Pa ge 35
Applying the above pronouncements on the instant case, it is clear that possession passed from vendor William Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro, and accordingly, the later sale a retro in favor of petitioner failed to pass the possession of the property because there is an impediment — the possession exercised by private respondent. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessions, the one longer in possession, if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper
proceedings (Art. 538, Civil Code).
ISSUE 2: WON the case for forcible entry was proper.
As to petitioner's query that "Is the entry of petitioner to the property characterized by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth in order to show that private respondent has had possession so that the case is within the jurisdiction of the inferior court?". The same is answered in the affirmative.
The act of entering the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. Under the rule, entering upon the premises by strategy or stealth is equally as obnoxious as entering by force. The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. The words "by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another who has had prior possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of person already clothed with lawful
possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 Ed., pp. 243 -244; Drilon vs. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 342 [1987]).
HELD: affirmed the decision of the CFI. /adsum
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND ELPIDIA, FELICIDAD, ISABEL, JOSE, EUGENIA, AQUILINA, CONSUELO AND NATIVIDAD, all surnamed LEYVA, and EDUARDA Vda. de LEYVA, respondents. G.R. No. 71393 June 28, 1989
CASE DOCTRINES
Acts of tolerance; cannot start prescription to run
The provision of Article 1942 of the Civil Code to the effect that acts which are merely tolerated produce no effect with respect to possession is applicable as much to the prescription of real rights as to the prescription of the fee, it being a glaring and self-evident error to affirm the contrary, as does the appellant in his motion papers. Possession is the fundamental basis of the prescription. Without it no kind of prescription is possible, not even the extraordinary.
Possession in the concept of an owner; start prescription to run
Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de dueño) or to use the common law equivalent of the term , it must be adverse. Acts of a possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en concepto de dueño and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription.
FACTS:
Petition to review by certiorari under Rule 45.
Nazario Crisostomo and Maria Escusar owned a parcel of registered land situated in Cainta, Rizal. Upon the death of both, the property passed on to their daughter Bibiana Crisostomo Vda. de Eladio Leyva. Ultimately, the property was inherited by the children of Bibiana (LEYVAs).
Prior to the issuance of OCT, in the name of Nazario Crisostomo, MERALCO erected thereon two transmission steel towers. In 1931, when the OCT was issued, no encumbrance was annotated thereon.
On August 4, 1973, the LEYVAs sued MERALCO for damages and sum of money with prayer for attorney's fees and exemplary damages for its continued use of the LEYVAs' property.
LEVYAs claim/s:
1. the property became off limits because of the high voltage of electric current running in the cable lines.
Notes (Case Digests Property)
Pa ge 36
MERALCO’s answer:
1. it had acquired a grant from the original owner of the land, Nazario Crisostomo, for a perpetual easement of right of way for the erection and operation of the transmission steel towers for which it had paid Crisostomo the total sum of $12.40.
2. even without the grant of perpetual easement, the LEYVAs' complaint is deemed barred by prescription and laches, because of MERALCO's open, continuous and uninterrupted enjoyment of the easement for a period of 43 years.
RTC decision: in favor of the LEYVAs.
CA decision: affirmed RTC decision in toto.
ISSUE: WON MERALCO had acquired a right of ownership over the property.
RULING:
It is a fundamental principle of the law in this jurisdiction concerning the possession of real property that such possession is not affected by acts of a possessory character which are 'merely tolerated' by the possessor, or which are due to his license (Civil Code, Arts. 444 and 1942). This principle is applicable not only with respect to the prescription of the dominium as a whole, but to the prescription of right in rem. In the case of Cortes vs. Palanca Yu-Tibo (2 Phil. Rep., 24, 38) the Court said:
The provision of Article 1942 of the Civil Code to the effect that acts which are merely tolerated produce no effect with respect to possession is applicable as much to the prescription of real rights as to the prescription of the fee, it being a glaring and self-evident error to affirm the contrary, as does the appellant in his motion papers. Possession is the fundamental basis of the prescription. Without it no kind of prescription is possible, not even the extraordinary. Consequently, if acts of mere tolerance produce no effect with respect to possession, as that article provides, in conformity with Article 444 of the same Code, it is evident that they can produce no effect with respect to prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary. This is true whether the prescriptive acquisition be of a fee or of real rights, for the same reason holds in one and the other case; that is, that there has been no true possession in the legal sense of the word. (See also Ayala de Roxas vs. Maglonso, 8 Phil. Rep., 745; Municipality of Nueva Caceres vs. Director of Lands and Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 24 Phil. Rep., 485).
Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de dueño) or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of a possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en concepto de dueño and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription.
HELD: petition is hereby DENIED. /adsum
SPS. RICARDO AND LYDIA LLOBRERA, et al., Petitioners, vs. JOSEFINA V. FERNANDEZ, Respondent. G.R. No.
142882 May 2, 2006 CASE DOCTRINES
Absence of proof of any contractual basis for possession; presumption
From the absence of proof of any contractual basis for petitioners’ possession of the subject premises, the only legal implication is that their possession thereof is by mere tolerance.
Possession by mere tolerance; implied promise of the occupant; remedy
A person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The subject of the controversy is a 1,849 square-meter registered parcel of land. Josefina V. Fernandez, one of the registered co-owners of the land, served a written demand letter upon the Spouses Llobrera, et al., to vacate the premises within fifteen (15) days from notice. However, they refused to vacate.
Fernandez then filed a verified Complaint for ejectment and damages against Sps. Llobera, et al. before the MTCC of Dagupan City.
MTCC decision: in favor of Fernandez.
RTC decision: affirmed the MTCC.
