Before looking at the biographies of these new military leaders, it is useful to review some of the key events that have shaped the recent history of the PLA in order to better understand their impact on this new CMC. For example, one would want to know where, institutionally, these new leaders sat during previous periods of crisis or tension. This would include understanding what positions these leaders held during the summer of 1989 or as the crisis evolved during the Taiwan Straits missile tests in 1995-96.
Other events deal more directly with the reform and modernization of the PLA. The new members of the Central Military Commission were not mere spectators to the dramatic changes that have taken place within the PLA over the past two decades. In many cases they were active participants, implementing military policies and responding to national crises. And, their involvement in these changes was deemed to be successful. These events shaped their careers, defi ned what were seen to be their professional accomplishments, and make up the experiences that they will draw upon when leading the People’s Liberation Army in the coming years.
Some key events include:
Development of the New Strategic Assessment of “Peace and Development.”
In 1985 Deng Xiaoping provided an assessment of the international security environment that has since provided a
rationale for the basic direction of China’s domestic policies, foreign policies, and defense policies. Key to this was the belief that “peace and development” was the keynote of the times—that China would enjoy a relatively long lasting peaceful environment in which it could concentrate on economic development. With this assessment, Deng determined that what had previously been considered the most likely PLA contingency—fi ghting an imminent war, total war, and nuclear war—was no longer applicable and that the PLA should instead train and prepare for a more limited, locally-oriented war. This fundamental shift in assumptions made PLA reform and modernization possible.
Quite simply, when the PRC was working under the assumption that total war was imminent, the PLA could only rely on the weapons and techniques it had on hand to defend China. With war no longer considered to be imminent, and with two decades of predicted peace in which to reform, modernize, innovate, and experiment, the door was now open for doctrinal adjustment based on new military developments. It was possible for the PLA to plan for the future as well as deal with the present.1 As a result the PRC leadership made
a decision to modernize the PLA while at the same time carrying out a program of economic development.
The defi nition of this most likely type of confl ict for which the PLA was preparing to fi ght has changed several times since this fi rst groundbreaking change: from Local Wars to Local Wars Under Modern Conditions, to Local Wars Under Modern High Tech Conditions. Each change has brought with it some adjustment to PLA military doctrine. These changes in turn have had to be internalized by PLA leaders, passed down through the ranks, and utilized in training. Rising offi cers in the PLA were called upon to master these changes and further implement them over the course of their careers.
Downsizing and Force Restructuring.
Concomitant with the decision to reform and modernize the PLA while focusing on economic development was the conclusion that PLA restructuring was necessary, as well. This involved downsizing
the PLA, both in terms of manpower and organizational structure. Thus, in 1985 the PLA was reduced by a million in personnel, and the number of Military Regions (MR) went from eleven to seven. This was followed by later force reductions of 500,000 (announced in 1997) and 200,000 (announced in 2003).
Although a critical move necessary in order to promote modernization and professionalization in the PLA offi cer corps, implementing this decision presented a host of challenges for offi cers in the PLA. This was particularly true for those working in the headquarters of military regions and in the General Staff Department (GSD) and those working on personnel related issues. As provincial and local governments worked with appropriate military counterparts to provide newly demobilized soldiers with appropriate jobs and housing, PLA offi cers developed a more nuanced appreciation for the evolving relationship between the PLA and society. Offi cers assigned to various military regions were able to see how this restructuring was affecting the PLA and were given an opportunity to gain a deeper appreciation for the limits and challenges downsizing presented. They also were afforded an opportunity to see the potential for professionalization and reform such polices provided.
Operation Desert Storm.
U.S. operations during the 1991 Gulf War left a deeper impression on the leadership of the Chinese military than virtually any previous military action. Most were shocked and stunned by the highly televised U.S. victory; more to the point, they were surprised by what this victory indicated about the state of modern warfare, including the role of joint operations in modern warfare.
