In most research studies, it is not appropriate to investigate research questions or test theories solely or primarily based on what might be called an “extreme” case (Gerring 2007). Extreme cases are unrepresentative of broader classes of cases, which makes generalizability difficult. Extreme cases are however, analytically useful when the proposed theory links the phenomena of interest to an extreme case. If the theory is not initially confirmed in an extreme case, it may not make sense to falsify the theory using other, typical cases. Extreme case analysis is also appropriate when many of the parameters of interest itself are unknown – when we do not necessarily know what it is that distinguishes between the “extreme” and other cases. Is the case extreme because it was observed a priori to be related to an extreme “effect,” or is it extreme because there is something unique about the case itself? In these instances, extreme case analysis is appropriate. The Democratic Study Group (DSG) is one such case.
The Democratic Study Group, or DSG, was the official organization of liberal Democrats in the House of Representatives from 1959 to 1994, and leader of the 1970s reform era. DSG was the first modern group of organized members inside the House, organizing prior the development of the congressional caucus and legislative organization systems, and groups such as the
Republican Study Committee (1971) or the Congressional Black Caucus (1973). But DSG was
24 In 1970, the legislative counsel for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Argyle Campbell, explained that the
Chamber did not lobby on the Legislative Reorganization Act because they regarded it as “strictly an ‘in- house’ matter. It would be much better for them (Members) to handle it themselves. Members should decide how they will conduct their legislative affairs and not outside pressure groups.” DSG papers, Part II, box 125, folder 2.
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members to come to the floor when the Democratic system faltered. It was a leadership platform for the most activist and ambitious liberal Democrats. It was a resource-sharing arrangement between Democrats (and a small number of Republicans) to develop and distribute unbiased policy research. DSG was much more than a sizable group of likeminded liberal Democrats – it was an organization intentionally designed to empower liberals to work together to achieve their mutual and individual goals.
The reforms DSG oversaw have been the subject of extensive analysis by political scientists, but the organization and work of the group itself is more or less absent. Most accounts of reform explicitly cite DSG’s work in drafting the committee and leadership reforms adopted in the 1970s. Rohde writes that “The leadership of the DSG…initiated or articulated the case for most the changes the Democrats adopted” (1991, 19). Polsby notes that “the Democratic Study Group (DSG) took the lead in proposing rules changes in the Democratic caucus” (2004, 57). And Schickler makes clear that “The DSG initiated the challenge to seniority in the late 1960s…” (2001, 231). These accounts often make some note to the group’s information research services or its whip system, or detail the rationale behind some of DSG’s decision-making, but the focus on DSG is ancillary. The full extent of the group’s role in reform is thus left unclear. And the accounts of DSG that do exist begin in the late 1960s – a full decade after the group was founded. Organizational development is assumed as a precondition of the growing minority of liberals in the House, rather than treated as an analytical unit in its own right worthy of investigation. This project is an attempt to change that.
The focus on a sole case of reform enables me to probe in-depth the institutional conditions that motivate group organization, and the role of organization in promoting the intra- party competition necessary to spur changes to institutional rules, norms, and structures. And the
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especially ideal case to provide the first test of the moderating theory of factional-driven change offered above. These reforms – the bulk of which were adopted in the 1960s and 1970s –
occurred relatively recently in congressional history. And they remain significant to party politics and the legislative process in the contemporary U.S. Congress – their impact still hard-felt in the current legislative environment.
Methods
It seems almost trite to note that this project has been conducted using a multi-method approach. I spent approximately 10 months over a period of two and a half years conducting archival research at the Library of Congress on the DSG and House Democratic Caucus papers. I read every single archival document in the DSG collection, totaling some 90,750 documents and spanning from the early 1950s to the early 1990s. The initial three months constituted an
extensive period of what Richard Fenno referred to as “soaking and poking” – an attempt to learn the tone and rhythms of a legislative office, intra-party politics, and a historical period by reading the documents key figures left behind. From there, the project evolved into a systematic analysis whereby documents were read to identify the major institutional process or phenomena of interest they had bearing on, including processes of agenda-setting, information distribution, coalition- building, leadership training, and so forth. The scope of the archival collection necessitated these groupings, but it also strengthens the validity of the analyses presented here. Analyses are developed and drawn from multiple archival documents, rather than any single document. This approach also fostered significant within-case variation, whereby failed legislative fights, leadership races, and reform proposals, are readily apparent. As these “failed” cases provide as much insight into processes of change as the “successful” cases do, I include several in the
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Congress, one former DSG staffer passed on a small number of documents from their personal papers. These documents date from 1994 and 1995, and are not part of the DSG archival collection. Some materials were coded into empirical datasets to be combined with data taken from Congressional Quarterly and Thomas.gov, as well as existing congressional data sources, and analyzed in several of the empirical chapters. These data were used to conduct the large-N statistical analyses presented in chapters 3, 4, and 5.
One of the primary weaknesses of extensive reliance on archival materials, especially that of a single collection, is that the official record is often strategically left behind by policy actors, which can over- and under-state the importance of specific actors and groups during key events (George and Bennett 2005). It may also be difficult to assess the extent to which the perspectives and views expressed in documents can be attributed to specific policymakers and not their staff members. This project benefits greatly from the fact that the historical period covered here overlaps with a significant growth in the use of computers and printers to maintain records, and that DSG was – as one former staffer interviewed succinctly noted – “a paper generating
organization.” The DSG collection includes a wide variety of materials that would not be out of place in an average workplace, including receipts for coffee and ice, and handwritten notes passed between bored staffers during meetings, but also condolence letters to members upon the death of a loved one, and materials that would likely have caused embarrassment to members of Congress should they be made public.25 The extensive record of these sorts of materials increases my confidence in the “evidentiary value” of the archival papers.
