Centralization and Supervision

In addition to candidate selection, another practice that varies widely across national parties is how they incorporate EP politicians into their leadership structure and how communica-tion with Brussels occurs. Just as centralizacommunica-tion determines the power of seleccommunica-tion procedures in parties, it also encourages specific behaviors in leadership-politician (principal-agent) com-munication and exchange of information. A party’s choice over the composition of executive leadership determines whether MEPs are part of the centralized leadership of the party. This structure, together with candidate selection mechanisms, is likely to determine whether the legislator acts as a delegate or a trustee. MEPs that act as trustees are likely to behave in the way they see fit based on their own personal beliefs, expert judgment or knowledge, or the requirements of the institutional decision making process. MEPs that act as delegates

are more likely to be loyal members of the party and act in a way they feel the party would find most acceptable (Fox and Shotts 2009). Trustees are expected to work independently in the EP, while delegates will stay close to the party.

The success of the MEP-party relationship relies on the intersection of individual and party goals within a framework of oversight. Because many factors influence the decision making of the EP, MEPs acting as delegates are likely to have a harder time pursuing personal goals or cooperating with their colleagues because they are more constrained by the party. They are likely to be informed by the party before making decisions and acting in way they feel will serve the party best. In contrast, trustee-style MEPs will likely be more successful in the EP because they are able to work freely and make their own decisions over policy outcomes. This EP level success may sometimes come at the expense of greater congruence with national party preferences. MEPs that can work freely are better able to manage the complexity and specialization of legislating in the EP where the party is simply not as knowledgeable. Therefore they will have a greater opportunity to shape their own agenda and that of the parties. These two types of information exchanges are depicted in Figure 9.

(a) Scenario A: Delegates (b) Scenario B: Trustees

Figure 9: Information Flows in MEP-Party Relationships

The inclusion of MEPs in their party’s executive authority may also increase the exchange of information between the EP delegation and the party leaders. MEPs often told me that the main reason for tension with their national party was a lack of communication and/or information sharing. Communication standards are vastly different across national parties serving in the EP. Some MEPs, and/or their assistants, disclosed that they rarely speak to their counterparts in their home country but others communicate almost daily. Usually this lack of communication was due to a lack of interest on behalf of their party leaders for their work in the EP. However, sometimes this also stemmed from a lack of understanding of the

complicated nature of EP legislation. MEPs often commented on the technical aspect of EP legislation and the difficulty this creates for an outsider to understand. One MEP shared a pattern of communication breakdown between his party and himself. He said he often experienced a total lack of awareness or interest when trying to communicate with his party during important policy debates. He often tried to consult national leaders over important policy matters but rarely had luck engaging them, only to have to later bear his party’s lament after unfavorable legislation was concluded and no longer an issue for the EP.⁴

Being left out of regular communication with the national party appears to inhibit both the sharing of policy preferences from the leadership to the MEP and the sharing of in-formation from the Parliament back to the party. If an MEP is included in the executive structure of the party, not only will he or she have greater access to information on the policy preferences of his or her party, but the MEP will also be able to share information about their work and the current agenda of the parliament more easily. Having an executive structure that requires regular communication between MEPs and their party leaders helps to eliminate information asymmetries that can often increase agency losses between parties and their politicians. Hence I hypothesize inclusive in the central leadership is more likely to result in scenario A, where MEPs act as delegates for the party and the direct effect on ideological congruence is positive:

H₂: MEPs incorporated into party executive structures are more congruent with their national parties.

Parties goals will also affect the way in which communication works between MEPs and their parties. One of the determinants Coman (2009) concludes affected the influence of national parties on their MEPs was ideological coherence. Coman argues that the clearer the position of a party on any given policy area, the easier it is for a MEP to determine what position he or she should also take. This can be extended to party goals. The clearer the goals of the party, the easier it is for a MEP to determine what the party wants. Policy seeking parties want to influence policy and are more likely to make their preferences known to their MEPs, who are then able to act more in congruence with the party. In contrast, office and vote seeking parties will experience less congruence with their MEPs because

4Interview(3) 6.18.2013, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium.

they simply do not care about legislating and do not have clear preferences. Therefore, the hypotheses about electoral goals and congruence are as follows:

H₃: MEPs in policy seeking parties are more congruent with their national parties than those in office or vote seeking parties.