“[A] relation which relates to itself, and in relating to itself relates to something else”
(Kierkegaard, 2004:43).
In the previous chapter we discovered that the above remark formed the basis of Kierkegaard’s understanding of selfhood. In this chapter I will attempt to reinterpret this understanding of ‘self’ as to construct what I will call the subject’s ‘subjective understanding’ of his existence. This concept will then be used in Chapter Six as the basis of my ‘subjective approach’ to exploring the relationship between subject and State.
I here draw attention to the fact that the above statement may be broken down into two parts: the ‘relations that relates to itself’, and the ‘something else’ which the subject also relates to. In order to achieve the aim of this chapter I will reinterpret these two components of selfhood and the manner in which they relate to one and other.
Firstly, I consider the ‘relation that relates to itself’. We may understand this as the subject’s relating of his ‘actual existing self’ with the ‘future self he desires to become’ and his capacity to realise this desire through making choices. It thus
primarily denotes the subject as a historically bound agent, an ‘existing self’, who nonetheless maintains the ability to make choices about his life from within this context; his ability to imagine and become the ‘future self’.
In section one I will reinterpret and defend this notion of the subject as one who exists within the limitations of a historical context but nonetheless retains the ability to make life choices.
Secondly, the ‘something else’ we may understand as something external to the subject that he may encounter. When encountering this ‘something else’ the subject is made aware of life options, or ‘possibilities’, which are available to him. In this way we may conceive that the ‘something else’ makes the subject aware of the different person he can become and thus inspires the ‘imagined future self’. It was the encounter with Christ for instance that made the subject aware of the possibility of a Christian life and subsequently ‘inspired’ him to become a Christian. In section two I will provide a reinterpretation of this ‘something else’ that the subject may encounter. This is where my articulation will differ significantly from Kierkegaard’s. This is primarily because I will here need to replace God, or ‘Christ’, as the ‘something else’ which the subject relates to with something that is more suitable for a ’political understanding’. In order to achieve this I will progress in four steps.
In subsection 2.1 I will consider why Kierkegaard identifies God as, not only the ‘something else’ in his theory, but furthermore the only ‘something else’ which is
a valid base from which the subject may make choices. I will aim to criticise and show the limitations that this insistence on God places on Kierkegaard’s understanding as to justify my movement away from it. This will involve a re- visiting of the problem of ‘teleology’ I raised at the end of the previous chapter. In section 2.2 I will then consider a second problem found when trying to reinterpret Kierkegaard’s theory in a more political light. This problem is to do with how knowledge is transferred in the encounter with the ‘something else’. To explain: when the subject encountered Christ the whole ‘truth’ of God was bestowed upon him; he only needed to accept this truth. However encounters with phenomena in the political world cannot bestow upon the subject a complete knowledge of this world in the same way as the encounter with Christ did. Therefore, I will not be talking about ‘one’ encounter, but rather ‘multiple encounters’. This shift from a ‘single encounter’ to ‘multiple encounters’ will thus be the second step I will have to make when reinterpreting the ‘something else’. In section 2.3 I will then provide my conceptualisation of what this ‘something else’ is. This I will call the ‘Horizon’ which I shall understand to be a perception of the world that surrounds the subject constructed from his multiple encounters. In section 2.4 I will then further illustrate this understanding of ‘something else’ through my simile of the ‘dark room’.
It can finally be understood that these two components are brought together by the subject’s ‘choice’; the moment in which he chooses to realise and become one
of the possibilities revealed to him by the ‘something else’. This choice further shapes both the subject and his relations to the world around him. We might for instance consider the choice to realise the possibility of a ‘Christian life’ defined the subject, as he become a ‘Christian’, and shaped his relationship with the world around him, as to ‘become a Christian’ he had to adopt a Christian mode of existence.
In section three I will consequently explore how my two reinterpreted concepts of the ‘relation that relates to itself’ and the ‘something else’ relate to one another and come together. Similar to Kierkegaard’s understanding, I will argue that these two components come together in the moment of choice; when the subject chooses to realise a life possibility that was revealed to him in his Horizon. Also, similar again to Kierkegaard’s account, I will argue that this choice shapes the subject’s identity and orientates his relations with the world around him. This understanding and orientation of his existence he receives through his choice is what I shall call his ‘subjective understanding’. It is this notion of the ‘subjective understanding’ which I will use as a bases to consider how a ‘subjective approach’ may explore the subject and State relationship in Chapter Six.
In the conclusion and summary of this chapter I will provide a summary of this ‘subjective understanding’ and identify any problems with my presentation of this concept which will have to be addressed in Chapter Six.
1.
Imagining and Choosing Alternatives: The ‘Relation which
Relates to Itself’
In this section I will outline my understanding of the subject as having the ability to make life choices from within a historical context. This understanding holds that the subject has the ability to make choices about how he wishes to lead his life. Nonetheless, this freedom is not absolute, but rather is restricted and conditioned by the external world the subject is situated in. The subject is restricted because the external world puts certain limitations upon what he may realistically choose to do. It conditions the subject as it is only through knowledge of the external world that the subject may come to know the options he may choose from, thus facilitating his very capacity to make free decisions.
It may be observed here that there is a great body of literature pertaining to debates about the ‘freedom of the will’. Nonetheless, my intention here is not to enter into such debates. What I primarily wish to achieve in this section is to give a specifically Kierkegaardian account of choice which I use to explore the ‘subjective approach’.
Nonetheless, one alternative theory about freedom that I shall consider is the argument put forward by Arthur Schopenhauer in his essay ‘Freedom of the Will’. The reason for this is to defend my interpretation against a specific argument concerning determinism which I believe proves particularly illuminating as to why
this Kiekregaardian understanding of freedom complements the ‘subjective approach’. Why I have chosen to consider Schopenhauer’s argument in particular is because I believe it draws out the differing ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ interpretations of human freedom which will be important for the proposed approach82.
To begin, we may once more consider our subject who wishes to become a pilot. Now, our subject may be able to decide that he wants to become a pilot, nonetheless his ability to realise this ambition is limited by the situation he finds himself in. He may for instance come from a poor background and consequently may struggle to raise the money for the pilot exams. Furthermore, he may lack the intelligence and mathematical skills that a pilot requires. Thus, although he may desire to be a pilot, the subject may be restricted and even prevented from realising this goal by the circumstances of his situation. Therefore, he is not completely free to define his life, but is rather restricted by the circumstances of his situation.
We can thus see how the subject’s circumstances restrict his choice. I would argue that his circumstance is also what facilitates his ability to choose. In order to choose to become a pilot our subject must have a conception of ‘what it is to be a pilot’. Now, the subject was not born with this understanding, the function of a
82 I may therefore also make clear here that I am not attempting to give a compressive account of Schopenhauer nor his philosophy of the will. I am rather only making an illustration of an