and services, available to the person in her specific context. Hence, commodities are an integral part of the CA but unlike approaches that ascribe intrinsic importance to these goods6, in a CA context, they serve as means only (Robeyns, 2005). Resources like food and shelter and services like education and public health care enable the individual to develop capabilities to function which is the CA’s goal for a development that promotes human well-being. The same resources do not serve different individuals in the same way, though. How a certain resource is transformed into a capability depends on the context, the individual is situated in. For instance, if a German student has saved a certain amount of money with the purpose to travel to a distant country after finishing school, there are very few requirements for her to transform her savings into the ability to travel. One requirement might consist in getting a visa for her favored destination, which should not be an issue due to the fact that it is comparably easy to obtain a visa in a lot of countries for German passport holders. Yet, the same amount of money saved up by a Gambian student in the same position of her career might not be transformed into the ability to travel, since the requirements for Gambian passport holders to get a visa for the countries, the German and the Gambian student would like to visit, are most probably a lot higher than for German students. In addition, the likelihood of being denied the visa while fulfilling all requirements would also be higher for the Gambian student than for her German counterpart. As Robeyns (2005, p. 99) indicates, various conversion factors influence the relation between a good and achieving certain beings and doings. A person’s health state, her reading skills as well as her sex influence how this person turns resources, like a broad network of influential
5 Sen (1993) indicates that there are four possible points for an evaluative interest when applying the CA: (1) promotion of well-being, (2) pursuit of agency goals, (3) achievement and (4) the freedom to achieve. This distinction then leads him to a definition of several concepts of advantage, among which “well-being achievement” is listed and described as the ‘wellness’ of the person’s state of being depicted through the constituent elements of her being, evaluated from her perspective of her own welfare. Her various functionings make up these constituent elements (Sen, 1993, p. 36).
6 Rawls‘ proposal of primary goods and Dworkin’s equality of resources are examples of such approaches (Sen, 1993).
people for example, into a capability, like being able to gain an influential position in society. These personal attributions fall into the category of personal conversion factors whereas social norms and gender roles are examples of social conversion factors. Finally, there are environmental conversion factors that describe the impact of the respective climate and geographical location. By specifying the relationship between goods and services and capabilities, Robeyns (2005) answers to criticisms stating that the CA is too individualistic and does not consider the social embeddedness of human beings. At the same time, she does not assign a new intrinsically important role to resources within the framework but classifies them, as Sen and Nussbaum do, as means to the ultimate goal of capability development, ergo well-being. At the same time, Robeyns (2005, p. 95) points out to the fact that the distinction between ends and means may be vague in explicit situations when ends again serve as means to other ends. Like that, being able to read and write might be an end in itself, enhancing the quality of life of the respective individual, and a means to being able to communicate with others at the same time. Here, she addresses one kind of feedback loop that might be observed when assessing the well-being of an individual with the help of the CA. In her non-dynamic visualization of the framework (Figure 2), this connection is not represented though.7 Yet another question that has sparked a lot of discussion in the debate around the CA is how the
most relevant capabilities should be selected from the many that constitute an individual’s opportunity space. In contrast to Sen, Martha Nussbaum advocates for a concrete list of ten
7 Feedback loops are an essential part of the MCLAA and will be part of its presentation in chapter 3.3.
Figure 2: A stylized non-dynamic representation of a person’s capability set and her social and personal context. Source:
(Robeyns, 2005, p. 98).
capabilities8 working as a threshold beyond which it is not possible to lead a truly human life (Nussbaum, 2003). In her opinion, capabilities like “being able to have good health (…)”(Nussbaum, 2003, p. 41)9, but also “[b]eing able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities” (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 42) as well as “[b]eing able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life” (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 42) should serve as political principles that secure constitutional guarantees. While Nussbaum is specifying central capabilities as part of her endeavor to create a partial theory of justice on the basis of the CA, Sen does not take such a stand but leaves the definition of central capabilities to case-specific deliberative processes (Nussbaum, 2003; Sen, 1993). Rather than establishing theoretical demands in favor of social justice, he promotes a use of the CA as an evaluation tool for policies focusing on quality of life augmentation (Nussbaum, 2000;
Robeyns, 2005). His position is closer to economic reasoning and assigns the role of effective opportunity to capabilities while Nussbaum’s approach can be situated closer to the humanitarian tradition. She sees capabilities as skills and personality traits of individuals (Robeyns, 2005). Sen (1993, 2012) accepts Nussbaum’s approach to defining central capabilities for all human beings but holds up the opinion that the CA does not require such a definite enumeration and may even need to make use of more extensive lists depending on the specific context10. According to Sen, democratic deliberation on selecting certain capabilities serves as a valid process to account for the diverse environments and situations of individuals.
In the present thesis, no threshold level of central capabilities was applied, following Sen’s line of thought. Firstly, an assessment concerning the social justice of the recyclers’ lives was not intended but a comparison of their quality of life in varying contexts, meaning that the case study focused more on the difference in quality of life of formal and informal recyclers than on the overall appropriateness of livelihoods of Peruvian recyclers regarding ‘the good life’. Secondly, by avoiding to pre-define capabilities of interest for the study, contestants were given the possibility to name functionings and capabilities without any constraints, so that an over-emphasis of certain points and holding back of other answers could be prevented.
8 See Nussbaum, 2000, p. 78-80 for a more detailed description of all ten capabilities
9 Robeyns (2005) points out that it is important to take the most recent version of Nussbaum’s list as basis for one’s work. Due to the fact that the list was not part of the research design of the present thesis, the citations were taken from a version of the list that was published in 2011 without checking for a more current version.
10 Sen defines basic capabilities as a subset of all capabilities that are necessary for survival and escaping poverty but does not go on to specify them (Robeyns, 2005). He did, however, endorse some capabilities when advising the authors of the UN Human Development Report 1990
(http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/219/hdr_1990_en_complete_nostats.pdf) in creating the Human Development Index Nussbaum (2003, p. 43)
The CA provides the MCLAA with several building blocks which therefore need to be highlighted.
Besides capabilities, meaning everything a person is able to do or be, like being able to read, being able to be adequately nourished or being able to have health insurance, functionings play a crucial part in Lienert and Burger’s framework, too. They explain what a person actually is and does, for instance being adequately nourished and having a health insurance. Capabilities and functionings are connected through choices, thus the process when a person chooses to pursue a range of her various capabilities for them to become functionings. Lastly, specific conversion factors are also a crucial component of the MCLAA. They describe the coherence between goods and services available to a person and the capabilities, this person manages to create from them. Conversion factors represent the social embeddedness of an individual by showing that structural characteristics, like growing up with many siblings, have an impact on how a good or service, like money on a savings account for education fees, are transformed into capabilities, like being able to go to college.
Before elaborating more explicitly on the MCLAA, its second constituent, the SLA shall be explained in the next chapter.