Changes to the careers service

Writing in anticipation of the careers service reforms, Watts (1991) considered the impact of the ‘New Right’ on careers guidance policy. He identified an inherent tension between public policy and the professional role of guidance, exacerbated by the primary client clearly being the individual with whom the careers professional

works, yet the provision of guidance being seen as an instrument of public policy, part of public welfare provision (1991, p.230). Watts argues that there are practical and ethical reasons to trust the careers professional to work with the client in front of them as the primary client, not having to shape their interactions with this actual client to the design of the more powerful fee-paying client outside the careers guidance encounter. Watts draws a useful distinction within the function of guidance within the labour market: ‘careers guidance needs to be viewed not as a direct instrument of public policy but more of a lubricant of such policies and the operations of the labour market’ (p.233). The image of guidance as lubricant holds equally good for work with the individual client, where the principle underpinning the practice is that the onus is on the client, supported by the guidance professional, to take responsibility for career decision-making and implementation. Watts again:

‘there are dangers that guidance services will be evaluated by the behavioural outcomes of the decisions taken by their clients - i.e. by their destinations. This is clearly at variance with the principle that it is the client who’s responsible for the decision and for determining whether the decision meets his or her needs. Guidance services should be evaluated...in terms of learning outcomes.’ (Watts, 1991, p.243)

In the period following Watts’ comments quoted above, the careers services were taken out of LEA control, the Departments of Education and of Employment were merged, and in 1997 Labour was elected to form a government (see Figure 1, p.iv).

There was no discernible change in the performance indicator management of public service, where targets comprise the main, if not sole instrument of performance. The Careers Services National Association (CSNA, 1999) responded to two policy documents proposed by New Labour; the Learning to Succeed White Paper (DfEE, 1999b), and the Bridging the Gap Advisory Document from the Social Exclusion Unit (Social Exclusion Unit, 1999). Their response to these policy proposals was

informed by careful consideration of the changes which had taken place within careers services as a result of the 1993 TURER legislation (H.M. Government, 1993). A clear criticism of output measuring is made:

‘There has been a preoccupation in recent years across the public sector with simple targets leading to league tables which purport to give valuable consumer information. In too many cases, and this is certainly true of careers services and Training and Enterprise Councils, counting what is measurable, not what is important, has been the norm. Simple targets or performance indicators often divert the organisation from its principal purpose, and may have unintended and damaging side effects.’

(CSNA, 1999, 3.34)

Having expressed this level of concern about the performance indicators used to measure work done by careers services against the core contract with the DfEE, the CSNA goes on to suggest a radical rethink of output measurement in order to use organisational energy for the core task, rather than for measuring: ‘ the DfEE should therefore take a more sophisticated approach to the setting of contractual targets. The results may not lead to league tables, but they would at least ensure the energies of the organisation are directed towards the desired ends’ (CSNA, 1999, 3.35). Power (1997), in examining the audit process in the context of the New Public Management points out that this kind of audit trail has an enormous impact on the way in which the organisation is arranged to the extent that the effectiveness of the organisation is not so much verified by as constructed around the audit process itself; the audit tail wagging the public service dog. He goes on to challenge New Public Management claims to speak on behalf of taxpayers and citizens as the mythical reference points that give the New Public Management its whole purpose. A curious iteration, where the auditing of self-serving professionals itself becomes self-serving.

Watson et al. (1998) undertook an evaluation of the management of change in six careers companies which were contracted from April 1996; not in the pilot

(Pathfinder) phase but in the rollout of careers service privatisation. Overall, they found that the new careers companies had adopted a conservative strategy, where delivering to the core contract with the DfEE and avoiding risk comprised the sum total of the strategic vision. Innovation and creativity were constrained by the pressure to deliver targets, with non-core activities (that is, activity which fell beyond the scope of the core DfEE contract) limited by insufficient development capital for ventures with more than a minimal level of risk. There was further criticism levelled at these new careers companies, that of ineffective change management. There was a polarisation between staff and managers, with low morale discernible among delivery or operational staff, including the careers professionals. Strategy, such as it was, was neither explained nor embraced, leading to the conclusion that ‘some careers advisers and assistants felt distanced from headquarters staff not involved in guidance delivery. This has had the effect of making them feel they had little involvement in decision-making’ (Watson et al., 1998, para. 323). What is meant by the management of change and how this might serve careers companies requires closer attention to this literature.