The cases – units of analysis 43 

As referred to above, multiple-case methodology is often considered more convincing than single case, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust (Herriott and Firestone 1983) as it helps isolate variability. There are valid reasons for using single-case method in some circumstances (Gerring 2004, p. 4; Luck et al. 2006, p. 104), but here the multiple-case method is preferred principally because it allows for replication logic in the cross-case analysis (Yin 2002, p. 45). The individual case reports indicate how and why a particular research question was, or was not, answered, while the cross-case report indicates the extent of the replication and/or contrasting results.

The discussion in Chapter 2 established what a political maverick is by providing a useable definition. In many ways that was a straightforward task – deciding who fits the definition and who does not proved to be much more problematic. It is useful here to

repeat that definition: “A political maverick is an unpredictable, independent loner who cannot be relied upon to follow an orthodox or prevailing group norms in pursuing his or her relationships or his or her goals within a political party.” Figure 3.2 represents diagrammatically how a politician’s behaviour might be represented on a continuum as “degrees of maverickism”: at one end is the “extreme” maverick – the politician who shuns all party orthodoxy and is unlikely to be, or remain, a member of any party; at the other end is the dedicated party acolyte. Those who fit the definition can be seen to occupy the shaded area: they will display varying degrees of “maverickism” and in different ways.

The problem, then, is not one of definition, it is one of interpretation. Logically, the solution would be to apply the definition to the politicians to determine the subjects for the study. But that is not straightforward. How is a concept like “unpredictable” quantified? What factors qualify a “loner”? How, exactly, should “cannot be relied upon” be determined? There is also a question of time and “quantity”: should one “maverick act” (if such a thing could be quantified) from someone who is, otherwise, a steady team player qualify that person for the study? Or should “persistent” maverick behaviour be the criterion?

Politicians that fit the maverick definition

“Extreme” mavericks Non-mavericks Party acolyte

(occasional maverick act)

More maverick in behaviour Less maverick in behaviour

Figure 3.2 The maverick continuum

Therefore, measuring maverickism is a difficult and subjective task - just how “maverick” does someone have to be to qualify? Considerable thought was given to setting “evaluation criteria” to measure and select the subjects for the study. Tests were conceived such as:

• those rejected or censured by their party

• those who crossed the floor, or voted against their party • those who made statements against party policy.

However, these criteria proved stubbornly difficult to quantify and apply. Certainly, they are all indicators of maverick behaviour, but problems of measurement and quantification arose with each attempt. Wherever a boundary was drawn on any one criterion, it became immediately arbitrary and difficult to defend. The conclusion is that an individual politician sits somewhere along the maverick continuum, put impossible to objectively justify the location. It became obvious that another approach was required.

It has been established that a vernacular definition – one that is generally agreed to – is readily discernible. It was shown, using reasoning derived from Pitkin (1967), that “political maverick” is of the class of expressions in the language that is used “unhesitant and correctly” by people to “say what we know”. Guided by Pritkin’s logic, the solution for this study was to let the way the definition is used in everyday language “select” the subjects for the study. This is approach is consistent with the study’s critical discourse perspective outlined above.

The logic is this: those politicians who are known and described as political mavericks should form the focus for the study; or, rather than fit the person to the description, fit the description to the person. “Political maverick” is not an ambiguous term – those who use it know what it means. Would not politicians who are most frequently described thus, be more likely to be political mavericks? Further, the role of the media in creating the maverick phenomenon means that the extent to which “political maverick” is a media construct validates this approach.

