Case selection

The hypotheses outlined above are tested through a comparative analysis of three case studies, which are selected on the basis of a number of criteria. First, they represent a variation on the key explanatory variable – the policy regime, and thus range from the Community method to the intergovernmental method. I apply Mill’s (1875) “method of difference” (Leuffen 2007: 149) by looking for “comparable cases” in Lijphart’s (1975) terminology (Blatter & Haverland 2012: 42). Thus I intend to have other variables potentially explaining lobbying and influence of similar value, and either kept constant or controlled. Second, while focusing on the same time period, I opt for cases with a longer timeframe in order to take into account a more dynamic characteristic of alliance building. Finally, cases should cover a whole policy cycle (agenda setting, policy formulation and decision-making, implementation and evaluation). This will allow us to look at influence as a “continuous” rather than “dichotomous” variable, following the suggestion of Baumgartner & Leech (1998: 138) and not to miss interest group influence by focusing on a particular stage of the policymaking process. Moreover, given that few studies on the participation of non-state actors in EU foreign policy are available, we cannot really know where (at which stage of the policy cycle) to look for their influence.

EU’s neighbourhood has been named a top priority in terms of EU’s relations with the world, along with building of external relations architecture and strategic partnerships (Ashton 2010). This also implies that neighbouring countries are of similar importance for EU foreign policy and there is also a web of relations between the EU and its neighbourhood at various levels (supranational, state, sub-state) that includes both state and non-state actors. Ideally, it would be good to look at the same country, but it is difficult to find such a case in the real world with all criteria being fulfilled.

In this study, policy dossiers do not represent the most lobbied cases or issues in EU foreign policy, the approach which has been adopted in the previous study (Voltolini 2013). The preference is for cases which represent sub-policy areas that are typical of EU relations with the neighbourhood and in which the EU applies a standard set of foreign policy tools. At the same time, I opt for cases which have been in the spotlight of EU policy towards the regions and countries, thus they are likely to attract attention of interest groups.

A detailed overview of the selected cases is presented in Table 2. The case closest to the Community method concerns EU visa policy, with all supranational institutions involved and QMV in the Council, though the member states are responsible for implementation. The focus is on the EU’s eastern neighbours given that visa facilitation and liberalisation have been key objectives of the Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative and as a means to promote security and reforms at the EU borders. The second case is closer to the intergovernmental extreme and centres on CSFP sanctions, with the Commission’s involvement in implementation and the EUCJ’s jurisdiction, if the Union measures are envisaged. While the EU has applied CSFP sanctions to many countries in its

neighbourhood (Belarus, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine) as a response to a sudden degradation of governance and human rights standards or as a part of conflict management strategy, the case of Belarus is chosen given it has the longest history of EU sanctions policy towards this country. The third, ‘the hardest case’ from which supranational institutions are excluded represents the CSDP. The EU has deployed CSDP missions in the conflict-affected neighbouring countries of Georgia, Lybia, Palestinian territories and Ukraine, all of which are civilian. The case turns to the CSDP missions in Palestine and Georgia as the oldest ongoing missions in the neighbourhood. According to the hypothesis H1, we expect that interest groups are more likely to achieve the highest degrees of influence in the first case, lower degrees in the second and the lowest degrees in the third case.

The cases relate to the time period between 2004/2015 and 2014/2015. Such a decade- long time frame should enable us to examine advocacy and eventual group influence on policy change from a longitudinal perspective, which is rather rare in interest groups studies in the EU. According to the literature on advocacy coalitions, a time perspective of a decade or more is necessary in order to understand the process of policy change to check against external factors such as socio-economic and technological changes, changes in governing coalitions, as well as decisions and impacts from other policy sectors that affect a policy under question that vary substantially over the course of a few years or a decade (Sabatier 1988).

Within the studied period, there have been treaty reforms which have amended the insti- tutional design of EU foreign policy. In particular, new foreign policy institutions have been created by the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009. It is assumed that these institutions have affected institutional set-ups in all cases in a sim-

ilar way. There were also a number of legal changes to the decision-making powers of the supranational institutions in all the selected cases. However, I maintain that they have not affected the type of policy regime in place.

Table 2. Description of cases

Visa liberalisation (EaP countries)

CFSP sanctions (Belarus)

CSDP missions (Palestine and Georgia) Time period

Since 2004 Since 2004 Since 2005 Institutional characteristics Access Points Council High Representati ve Commission EP EUCJ Decides by QMV (art. 77 TFEU)

Responsible for overall coordination with other EU external policies

Commission conducts a visa liberalisation dialogue; drafts Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP); reports regularly to the EP & the Council on the implementation of the VLAP. Makes a proposal to the EP & the Council for the lifting of the short-stay visa obligation, through an amendment of Regulation 539/2001 (ordinary legislative procedure) Co-decides (ordinary legislative procedure)/consent for international agreements Conducts judicial review on fundamental rights-sensitive areas of migration, border control and asylum and

Decides unanimously Implements by QMV

HR and Commission make a joint proposal for implementation

Commission can be responsible for implementation (e.g. aid suspension, trade bans) or supervise implementation by member states if Union (formerly Community) measures are concerned

Informed by Council

Reviews the legality of sanctions implemented through the measures of the Union competence;

Decides unanimously upon a proposal of HR or a member state initiative. Exercises, through the PSC, political control and strategic direction over a CSDP mission.