25 A good example of materials that would cause embarrassment for Members is a whip call dated
November 5, 1969 (4:45pm) that reads: “This is a DSG whip call. Please remind your member of the weekly DSG Beer Party and Orgy to be held Thursday night. This week the party will be a surprise one at John Rarick’s place. Dates are invited, of course, but no wives.” [Part I, box 71, folder 1: DSG Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.] The question of whether this whip call should be taken at face
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releases, research reports, speeches) and “private documents” (memos and letters between members, meeting minutes, transcripts of party meetings). To the extent possible, I also
incorporate materials that were clearly written by members themselves (short memos and letters), with materials written by staff documenting or transcribing member behavior and activity (in particular, DSG meeting minutes and Caucus meeting transcripts), and communication between DSG and other congressional staffers which may or may not attribute preferences, behavior and activities to specific Members (memos and letters).26 In addition to the archival record, I also incorporate media coverage of events in national newspapers (the New York Times, the
Washington Post, etc.) and daily Capitol Hill newspapers (Congressional Quarterly, the Hill, Roll Call, and National Journal), and members’ own words in the Congressional Record.
value remains unclear (and certainly no other records of this particular event exist to my knowledge). Regardless of the true facts surrounding this event or the participants involved (John Rarick was obviously no friend of DSG), in the contemporary context, this whip call does not portray members of Congress (or staff) associated with DSG in the most flattering light. If the DSG papers were strategically constructed to protect the reputation of specific individuals, it is likely that this type of document (and similar materials identified by the author in the collection) would have been destroyed or at least eliminated from the collection before donation to the Library of Congress. An interview conducted by the author confirmed that the DSG papers were archived by DSG staffers who did not work for any one particular member. Unlike member’s personal staff who may have been loyal to a specific member and had an incentive to protect their legacy, DSG staffers did not have the same potential incentive. The content of the papers no doubt reflects this.
26 Identifying and categorizing the source or authorship of many archival records is extraordinarily difficult.
While it is relatively easy to identify documents written by staff members, it is far more difficult to identify documents personally written by members themselves. However, the extensive archival research conducted by this author revealed several common features. Letters and memos written by members themselves often used nicknames (such as referring to Rep. Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) as “Rosty” or Rep. Frank Thompson (D-NJ) as “Thompy”), which was less likely in materials written by congressional staffers (although some high level staffers did use nicknames for Members). In addition, members often signed their names to documents in unique ways. For example, Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) signed her name with a smiley face inside the loop of the “P” in her first name. And finally, these materials tended to be very dense and short in length, and were far more likely to reveal the author’s opinion and personality (a large portion of these documents were rife with sarcasm). Documents written by staff – with a few exceptions, including notably former DSG Executive Director Richard Conlon (who was never reluctant to express his opinion) – were more factual, often recounting the specifics of an event or proceeding without commentary.
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Nearly two dozen interviews with relevant congressional staffers and members of Congress were included to provide first-person accounts of key events and decision-making processes. I interviewed a few figures outside of DSG’s organization but present inside the halls of Congress to help situate the relationship of DSG to other key figures and groups. The
interviews ranged in length between 45 minutes and 4 hours, although the average interview was about 2 hours in length. They were conducted in-person in Washington, D.C. and in St. Paul and Minneapolis, Minnesota, or via telephone. While the identity of most of the interviews will remain confidential, names were identified through archival papers or by referral from other interview subjects.27 Contact information for each interview was either publicly available through an internet search, or was obtained via referral from other interviews.
This project combines elements of historical institutionalism and process tracing approaches, but is perhaps best defined by Paul Pierson’s (2010) notion of “placing politics in time” and John Kingdon’s (1984) method of building theory about decision-making processes from careful empirical observation. I employ the available archival materials to identify and record processes of institutional change according to the actual historical sequence of events. This was a considerable task that necessitated integrating documents collected months, if not years, apart from each other, as well as actual events and decisions that occurred years apart from each other. The scope of publicly available information helps to fill any gaps in the historical
sequence, and I strived to note any persistent gaps.
27 A small number of interview subjects agreed to be identified by name (and I do so throughout the
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general conclusion(s) that can be applied to the contemporary (and future) U.S. Congress. This is one of the goals of this project, but it is certainly not the only one. The historical particulars of the case analyzed here – of DSG and reform in the 1960s and 1970s – matter in and of
themselves. It provides insights into how the first modern group of members organized themselves absent any pre-existing model to follow, how the programs of the Great Society passed despite great divisions within the Democratic Party, and how specific notable figures within the Democratic leadership, including Reps. Tip O’Neill (D-MA), Thomas Foley (D-WA), and Phillip Burton (D-CA), strategically developed a base of support within the House. The ultimate goal of this project is to give due credit to these historically-bounded developments, while also abstracting those lessons that can and do carry to the contemporary U.S. Congress. I leave it to the reader to determine whether either or both of these phenomena is more interesting.