This technique of using “mentions” in the media is similar to that used by Gans and Leigh (2009) in their identification of “public intellectuals” in researching media bias. Similar to this study, Gans and Leigh tally media mentions to make their determinations (Gans and Leigh 2009, p. 4). Figure 3.3 shows a summary of results for a data search for mentions of “political maverick” in the Australian media, for the period 31/10/03 – 31/10/08. That is, it shows the number of times individual politicians

(those that sit within the limitations set out in Chapter 1) were referred to as “maverick” in political opinion pieces, press items and news items. There were 43 politicians in total who received at least one “hit”. The six with the most hits are shown. (It is accepted that a “selection bias” is possible in using media hits as the selection tool. This is because the more senior and prominent the politician, the more they are covered in the press. Thus, there may be politicians just as “maverick” as the ones identified here, but do not have the same opportunity to be selected. This potential for bias is noted: here is a danger the thesis will import any failings of Australian political journalism and any hyperbole in reporting. However, the purpose here is not to select the “most” maverick politicians in Australia; rather to identify those who fit the definition and who have sufficient volume of material written about them to contribute to a meaningful study.)

Politician Total number of “hits” for [politic* AND maverick]

Barnaby Joyce 64 Mark Latham 43 Bob Katter 27 Ross Lightfoot 14 Harry Quick 12 Petro Georgiou 12

The next most mentioned was Bill Heffernan (Lib, Senate) with 5 hits

Figure 3.3 The Top Six – media hits “political mavericks” 31/10/03 – 31/10/08

These six politicians are clearly the most mentioned in the press during the study period. Figure 3.4 places them into cases, classifying them by:

• the party they represent;

• the House of Parliament in which they sit; and

• whether they remained in the party during the study period.

This classifications was adopted as a way of ensuring that, in using the top six, a reasonable “spread” across the parliament is achieved. It allows testing of the extent to which party membership is a factor in maverick behaviour. By ensuring the study

includes members from both Houses it allows for comparison between two electoral systems. Researching mavericks who have left the party, and those who remain, is also important to the study.

Case Subjects Senate House of Reps Remained a

party member? LNP ALP LNP ALP “The House” Quick 9 No Katter 9 No Georgiou 9 Yes “The Senate” Joyce 9 Yes Lightfoot 9 Yes

“The leader” Latham 9 No

Figure 3.4 The mavericks sorted into case studies

The real focus for the case studies is not explaining maverick behaviour but describing its consequences on the party. There are important justification for studying mavericks within the established political parties, not the least is that it is interesting and relevant – the vast majority of Australian politicians belong to one of the major parties. Election is “next to impossible” in Australia, McAllister and Farrell (2005, p.13) assert, without the benefit of one of the major party labels.

No doubt, within the broad meaning of “political maverick”, independent and minor party candidates are worthy of inquiry (Costar and Curtin 2004; Jaensch and Mathieson 1998). For example, Pauline Hanson, an independent who won a seat at the 1996 election after she was expelled from the Liberal party for perceived slurs against indigenous Australians, is often described as a maverick (Bolt 2006; Corder 2003). However, Hanson was not a party maverick and therefore outside the scope of this study. (Notwithstanding, her influence on an “anti-political” mood among Australian voters is noted in the conclusions to this thesis.)

Major party mavericks have the added burden of party discipline, and to discover how these mavericks cope with the party stricture is an important element of this research: why mavericks exists at all within political parties is central to explaining the maverick

paradox. Carney (2006) sees that in Australian political parties there are two types of politicians:

On both sides of politics, MPs generally break down into two categories: high- flyers who yearn to rule the roost and parade their achievements, knowledge and power, and ground dwellers who want to blend in and are content to tend the home patch, and demonstrate their loyalty to the cause. (Carney 2006)

Carney made these observations in the context of analysing the behaviour of a maverick, the Liberal’s Petro Georgiou; as he describes him, a “genre buster”. Because the majority of Australian voters identify with one party or the other (Farrell and McAllister 2005), if an Australian politician wants to achieve the maximum from his or her political career then a maverick path would not be the choice; he or she should join a political party and adhere to its party line, perhaps choosing one of Carney’s two pathways, a high-flyer or a ground dweller. The trappings of political office, in terms of the highest salaries, prestige, ministerial positions and status, can really only be achieved, it will be argued, by becoming if not a party sycophant then at least a party loyalist, and certainly not a maverick. Kam (2006) makes the point:

The Prime Minister's monopoly over the distribution of preferment is a far more reliable means of ensuring members' loyalty. The rules of the game are simple: if the member of parliament wishes to climb the parliamentary career ladder, he or she must toe the party line.