CA decision: affirmed the RTC.
Notes (Case Digests Property)
Pa ge 37
ISSUE: WON Sps Llobera, et al.’s occupation and possession of the property is by mere tolerance of Fernandez.
RULING:
From the absence of proof of any contractual basis for petitioners’ possession of the subject premises, the only legal implication is that their possession thereof is by mere tolerance. In Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled:
A person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
The judgment favoring the ejectment of petitioners being consistent with law and jurisprudence can only be affirmed. The alleged consignation of the P20.00 monthly rental to a bank account in respondent’s name cannot save the day for the petitioners simply because of the absence of any contractual basis for their claim to rightful possession of the subject property. Consignation based on Article 1256 of the Civil Code indispensably requires a creditor-debtor relationship between the parties, in the absence of which, the legal effects thereof cannot be availed of.
HELD: petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. /adsum
GABRIEL ELANE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and INOCENCIO V. CHUA, respondents. G.R. No. 80638 April 26, 1989
CASE DOCTRINES
Possession as a fact; rule; exception
General Rule: Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities Exception: in the case of co-possession
Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession;
1. the present possessor shall be preferred;
2. if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession;
3. if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and
4. if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.
FACTS:
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Inocencio V. Chua filed an action for forcible entry in the MTCC of Olongapo City for the eviction of Gabriel Elane from a portion of a parcel of land which was the subject of a permit to occupy issued to Chua by the Bureau of Forestry on August 16, 1961.
Chua’s allegations:
1. that on February 15, 1980, while visiting the property, he discovered that Elane was constructing a semi-concrete building on a portion thereof, without his knowledge and consent.
2. The order made by Chua upon Elane to desist therefrom was ignored by the latter.
Elane’s answer/s:
1. that he was granted a permit by the Bureau of Forest Development over a parcel of land located at Upper Kalaklan,Olongapo City.
2. that he has been in possession and occupation of that parcel of land continuously and uninterruptedly since 1970, having originally erected a hut thereon which was later replaced by a bungalow
3. that the land has been declared for taxation in his name and the real property taxes thereon paid by him for the years 1970 to 1979.
MTCC decision: dismissed the complaint.
RTC decision: affirmed the MTCC.
CA decision: reversed the RTC and MTCC.
ISSUE: WON Chua has a better right over the property.
RULING:
In sum, private respondent was in earlier possession of the contested lot; his sales application preceded that of petitioner; his warehouse and gasoline station already existed long before petitioner took possession of the parcel of land in question; and he has been paying taxes and rental fees thereon since 1968. As provided by the Civil Code -
Notes (Case Digests Property)
Pa ge 38
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the case of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; ...
Having been in prior continuous possession, private respondent is preferentially entitled to occupy the land.
HELD: judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. /adsum
Republic vs. Alonte CASE DOCTRINES
Possession can be exercised in one’s name or that of another
The fact that Editha Alonte, respondent's attorney-in-fact, testified that it is she and her family who are residing on the subject lot does not negate the statement in the petition for reconstitution that it is respondent who is in possession of the lot.
After all, Article 524 of the New Civil Code provides that possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of another.
Obviously, Editha Alonte was exercising possession over the land in the name of respondent Lourdes Alonte.
FACTS:
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
In 2001 Lourdes F. Alonte filed a Petition for the Reconstitution of the original TCT and Issuance of the Corresponding Owner's Duplicate thereof over lot 18-B of the subd. Plan (LRC) Psd-328326 co situated in the Municipality of Caloocan (now Quezon City).
All the requirements were complied by Alonte. There being no opposition her representative was allowed to present evidience ex-parte.
RTC decision: granted the reconstitution.
The RTC has issued a Certificate of finality. However, it revoked the same because a Notice of Appeal was submitted.
CA decision: affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE: WON Alonte who was in the United States complied with possession requirement for the reconstitution of title.
RULING:
The petition for reconstitution alleged that respondent is in possession of the subject lot and it listed the names and addresses of adjoining owners enumerated in the Certification from the Office of the City Assessor dated August 1, 2001; it stated that the title is free from any and all liens and encumbrances; and it stated that a copy of TCT No. 335986 is attached to the petition and made an integral part of the petition, hence, the restrictions and liabilities appearing at the back of the copy of the TCT are deemed part of the petition for reconstitution. Said petition was also accompanied by a technical description of the property approved by the Commissioner of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, the predecessor of the LRA, as prescribed under the last condition of Section 12 of R.A. No. 26. Thus, the petition clearly complied with the requirements of Section 12, R.A. No. 26.
The fact that Editha Alonte, respondent's attorney-in-fact, testified that it is she and her family who are residing on the subject lot does not negate the statement in the petition for reconstitution that it is respondent who is in possession of the lot.
After all, Article 524 of the New Civil Code provides that possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of another.
Obviously, Editha Alonte was exercising possession over the land in the name of respondent Lourdes Alonte. This is supported by the Certificationfrom the Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City which states that the real property taxes on said property, declared in the name of Lourdes Alonte, had been paid.
Furthermore, as stated above, the LRA submitted to the trial court a Report dated August 2, 2002 stating that “*t+he plan and technical description of Lot 18-B of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-328326, were verified correct by this Authority to represent the aforesaid lot and the same have been approved under (LRA) PR-19193 pursuant to the provisions of Section 12 of R.A. No. 26.”
Attached to said Report were the print copy of plan (LRA) PR-19193 and the corresponding technical description. Since the LRA issued a Report that is highly favorable to respondent, and considering further the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed the only conclusion would be that respondent has fully complied with the requirements of LRC Circular No.
35.
HELD: petition denied. /adsum
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