to 60 per cent As against the ryots who complained

30

The problems which Briggs confronted in Kandesh were

not unique to his Collectorate, And although the conse­

quences arising out of his survey discouraged other

Collectors from embarking on any hasty surveys, it was clear

that the rival rates could not for long form the basis of the

land-tax under the new administration, Conservative adminis­

trators like Chaplin had no categoric answer to the question

how the profits of agriculture could be equitably distributed

between the peasants and the State, But their diffidence was

not shared by individuals like Robert Keith Pringle, a young

civilian in charge of the talukas of Pabul and Sewnare in

the Collectorate of Poona in 1822, who had studied Ricardian

economics under Malthus, the Professor of Political Economy

in the East India College at Haileybury, Confident in his

knowledge that political economy had a scientific explanation

of agricultural profits in the Ricardian law of rent, Pringle

launched a frontal attack on the administrators who sought to

keep alive the spirit of the old Maratha revenue system.

Unlike Elphinstone and Chaplin, who regarded the village

community as an institution which formed the hub of the rural

order, and was hence worthy of preservation, Pringle pointed

out how the prevailing social organisation in rural society

merely served to cloak the domination of the patel and the

Madhav Rao Peshwa, Pringle argued in his criticism of the

’revenue axiom(s)’ set out by Chaplin, had been designed to

absorb all the rent of the land, leaving to the cultivator

the wages of labour and profit on the capital he had

invested. But Madhav R a o ’s attempt to devise a rational

basis for the land-tax had provoked the hostility of the

dominant groups in the village, which had exploited the

rivaj rates to transfer a preponderating share of the village

rental on the shoulders of the poorer cultivators. These

dominant groups had proved far too strong for the Maratha

bureaucracy, with the result that although the mamlatdars

were able to use the kamal survey as a guide in levying the

total village rental, they had never succeeded in breaking

through the domination of the Patel and the principal ryots,

and in imposing the kamal rates on individual c u l t i v a t o r s .

To prove the dominance of the patel and the principal

cultivators over the village, Pringle turned to an examina­

tion of the principles and practice of the riva.j survey.

The unit of measure according to the riva.j was the cliowar,

which paid a standard assessment irrespective of the quality

of the soil. The chowar was not a fixed unit, and its

31

B A . R.K, Pringle to H,D, Robertson dated 20 November 1823: R.D., Vol. 10/94 of 1824.

dimensions, so it was believed, varied inversely with the

quality of the soil, thus bringing about a measure of

equalisation in the assessment. However, the kamal survey,

which took into consideration the quality of the soil, and

employed a standard b e e g a h , had shown this to be untrue. To

take an example, the estate of the Mallee .jatha in the

village of Oswaree amounted to 4+1/40 chowars, while that of

the Indoree iatha embraced five c howars, and their riva.j or

customary assessments therefore stood in the proportion

17:20. But the kamal survey showed that the holdings of the

Mallees were of a superior quality, and it fixed the assess­

ments of the two .jathas in the proportion 275 :234» Since the

Mallees had paid a lighter rental under the riva.j, they

could hardly be expected to be over fond of the kamal survey.

It is equally clear that the Mallees had formerly exploited

their social position in the village to secure preferential

treatment for themselves in the distribution of the riva.j

r e n t a l .

The dominance of the patel and the principal cultivators

over the village community, Pringle argued, could only be

undermined through a survey based on entirely novel

principles. The riva.j rates, it was obvious, constituted a

reflection of their dominance, and it would be fatal, as

Rent, as defined by Ricardo, provided an objective criterion

for the determination of the share of agricultural produce

which the State could equitably claim as its own:

The character which land revenue has always borne throughout India [ Pringle concluded] is essentially that of rent, and not a personal or property tax. It ought not to be equal to all individuals, nor vary with the circumstances of individuals. But ought to be regulated only by such incidents as affect rent; and the circumstances which affect rent are the powers of production anduthe value of the produce. The rent payable to government should depend upon these, and the net profit of the ryot should be the same in all lands, and under all circumstances...To regulate the respective rights of government and its subjects under this principle appears to have been the object of the different systems of administration under every Indian Government.•.32

In the discussions over revenue policy arising out of

Briggs’ abortive survey of 1821, Pringle’s was a lone voice

pitted against powerfully entrenched conservative adminis­

trators, who were anxious to preserve the traditional

institutions of rural society, and who looked upon former

methods of government with sympathy. Both of Pringle’s immed­

iate superiors, Henry Robertson, the Collector of Poona, and

William Chaplin, the Commissioner of the Deccan, refused to

support the revolutionary idea which he had put forth as the

basis of a new revenue system, Robertson took his stand on

32

the principle that ’in the present situation of our govern­

ment in the Dekhun, the ascertainment and preservation of

rights, laics and customs of society subject to our control

should be our first concern.,.’ He repudiated Pringle’s

interpretation of the kamal survey, and debunked the view

that the State had traditionally stood forth as the supreme

landlord in the country. The kamal survey, Robertson be­

lieved, had been instituted in order to determine the

resources and the tax bearing potential of the countryside.

