Capability

Capability refers to those aspects of the EU’s internal policy process which constrain or facilitate actorness and hence ‘govern the Union’s ability to capitalise on presence or respond to opportunity’ (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006:29). Here our DA focus is on: the values underpinning the EU project, on the legitimisation of processes and priorities related to external action, but more importantly on the consistency and coherence of policies, as well as on the availability of adequate instruments.

European values

Identifying references of overarching EU values and principles is relatively unproblematic. The texts of the ESS, the ENP, the Comprehensive Approach or the EUGS, for instance, all echo the values enshrined in the TEU. There are repeated mentions of the rule of law, democratic governance, human rights, liberty, peaceful resolution of conflicts, but also of social progress and sustainable development.

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The EU and its Member States claim to adhere to all these values in their internal affairs and also to advance them in their interaction with third countries.

Domestic legitimisation of external action

The values above are not the main drivers of the EU’s international mediation efforts. Although the EU is constantly reaffirming its commitment ‘to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to champion the indivisibility and universality of human rights’ (EEAS, 2016a:17), this appears more a matter of externally legitimising EU action. Domestic legitimisation is generally achieved through the reiteration in all strategy and policy papers that conflicts anywhere in the world threaten ‘European interests directly and indirectly’ (European Council, 2003:4). The predominant narrative draws attention to the fact that conflicts can ‘affect the EU’s own security, through regional escalation, unmanageable migratory flows, […] and the creation of breeding grounds for terrorist and criminal activity’ (EU, 2007:6), as well as undermine the EU’s geopolitical and economic interests (European Commission, 2011b:5). All these suggest that Member States seldom support engagement in conflict resolution if this is not framed as vital to their own interests. While this diminishes the extent to which EU action can be thought of as normative, it does mean in theory that the EU has the full capability for actorness with the support of all its Member States.

Consistency and coherence

Consistency indicates the alignment between the EU’s external policies and those of its Member States. The EU documentation is very self-critical of the high levels of inconsistency (European Commission, 2011b; 2015; EEAS, 2015; 2016; Juncker, 2016). In the context of the response to the Arab uprisings, the EU condemns the ‘business of usual’ of its Member States and declares that its neighbourhood cannot become ‘a safer place’ unless the Union delivers a ‘common message’ (European Commission, 2011b:5). Years after this call for unity, there is still the belief that ‘a joined-up approach is needed today, not only in external conflicts and crises, but in virtually every aspect of the EU’s presence in the world’ (EEAS, 2015:18).

Coherence refers to the coordination of EU policies and goals. The EU is well-aware of the need to address this issue for a more effective external action, so the 2009 Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities and the 2013 Comprehensive Approach are hailed as significant steps towards a common strategic vision. The EU appears to work for a ‘clear sense of direction’ in order to really ‘punch its weight in global affairs’ (EEAS, 2015:20).

However, despite the promising rhetoric and new strategies, the EU struggles with promoting conflicting goals. For instance, the ENP’s review in the wake of the Arab Spring illustrates the tensions deriving from supporting, on one side, democracy and human rights (European Commission, 2011a) and, on the other side, stability and security (European Commission, 2015). Promoting democratic change implies the risk of destabilizing authoritarian countries since it calls for a governmental transition. There is clearly political uncertainty associated with the result of the transition and even the

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risk of starting or aggravating violent conflicts. This example proves that the EU has little chance for actorness unless it addresses all these in-built incoherencies of its external mission.

Availability of policy instruments

The EU has at its disposal a wide range of instruments including diplomatic, economic (incentives and sanctions) and even military. The 2013 Comprehensive Approach aims to harmonise their potential use in order to ensure that short-term actions and objectives are pursed with a long-term vision. The EU has, in theory, adequate tools and strategies not only to mediate, but also to contribute to peacekeeping, post-conflict economic recovery and to build sustainable peace. Nonetheless, as the EU itself notes, the possibility of applying them all and/or effectively depends on its ability of overcoming issues of consistency – hence the call for ‘greater coordination with Member States’ own policies’ (EEAS, 2015:3) - and coherence – putting ‘a premium on various actors and instruments of EU external action working in synergy’ (EEAS, 2015:18).

The use of military means under the CSDP is particularly contentious. Since the EU is not a military alliance, the possibility for CSDP operations relies on ‘voluntary contributions by Member States’ (EEAS, 2015:17). The EU stresses that this has often resulted in peacekeeping and crisis management operations being deployed too slowly and often with very limited ‘scope, size and strategic depth’ (EEAS, 2015:17). Consequently, the EUGS calls on Member States ‘to enhance the deployability and interoperability of their forces’ in order to allow the CSDP operations to ‘become more rapid and effective’ (EEAS, 2016a:47). The Member States’ willingness to do so remains highly questionable.