RE-CDMs in China as a least-likely, interpretive single case single case

It is noted that the selection of case and observations lies at the heart of qualitative case study research (Mitchell and Bernauer, 2004). Although CDM is often regarded as an innovative and rather complicated governance tool that is applied across the national borders and many existing economic sectors and since its inception, this research is designed to be a single case which focuses only on one particular sector (renewable energy) in one geographical area (mainland China). The strict boundary of this case study is set mainly to narrow down meaningful observations and data in a manageable manner and in a realistic time frame for this PhD project.

In this research, I focus on renewable energy CDM projects, and wind

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energy projects in particular, that have been developed in mainland China between 2004 and 2011. Analytical focus is given only to the actors that are directly involved in CDM related business activities and policy process. However, I also engaged with certain peripheral actors within CDM circle, such as NGOs and academics who have considerable relevance in China’s present CDM reality.

There are clear rationales for such case selection. In China’s CDM portfolio, renewable energy CDMs (RE-CDMs) are playing a significant role, comprising about 41% of generated CERs, among them wind energy CDM accounts for 10% (NDRC, 2013). However, the selection of RE-CDMs in China as a case is not only due to its dominant share, but rather some theoretical and empirical assumptions about its dominance as presented in the previous chapter. Firstly, critics argue that a great-leap-forward of renewable projects in China has nothing to do with CDM (Wara and Victor, 2008; Lewis, 2010). For China, development of renewable energy is an inevitable move toward diversification of China’s coal-centered energy production mix. This is an unprecedented challenge to China’s present political agenda which links with other political concerns such as energy security or even social welfare (Han el al. 2009, Schroeder 2009). Besides, the dominance of hydro, wind or solar power CDM projects is not surprising because these technologies comprise the majority of relatively mature and marketable renewable technologies

(Haya, 2007; Lewis, 2010).

Second, the development of renewable energy sector, wind energy in particular, comprises intense power dynamics among actors with various backgrounds (Lema and Ruby, 2007; Liu and Kokko, 2010). CDM as the new intervention scheme adds to the already complicated situation where policy processes and institutional transformations have been constantly shaped by the inter-business, public-private and global-local interactions.

Conflicts between wind farm builders and grid companies, and between foreign and home investment and technologies, have the potential to reconfigure the present political coalition in the CDM market. Yet unlike other CDM activities, such as HFCs or large Hydro power, the economic and sustainability benefits of wind farm CDMs have been unanimously acknowledged. RE-CDM has been regarded as a living proof of a successful ‘business case’ in promoting sustainable energy system in China (Lema and Ruby 2007). The lack of obvious opposition in developing wind farm projects provides an insightful case of political coalition and unrivalled support for wind CDMs deserves explanation.

Thirdly, and closely related to the above argument, the CDM boom in China raises theoretical issues from governance perspectives. The creation of CDM was once regarded as a vivid example of new forms of networking or multi-level governance, where public and private actors

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have to align closely to guarantee the success of this green-field governance project (Streck, 2004). Yet, it is observed by many that China attributes its CDM explosion largely to a traditional top-down governance where a strong and powerful regulating authority plays a crucial role in promoting and expanding activities effectively (Michaelowa, 2007;

Ganapati and Liu, 2009). Is CDM an illustration of ‘governance without government’ in climate policy arena, or merely the old wine (command and control) in a new bottle? Is it merely another round of top-down coalition building or a triumph of the private actors over their state counterparts? These rather conflicting explanations need to be reconciled with solid empirical evidence. A close examination of how RE-CDM projects are negotiated and implemented on the ground, underpinned by intensive power interactions, will hopefully solve these theoretical puzzles.

China is traditionally viewed as a highly centralized government with command and control or authoritarian governance as the dominant pattern in regulating most of its domestic environmental affairs, including climate change (Beeson, 2007). The non-state actors’ incentives to establish political connections and coalition ultimately arise from the state control of key governance resources (Li et al, 2008). In this regard, the RE-CDM in China is served as a ‘least-likely’ single case to test the role of non-state actors in global climate governance. If CDM, being the

newly introduced market based mechanism, has successfully empowered non-state actors in advancing its own interests, this would provide strong confirmation for the inference of ‘state-retreat’ in governing global climate, which can be more likely valid in other parts of the world where state power is relatively weaker than in China. Hence it would open possibilities for future comparative studies of similar events in other developing countries, as well as other critical climate governance events in China at various historical moments.