And sometimes the prospect of promotion or favour is used by the party to control the potential maverick. Kam (2006) further notes that:

The Prime Minister's power over MPs' parliamentary careers is not without limit, of course. Some MPs must be brought into cabinet because they are too powerful and dangerous to leave on the backbench where they can openly challenge the Prime Minister.

One important task is to describe the conventional expectations of political success – that is, remaining within and moving up the party structure – and comparing and contrasting that with how mavericks measure success. It is acknowledged that it can be a difficult task to define the qualities of political success. Brodie (1984) argues that great political achievers are those who demonstrate qualities such as vision,

commitment to goals, a desire to improve, a willingness to take risks for the good of the people, and an ability to communicate these intentions. Alternatively, Stott-Despoja (2000) describes political achievers as those who demonstrate accountability, accessibility, and honesty.

Achievement is perceived as many things – as a politician, the opportunity to create a significant legacy can be greater than in many other areas – however, the opportunity to achieve as a politician is a delicate process, where circumstance and external factors can easily alter the balance between opportunity and outcome. It is this concept of success and the juxtaposition between party and maverick that is so intriguing.

Of the six subjects for the case studies, just two are senators. A possible explanation is that senators are more beholden to the party because of the list voting system used for the Senate in Australia. This requires prospective senators to curry favour with the party leadership to gain a high position on the list; party “machines” often reward loyal staffers and administrators (in the case of the ALP, notably union officials) with senate “postings”. Thus, there are no ALP senators to be studied. A review of all the politicians identified in the search (in total 43) showed no ALP senator with any hits. However, in undertaking the research some observations will be made regarding comparisons between the Coalition and the ALP. (Note, also, the comments earlier in Chapter 2 regarding the propensity for the ALP to have fewer mavericks than the LNP.)

Katter, Georgiou and Quick are grouped into one case. They provide a cross section of ALP and Coalition members in the House of Representatives. They also vary in party longevity: Katter quit from his party but remained as an independent; while Georgiou and Quick stayed a party members throughout the study period. (To be accurate, Quick quit the ALP just a few weeks before his retirement from parliament, serving out that time as an independent.) The principal characteristic they share is that they are all long- term backbenchers which makes their study together an interesting exercise. It allows for themes or premises to be developed to explain backbench maverickism despite their widely varying backgrounds.

Joyce and Lightfoot share similar characteristics: they are both Coalition senators and both remained within their respective parties during the study period. Because they are Coalition partners, but from different parties, it is appropriate and interesting to include

them within a single case. It allows the close monitoring and comparing of differences and similarities.

Latham is considered as a separate case because he alone of the mavericks under study moved up the party hierarchy to eventual leadership. His rise, as reported in the media, was spectacular, as was his fall when as leader of the Labor opposition he lost the 2004 general election, then shortly after resigned from parliament altogether. This case study asks the question, can a maverick lead a political party?

The ultimate electoral failure of Mark Latham, has, in the subsequent commentary, largely been attributed to voters perceiving him as “too risky” (Bantick 2004, p. 18; Brent 2005a). If voters are largely risk-averse (and later discussion will argue that they are) it is no surprise that political parties eschew mavericks and that voters do not want them anyway. These detached “median” voters, the argument goes (Tucker 2005), prefer their politicians safe and predictable, and Latham certainly did not fit that bill.

Elections are normally decided by passive voters, not partisans. These punters are given the flattering title of swinging voters. But it is code for not really caring one way or the other. (Megalogenis 2004, p. 30)

The subjects for these case studies are not intended to be a representative “sample” of the maverick population, or necessarily the “most maverick” of the population. There are likely many politicians who fit the definition and could legitimately be studied. The purpose here is to select politicians who are considered mavericks and to see how they behave and respond in a real-life situation; the selection method used helps ensure that outcome, but there is no claim to completeness. That is not considered a negative as the case study is intended to be an intensive enquiry of a single, or in this case several, units where the aim is to shed light on a problem pertaining to a broader class of units (Gerring 2004, p. 341).