Its rates were never intended to supersede the riva.j, and

they were never meant to be applied to individual cultivators

or particular estates. What had prevented the application of

the kamal rates was not the opposition of any dominant group

in the village, but the fact that they had rested on very

shaky grounds. In assessing fields, the kamal had only taken

the quality of the soil into consideration, neglecting a host

of other very important factors like proximity to markets and

the state of communications:

By the kamal [Robertson pointed out ] the same quantity of land is rated at different values. By the old custom of the villages, variable quantities of land are rated at the same value,

...By the algebraical process of alteration,

these data would produce the same result. But... you will perhaps admit that the accuracy of the particulars of the one is not to be put in com­ petition with that of the other. The kamal rates were things of theory. They were the same in every village and in every talook. They were an

estimate in general terms of what the assessment of lands of different qualities might be. They may therefore be termed accurate on the whole, but erroneous in detail. To say that the kamal

rates were not applicable to particular estates or fields is not to prove that the realisations from such particular estates according to the old

village rivaj was actually fair - but if we reflect on the constitution of village society, there is every reason to believe that the burdens of the corporations were originally equally distributed, however much the improvement of their lands by some holders may have enhanced at a subsequent period their apparent value...33

Since the principles of the riva.j survey had been

obscured with the passage of time, both Chaplin and Robertson

agreed with Pringle on the need for a reinvestigation into

the resources of the countryside. A new survey, they

believed, would furnish the authorities with a complete

record of the productive capacity of the villages, and of the

holdings located in the villages, and it would set the basis

for a relationship between the State and the kunbi in which

the rights and obligations of both parties would be clearly

and equitably defined. However, while the conservative

administrators supported the idea of a new survey, they

differed from Pringle over the advisability of the adoption

of a purely theoretical criterion for the regulation of the

cultivator’s dues to the State. It was a fallacy, they

33

BA. H.D, Robertson to R.K. Pringle dated 22 December 1823:

believed, to assume that these dues could be determined

solely by reference to the productive potential of holdings,

since the ’rent which the assessment is intended to fix is

that of government, not that of the ryot and his tenant;...

the government rent should be that which can be produced by

the ordinary means of cultivation in ordinary seasons ...T3 v

In fixing the assessment, account had therefore to be taken

of the actual produce and collections over a period of time.

Because the collection of the land-tax under the Marathas

had not been based on any consistent principle, reliance on

past realisations could, in certain instances, prove to be a

treacherous guide. But the detailed investigations to be

conducted independently, and simultaneously, would provide a

useful check in cases involving gross injustice. Once a

survey based on such principles had been accomplished, the

ryots could be made to enter engagements severally for their

rents, and collectively for the rents of their villages. At

the same time, the State could reserve to itself the prescrip­

tive right of levying extra assessments to make good losses in

revenue arising out of individual failures.

34

Circular letter to the Collectors of the Deccan by W. Chaplin dated 13 September 1824: R.D., Vol. 18/102 of 1824»

Clearly, then, Chaplin and Robertson were no apologists

for the statns q u o . They eschewed reform in the system of

revenue administration, as they eschewed it in other spheres,

only to the extent that it involved a complete departure from

traditional practice. A revenue survey which was designed to

remove obstacles in the way of rural progress, and which did

not completely disregard the riva.j rates, had the full

support of Chaplin and Robertson. But despite their regard

for traditional institutions, and the caution with which they

formulated their proposals, it is obvious that they were

advocating the establishment of a new, and in some respects

revolutionary, relationship between the ryot and the State.

The land-revenue system advocated by Chaplin and Robertson

was not only dependent upon the creation of a legal and

rational bureaucracy, but it was also designed to result in

the atomisation of rural society.

How far-reaching were the changes advocated by Robertson

and Chaplin was made clear by some administrators who

attacked their proposals from a rigorous conservative stand­

point. G. More, the Secretary to the Bombay Government,

voiced his opposition to a revenue survey in any form whatso­

ever because of the dislocation it would cause in the rural

economy by suddenly raising, or lowering, the fiscal obligations

of setting any fixed standards for the payment of tax by the

ryot. The efficiency with which a ryot cultivated his field

varied so much from one year to another that it was imposs­

ible for him to pay a fixed land-tax, and even if the rates

of tax were computed on the basis of a scientific survey,

the revenue officers would have to resort to the traditional

expedient of negotiating the land-tax with the village

officials annually0 3 . F. Warden, a member of the Bombay

Executive Council, raised even more fundamental objections

to a revenue survey. Warden looked upon a survey as an

’inquisitorial* probe into the rights and privileges of the

peasants. The State, he believed, lacked the moral authority

to carry out such a probe. Besides, the institution of a

ryotwari, as opposed to a village, settlement involved a

radical departure from the administrative system of the

Marathas, and it was in conflict with the spirit of modera­

tion which informed Elphinstone’s policy of modernising

Maharashtra0 .