The Gulf War resulted in a PLA “study campaign” to understand the operational signifi cance of the event. Upon assessing the rapidly changing nature of modern warfare, China’s leadership apparently drew two important conclusions. First, it revised its conception of the most likely types of wars and campaigns its military would be called upon to prosecute. Second, it concluded that the armed forces of China were ill equipped to fi ght and win these new, most likely campaigns, which they termed “Local Wars Under Modern High Tech Conditions.”
Two Transformations Program of Reform and Modernization. Based upon the conclusions the PLA leadership drew from the 1991 Gulf War, the PLA set upon a course of thorough and comprehensive reform—cutting across virtually every conceivable facet of activity within the PLA and seeking measured leaps in the intellectual, professional, and conceptual outlooks of its defense establishment and virtually every member of its military.2
In December 1995, at an enlarged meeting of the CMC chaired by Jiang Zemin, China’s military leaders put forth a new policy for “army building” or defense modernization to guide all aspects of PLA reform.3 Known as the “Two Transformations,” it calls for the
Chinese armed forces to undergo a metamorphosis, transforming: • From an army preparing to fi ght local wars under ordinary
conditions to an army preparing to fi ght and win Local Wars Under Modern High Tech Conditions.
• From an army based on quantity to an army based on quality. Although a holistic endeavor, the true scope and breadth of these reforms is best understood by considering them as three separate vectors aimed at the same objective. 4 (See Figure 1.)
Material V ector Doctrinal Vector
Institutional Vector
Capability to fi ght and win future Local Wars Under Modern High Tech Conditions
• Material vector—weapons, equipment, and new age systems. Reforms in this area are aimed at improving the weapons and equipment that the PLA will use to wage a campaign. They involve the development, procurement, acquisition, and fi elding of new weapons systems, technologies, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets and architectures, and both combat and combat support technologies.
• Doctrinal vector—operational concepts and warfi ghting techniques. Reforms in this area are aimed at improving how the PLA will fi ght. It consists of the new operational concepts: strategic guidelines, campaign methods, and tactics.
• Institutional vector—systemic underpinning, organizations, and processes. Reforms in this area are aimed at improving the institutions that enable the PLA to fulfi ll its national security objectives. It includes reforms to the systemic underpinnings, organizations, and processes that support and enable the fi rst two vectors of reform. Examples include the personnel system, military education system, training regimens, force structure, command and control relationships, logistics structure, defense research and development complex, standardization processes (the codifi cation of regulations and standard operating procedures), and military legal system.
It would be diffi cult to overstate the degree to which the PLA has focused on this program of reform and modernization in recent years. Reforms occurring along each of these vectors have been repeatedly emphasized in PLA discussions during the bulk of the past 10 years.
Progress along the material vector is comparatively easy to measure. Leaders engaged in these sorts of reforms include those engaged in weapons procurement and those participating in or guiding the development of new types of weapons and equipment.
Military leaders engaged in work along the doctrinal vector would include those involved in the formulation, vetting, and implementation of new operational concepts and techniques. At various phases in the process, this would include researchers at military science research and teaching institutions such as
the Academy of Military Science and China’s National Defense University. It would also include operators, such as leaders in experimental units that are charged to test and evaluate new tactics and operational concepts and those working in the headquarters departments of Military Regions who might be charged to incorporate these concepts in large-scale military exercises.
Military leaders engaged in work along the institutional vector focus on improving the systemic underpinnings supporting PLA reform and modernization. Often this work supports activities occurring along the other two vectors of reform. Offi cers engaged in this work can be found both “at the center” working within the four general departments, and at the headquarters departments of military regions throughout China.
In light of all these changes, the PLA is therefore in fl ux. That is, it is operating in the midst of both internal evolution (covering institutions and doctrine, as well as equipment), as well as national- level changes (in terms of the ongoing process of economic reform and the building of a “socialist market economy”) and a global security environment that has seen, since at least 2001, enormous shifts.
LEADERSHIP CHANGE IN THE CENTRAL MILITARY