Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy

Member States must be able to conduct political dialogue in the framework of the foreign, security and defence policy, to align with EU statements, to take part in EU actions and to apply agreed sanctions and restrictive measures.

Turkey is moderately prepared as regards the alignment with the EU in the area of foreign, security and defence policy. Some progress was made as the political dialogue between the EU and Turkey on foreign and security policy continued to intensify. Turkey maintained its policy on Syria, supporting the opposition and providing vital humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees. It has continued to participate actively in civil and military crisis management missions. An importing development was the development of the dialogue on counter-terrorism, with Turkey joining the international coalition against Da'esh. In the coming year, Turkey should in particular:

→ align itself more closely with EU declarations and Council decisions.

The political dialogue between the EU and Turkey continued, covering developments in North Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, South Caucasus, Central Asia, counter-terrorism, foreign fighters and non-proliferation issues. Informal EU-Turkey consultations also took place on closer common security and defence policy cooperation, Africa, the Middle East, and the Western Balkans. (For more information on relations with other enlargement countries and EU Member States, see Political criteria— Regional issues and international obligations). The EU counter-terrorism coordinator visited Turkey in October 2014 and June 2015.

Regarding the common foreign and security policy, Turkey aligned itself, when invited, with 16 out of 40 EU declarations and Council decisions (40 % alignment, against 29 % during the reference period of the 2014 Progress Report). Turkey did not recognise and condemned the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia and expressed concern for the Crimean Tatar minority. However, on Crimea and events in eastern Ukraine Turkey did not align with Council decisions, including EU restrictive measures in that field. Turkey has not yet signed the statute of the International Criminal Court. Turkey continued to be vocal on the crisis in

Syria and its spill-over effects, strongly and repeatedly condemning the Syrian regime’s

violence against civilians. It maintained its support for the Syrian Opposition Coalition and provided massive and unprecedented humanitarian assistance to close to 2 million refugees. Restrictive measures against Syria remained in place. Relations with the new government in

Iraq improved significantly. In parallel, relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government in

northern Iraq continued to develop. Turkey joined the international coalition against Da’esh, co-chairing the working group on foreign terrorist fighters. It consulted regularly with the

United States on security and counter-terrorism issues. In September 2014, Turkey and the

US co-chaired the Fifth Ministerial Plenary of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, which adopted internationally agreed best practices on countering the threat of foreign terrorist fighters. It engaged with the US in a ‘train and equip’ programme for the Syrian opposition, and in the same context with Iraq and Kurdistan Regional Government Peshmergas. Following the Da'esh terrorist attack in Suruç in July, Turkey strengthened its engagement and launched several air-strikes against Da'esh positions in Syria. It also struck a deal with the US on the use of Incirlik base for the coalition forces.

Relations with Israel remained strained, with no significant steps taken to conclude the normalisation process initiated in March 2013. Turkey continued to provide humanitarian assistance to Gaza and kept open communication channels with both Fatah and Hamas. Relations with Egypt did not improve. Egypt decided to terminate the bilateral Ro-Ro transport agreement as of April 2015. Relations with the internationally recognised authorities of Libya did not improve, either. However, Turkey officially supported the UN’s efforts in the country. Turkey maintained good relations with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation

Council. Relations with Iran improved despite diverging policies on Syria and Yemen.

Turkey supported the Saudi Arabia-led coalition against the Houthi rebels in Yemen and also sought to mediate in the conflict. It continued to improve cooperation with and between

Afghanistan and Pakistan. Turkey also continued to develop and strengthen its relations

with countries in Asia, Africa and Central/Latin America. It became a non-regional observer in the Central American Integration System.

A series of high-level exchanges with Russia took place, including a visit by President Putin to Ankara in December 2014, during which a new gas pipeline project, ‘Turk Stream’, was proposed as a possible substitute for the ‘South Stream’ project. Turkey maintained good relations with Ukraine. After the meeting of the Turkey-Ukraine High Level Strategic Cooperation Council in March 2015, the two countries declared they would improve their relationship further, with Turkey announcing support for Ukraine’s efforts to deepen its partnership with the EU.

Turkey maintained its policy of engagement in South Caucasus and Central Asia. The inauguration of the trans-Anatolian natural gas pipeline in March was an important step in strengthening energy cooperation with the region and the EU. In April 2015, the Prime Minister again offered deep condolences to the descendants of the 1915 events. However, the Turkish authorities responded systematically and strongly whenever the events were recognised as genocide abroad. The 2009 protocols on normalisation of relations with

Armenia are not yet ratified. Turkey continued to maintain close relations with the countries

of the Western Balkans.

Turkey is party to all international arrangements on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It has not yet aligned itself with the EU position on membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement (see Chapter 30 — External relations) and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Turkey continued to participate in civil and military crisis management operations under the

common security and defence policy (CSDP), in particular EUFOR ALTHEA Bosnia

Herzegovina and EULEX Kosovo. It has offered to contribute to EUFOR RCA, EUBAM Libya, EUTM Mali and EUAM Ukraine. The issue of EU-NATO cooperation, going beyond the ‘Berlin plus’ arrangements, involving all EU Member States, has not yet been resolved.