Proposes to initiate a mission; exercises overall authority over civilian missions

Commission is involved in implementation if the Union’s resources are used

Informed by Council and HR regularly. Approves CSFP budget from which civilian missions are funded Excluded

National government s

related to four freedoms, esp. freedom of movement of services (e.g. Turkish cases on freedom of movement of services) Implement (e.g. issue visas, control borders)

addressed by natural and legal persons in respect of restrictive measures affecting them

Responsible for implementation of certain measures, e.g. arms embargoes, visa bans, diplomatic & cultural sanctions

May initiate a mission. Funding of civilian missions if nationals are seconded Funding of military missions Issue characteristics Time frame (Crisis vs. long-term) Involves violence Novelty of issue Salience Scope Types of interests affected Long-term Unlikely Well-established Low High politics

(It is seen as one of the key offers in the EaP. A number of EU members have a special relationship with the countries in the region. There are also migration flows to a number of EU states – labour, tourism, asylum seekers)

human rights, business, solidarity, security Short/mid-term towards long-term. Spurred by an external crisis Unlikely Well-established Low High politics

(Belarus has been dubbed as ‘last dictatorship’ in Europe. There is well-developed political interest of a number of member states in this country. Human rights and democracy promotion agenda of the Council of Europe, OSCE, US)

democracy, human rights, business

Short/mid term towards long-term. Spurred by a crisis

Rather likely (low intensity conflicts)

Well-established Low

High politics

(The Israeli-Palestinian conflict of the most long standing conflicts in the world. EU member states have a long history of involvement in conflict resolution, though secondary to the US. The conflicts in Georgia have an international dimension due to Russia’s involvement) human rights, security, solidarity

Changes in the Treaty of Lisbon In force

since 1 December 2009

EP has acquired co-decision powers (‘ordinary legislative procedure’ and consent, before consultation procedure)

EUCJ became fully competent

Commission has no longer has an autonomous right of initiative on CFSP issues. It may support the HR or submit joint proposals. EUCJ powers slightly enlarged with regards to better protection of rights of individuals (Art. 275 TFEU)

The Council can entrust a group of member states with a CSDP mission (Art 42.5 and 44 TEU). Member states are to make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of CSDP.

While examining the relationship between institutional conditions and interest group influence, we have to take into account other determinants of influence. The issue characteristics such the scope and salience of the issue, the level of conflict, the newness, the presence of focusing event are seen as having impact upon the probability of achieving lobbying success (Mahoney 2008; Kluver 2013).

It is assumed that all three foreign policy dossiers chosen for this study are similar in scope: they are high politics issues which concern EU values such as democracy, peace, security and economic freedoms and constitute relations with important for EU countries in the neighbourhood. They are expected to attract different kinds of interests. The degree of salience of the issues which refers to visibility or importance of the issue to the public (Mahoney 2008; Kollman 1998) is assumed to be similar and relatively constant. In general, foreign policy issues are considered to be low salience issues compared to domestic policies.

New issues are more difficult to lobby on (Mahoney 2008; Joachim & Dembinski 2011). The selected foreign policy issues are well established rather than new, in the sense that they are part of portfolios of the existing structures at the EU level or conform with well-developed EU policies.

The time frame and the degree to which violence may be involved in pursuing the policy is assumed to define to what extent multi-level governance extends to CFSP decision-making (M. Smith 2004b). This largely coincides with what Mahoney (2008) calls a focusing event – “a crisis or disaster” that affects the probability of lobbying success. It is hypothesised that these two characteristics may have impact on interest groups ability to participate in the policymaking process.

The time frame is defined as “a degree of urgency surrounding the issue: crises must be decided within weeks at most (more often days or even hours); short-term/medium-term policies may be decided over months or a few years; long-term problems must be decided over several years or even decades” (M. Smith 2004b). Given the time shortage, interest groups can hardly be involved in policymaking on urgency issues. CFSP sanctions and CSDP missions are often deployed as a reaction to crises or armed conflict in a third country or region. This contrasts with visa liberalisation which may seen as a more gradual policy development not enacted as an urgent response to an external crisis. Indeed, in the case of Belarus, first sanctions were introduced as a reaction to crisis, but then they were revised in a short/medium term perspective, and given EU sanctions towards Belarus have not been fully lifted since their introduction in 2004, we could argue that they have become a long-term solution. So we will be able to control for the time-frame factor examining several time periods. In the case of Georgia, the CSDP mission EUMM was deployed to monitor the ceasefire in the Russia-Georgia war of 2008. But we will be able to control for this factor having EUPOL COPPS in Palestine which was considered at least a year in advance.

Finally, in the case of CDSP missions, there is a possibility of violence, given that they are situated within conflict zones, though these missions are far from being combat military operations. Thus, we assume that this variation is not significant to explain the degree of interest group influence in comparison with the institutional set-up.

However, there are some issue-level characteristics that are not known in advance (for example, the degree of conflict on the issue). Moreover, group-level characteristics (e.g. financial resources, membership resources, information on constituencies interests, expertise) will vary too given that I do not have theoretical reasons not to expect both

resource-rich and resource-poor groups involved in lobbying. Thus I also employ within-case analysis to trace possible causal links and configurations of the many factors that impact on lobbying strategies and influence. Nevertheless, it is still expected that overall interest group influence will vary across three institutional contexts for all types of groups, even though resource-rich groups may be indeed more able to adapt to less favourable environments than resource-poor groups.

The combination of the cross-case and within-case analyses complement each other (Blatter & Haverland 2012: 212). Through the cross-case analysis I aim to answer the question of whether institutional design matters when seeking influence. Whereas within-case analysis allows us to understand the effect of the institutional design on lobbying and influence. This method is also needed to answer the underlying research question of how and to what extent interest groups influence EU foreign policy, or, in other words, what the consequences are of (intergovernmental) policymaking on the lobbying and influence of interest groups.