Case 1: Libya

The performance of High Representative Ashton was criticized by the media but also by MEPs. The crisis in Libya started early 2011. The time between the first riots in Libya and the first airstrikes of the NATO partners was very short. It took little more than a month. The EU MS condemned the use of force and would like to see reforms in Libya and increased the pressure by pro-active sanctions policy (Smidt, 2012).

The Libya crisis showed that the function of the High Representative had a strong impact on the European crisis management missions. European crisis management had a very complex decision-making process. It begins with monitoring in most cases together with a fact finding mission. The fact finding mission was focused on the living conditions of the people of Libya (Smidt, 2012).

In March 2011, High Representative organized an extraordinary informal FAC meeting. The purpose of this meeting was an assessment of the ongoing development in Libya and also to send a technical fact finding mission to Libya (Smidt, 2012). The FAC meeting resulted in joint EU action like the opening of the EU office in Benghazi. Ashton inaugurated the office. It would sent a powerful message of support to the local population. It was one of the first international missions there. The EEAS was very popular in Libya, because of the opening of their office in Benghazi and Secretary General Vimont praised Ashton for this achievement (Tercovich, 2014; O’Sullivan, 2014; Miedzinska, 2014).

Before the FAC meeting in March 2011, Ashton spoke with the NATO Secretary General to see of both the EU and NATO had the same intentions of crisis management and were complementary to each other. At the FAC meeting, Ashton indicated what the plans were of EU humanitarian mission and the planning of the evaluation of the economic sanction programme (Smidt, 2012).

The High Representative played a role by making and achieving agreement on two declarations forms on behalf of the EU, which demanded the immediate end of the use of force. According to Koenig (2014) these declarations were strong diplomatic declarations. The EEAS prepared sanctions before the UNSC. It was based on the UNSC resolution 1973. Ashton reminded Gaddafi of taking this resolution into account. Further, Ashton mentioned that Gaddafi had to comply with the demands of the international actors and especially, comply with the demands of the Libyan people (Helwig, 2014).

The EU was the first with sanctions against the Libya regime. In the early stage of the crisis of Libya, Ashton could play a central role due to her post of High Representative. She had the task of keeping contact with relevant international partners, like Ban Ki-Moon (UN) or Rasmussen (NATO) (Helwig, 2013).

MS positions did not match regarding the issues of “recognizing the opposition in Libya and the possibility of a military intervention” (Helwig, 2013). There was no vertical coherence between the MS. The decision-making level in the MS was changed from the foreign ministers to the heads of state and government. The High Representative chaired a meeting with the foreign ministers on EU level, but they were no longer in charge of the decision-making. The responsibility moved to the European Council for that reason. Ashton mentioned that there were big differences

between the MS on how to act. There was no consistency between the MS. The European Council would determine what to do at that point. From that moment the head of state and government took the attention of the media. The big three countries did not had the same viewpoint on how to act. France and the UK wanted a No-Fly-Zone but Germany had concerns among others (Howorth, 2011; Helwig, 2013; Helwig and Ruger. 2014).

Another issue was the recognition of the National Transitional Council (NTC) in the role as political interlocutor in Libya. Ashton did not take a clear position about the National Transitional Council in the beginning. She did not want to publicly meet them in Strasbourg on 9 March 2011. Cameron and Sarkozy backed the recognition of the NTC and the European Council did the same two day later. She met with the NTC on 17 March, this was after the Committee was authorized by the UN (Howorth, 2011; Helwig, 2013).

Ashton did not take the initiative, but let the MS made the decision without her doing about the NTC. In the same extraordinary Council, the Head of States and Government, demanded that Gaddafi stepped down and discussed about a No-Fly-Zone (Koenig, 2014). Ashton was resistant toward the No-Fly-Zone during a European Council meeting at 11 March. She was resistant because it could lead to a large number of civilian deaths (Nicolas and Traynor, 2011).

Another reason was that some of the MS did not preferred a leading role, especially a military one. Ashton mentioned that the EU would take a back seat and let the international community decide to act. After this decision, France and the UK together with Italy allied with the US in imposing a No-Fly-Zone. Ashton’s had a formal initiative, it consisted of an EU military operation to support humanitarian aid and was accepted by the Council on 1 April 2011. This was only a success on paper, because the EU did not get the permission of the UN, specifically the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (Howorth, 2011; Helwig, 2013; Smidt, 2012).

The Libya crisis made clear that the role of the High Representative was limited as crisis manager. When immediate actions and decisions were required, the MS were the ones in control. The High Representative was capable to show a high profile when it comes to traditional EU-level instruments, like sanctions and also in the case of permission between the MS, for example statements and diplomacy (Howorth, 2011).

Ashton was more focused on playing an active role coordinating in the areas of sanctions and humanitarian aid instead of the CSDP. This could explain why Ashton did not see CSDP as a top priority. Civilian and long-term assistance mirrors the wider range of instruments that Ashton has at her disposal (Howorth, 2011). The High Representative was a link between the Commission and the Council. It was likely that with the help of the High Representative the flow of information between both actors would improve. However, Ashton did not had influence on the unclear delimitation of the Union competences (Smidt, 2012).

Ashton has the opinion that the EU is not a traditional military power. Officials in the EEAS and also in the Council Secretariat were used to the leadership of Solana. He was in favour of that the EU would have a visible civilian and military crisis management role during crisis situations. A member of the EEAS stated (11 April 2013) that the EU Military Staff (EUMS) wanted to justify its existence during the Libya crisis. A European diplomat mentioned that “the EU should either wage a war or not react at all” (Koenig, 2014).

“The improvement of institutional coherence therefore was depended on the will of the institutions involved in crisis management, to cooperate with each other in order to achieve timely decisions and to avoid duplication of resources. The different crisis management actors needed to be encouraged to develop clear guidelines on what legal basis crisis management should be adopted if several Union competences seemed suitable (Smidt, 2012).

It can be considered that the High Representative lacks hard powers to act upon. Ashton had the role of convincing actors involved with crisis management to work together. In the case of Libya, Ashton did not live up the expectations. The MS had different opinions, how to act as the EU, but also among each other. France and England wanted a military role but some of the small countries did not had the desire of taking a leading role. Ashton led the MS do their own thing and did not picked a side. By doing this other actors took the spot lights and Ashton did not contributed much in order to solve the Libya crisis. It did not meant that she did not do anything: She opened an EU office to show her support for the people of Libya; she helped develop two

declarations and played a central role regarding the sanctions. It can be considered that Ashton was not a leader in crisis management during this crisis.