The difference of opinion over revenue policy between a

Utilitarian like Pringle, and conservative reformers like

35

B A . Memorandum by G. More dated 13 September 1824: R.D., Vol. 18/102 of 1824.

36

Memorandum by F. Warden dated nil: R.D., Vol. 18/102 of 1824.

Chaplin and Robertson, revolved around fundamental questions

of innovation and reform, and stemmed from conflicting social

visions. Similarly, the objections advanced to the institu­

tion of a survey, even on ’traditional1 principles, by More

and Warden served to illustrate the extent to which in the

peculiar circumstances of the Deccan supposedly conservative

administrators could espouse the cause of change. Amidst all

this conflict of opinion, Elphinstone was unable to formulate

a policy with the clarity and sophistication which had

characterised his policy for transforming the intellectual

climate of Maharashtra. His failure to seize the initiative

in revenue administration was partly.a result of the nature

of the problem, since it was impossible to set out a revenue

policy without a thorough investigation into the rights and

obligations of the peasants. But it was equally a conse­

quence of his unfamiliarity with economic problems, and with

questions affecting revenue administration. Be that as it

may, Elphinstonefs vision of social progress, and his belief

in the inevitability and the desirability of change, led him

to support the views of Chaplin and Robertson. The strongest

argument in favour of a new survey, he observed, was the chaos

which characterised the revenue administration of the Deccan.

In a flourishing community it would be pointless to embark

The rival rates had fallen into complete disarray as a

result of the iniquitous practices of the revenue farmers

employed by Baji Rao Peshwa. The disorder \vhich they had

inherited from the previous regime obliged British revenue

officers to make their annual settlements in complete

ignorance of the resources of the country. Their settlements

therefore combined the worse traits of a traditional bureau­

cracy with all the disadvantages of a rational administration.

If British revenue officers had a careful survey to guide

them in the settlement of the land-tax, their rates would be

less arbitrary, and less harmful for rural prosperity, than

they had proved in the years immediately following upon 1818.

Of course, the important question whether the settlements

were to be ryotwari or villagewise could be settled only in

the concluding stages of the survey, and in the light of the

evidence that it would bring forth. ’The survey must be

ryotwar...that is, it must be based on an inspection of each

field’ . Elphinstone summed up. ’Which mode of settlement to

adopt is a question for further decision. The one which I

had the honour to propose for adoption when the survey should

be completed was the mauzewar (villagewise)...’ ''7

37

B A . Minute by Governor of Bombay dated 26 October 1824: R.D., Vol. 18/102 of 1824.

In the administration of land revenue, as in education,

moderation in change, and concern for the gradual evolution

of institutions, was the main theme of Elphinstone’s policy.

The worst features of the Maratha revenue administration were

to be abolished; yet the spirit of the former system would

have its due place in the new order. The contradictions

between the kamal and the riva.i were to be resolved through

a new survey: but the principles informing this survey would

not violate established revenue practice. The kunbi would

henceforth pay a land-tax based on objective criteria:

however, his prescriptive rights would not be trampled upon

in the process. Elphinstone thus sought to secure the best

in both worlds, and to preserve in the new order being shaped

under his aegis facets of the old that were of enduring value.

Yet the old order was bound to undergo radical modifica­

tion because of the values which inspired Elphinstone, and

which differed radically from those to which his Maratha

predecessors had subscribed. In the circumstances of

direct British rule over Maharashtra, it was beyond human

ingenuity to bolster the position of the patel and the

deshmukh and the m a mlatdar. Their status in former days had

stemmed from the fact that their powers and obligations were

not precisely defined, and they were not subject to any rigid

of a rational and legal bureaucracy was bound to interfere

with their freedom of action, and to undermine their domin­

ant position, Elphinstone’s attempt to reinforce the village

community was equally futile, for the village community was

an institution that could flourish only in a traditional, as

opposed to a modern, State, Modernisation was thus bound to

result in the destruction of the institutions, and the dis­

ruption of the social organisation, which had imparted

stability and cohesion to Maharashtra under the Peshwas.

The Elphinstone Code of 1827

For despite chronic political instability and arbitrary

government, the dominant note in Maharashtra at the time of

the British conquest was struck by cohesion and order rather

than by disunity and chaos. This is not to deny that even

a conservative like Elphinstone found much that was repre­

hensible and objectionable in the institutions and values

which flourished in the Deccan under native rule. This is

merely to emphasise the undercurrent of stability

characterising the social climate of the P e s h w a ’s territor­

ies. The climate of stability reinforced the reluctance of

conservative administrators like Elphinstone to embark upon

sweeping programmes of political reform, for it pointed, so

In document State and society in Maharashtra in the nineteenth century (Page 125-142)