1. introduction
More than any other sector education, and in particular higher education, suffered as a result of the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution.
Universities and colleges across China closed as many students joined rival Red Guard units and teachers and other staff were often subject to brutal attacks and ritual humiliation. In the wake of the mobilizational phase, higher education policy became the focus of an intense debate within the senior leadership.
This focus on higher education was clearly a result of its inherently political nature. Education was directly related to training successors and imparting the values and lessons of the revolutionary generation. In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution Mao had expressed concern about how this successor generation was being educated and raised the fear that higher education (along with the “cultural” realm in general) continued to be dominated by bourgeois academics. Mao saw the Cultural Revolution itself as a means of regenerating and re-invigorating the Party through participation in the Cultural Revolution. Thus educational issues lay at the heart of the burgeoning
movement.
The debate over the direction of higher education reflected the wider political issue of how far ideological issues should influence economic and social
policy. The views of the various coalitions on this issue are clear from the debates over access to education, quality of education, and the extent to which students should be expected to participate in manual labour. Concerns that China’s universities should train enough qualified engineers or scientists to support economic development often clashed with the ideal of wider access for workers and peasants. In education, this debate had been summarized in the
phrase, “Red versus expert” and the extent to which each element should be emphasized. The period from 1969 to 1978 was characterized by a constantly shifting content of just what this phrase meant.
a. The significance of a study of higher education
In terms of policy making, higher education contrasted with both agricultural and foreign policy in the extent to which it was allowed to become radicalized.
The radical Left’s influence over higher education during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution has been widely commented upon. This study will show that they retained this influence all the way through to their ouster in
1976, despite a number of reform initiatives from senior moderate figures like Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping in the early 1970s.
Mao’s support for the radical Left was clearly important for the radicals’
continued domination of educational policy. After the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution, Mao continued to be concerned with ideological issues and this found expression in his views on higher education policy. Higher education was one area where Mao did see the need for policy to be led by ideological concerns to a far greater extent than he did in either agricultural or foreign policy.
Higher education is significant as the only major policy area where major decision-making bodies were controlled by the radical Left throughout the Cultural Revolution period. Higher education had suffered considerably during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution and had been the scene of intense activity by the radical Left. Supporters of the Left had gained control of a number of key institutions within the government that controlled higher education policy, in particular the State Science and Education Group (SEG), which effectively replaced the Ministry of Education as the locus of decision
making in the period 1969-1975.
The radical Left had also gained control of a number of leading universities,
most notably Tsinghua and Peking universities, as well as universities in their bailiwick of Shanghai, such as Fudan. Together with their control of the SEG, this presence gave the radical Left access to the policy debate on higher
education in a way that they failed to achieve in any other field (except perhaps propaganda work) and allowed them to develop and publicize prominent models.
Despite this apparent influence, this study highlights the apparent weakness of the radical Left in the field of policy implementation, even in an area in which they seemingly dominated the propaganda debate. Zhou Enlai's control over the State Council and the authority of senior figures like Deng Xiaoping are significant as it gave them the ability to resist many of the more radical policy initiatives of the Left and to push their own policies which were more concerned with issues of quality and training than with increased access and political correctness. The apparent strength of both sides led to periods of stalemate, characterized by limited or stagnated reform: The contrasting examples of the introduction of a limited entrance exam for would-be university students and the radical Left’s attempts to overturn it are instructive.
Finally, this study of higher education shows the apparent weakness of Hua Guofeng in this field. With no experience of working on higher education, Hua Guofeng appears to have been unable to resist the reform initiatives of
moderates under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in the period 1977-1978.
Hua’s weakness in this area and in foreign policy was in stark contrast to agriculture where he launched a major policy programme and dominated the decision-making process at the centre throughout 1977 and early-1978.
b. Policy issues in the debate over higher education
Although there are a number of important issues that made up the debate over higher education policy this chapter will focus on three key themes:
Changes in the aims of education; selection procedures for universities; and
issues relating to the curriculum. These lay at the heart of the competing lines in higher education during this period.
Education received a high priority after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) assumed national power in October 1949 and was initially charged with
fulfilling two main aims. Faced with administering a vastly expanded territory, the CCP had an acute personnel shortage, and graduates from schools, colleges and universities were expected to fill the gap as quickly as possible.
In addition, schools and universities were expected to play an integral role in transforming the ideological outlook of the population and ensuring their political loyalty.1
In the early 1950s, under the influence of the Soviet Union, Chinese universities were reorganized following the Soviet model. The rationale
behind this restructuring was simple, to transform higher education in China so that it could support “the economic and social goals of the First Five-Year Plan”
and to train the personnel necessary to achieve these goals.2 To meet these practical aims, curricula in Chinese universities underwent wholesale reform, adopting the Soviet model of focusing on training students in specific
specialities which accorded with the needs of the economic plan.
During the Great Leap Forward and the period leading up to the Cultural Revolution this wholesale adoption of the Soviet model came in for criticism from Mao and members of the radical Left. Mao expressed concerns about the need for a greater emphasis on political education, shortening courses,
adapting teaching material to better reflect China’s conditions and combining study with labour. Above all else, Mao became concerned that higher
education was under the influence of ‘bourgeois academics’ and that the 1 A number of authors have recognized these two functions. See, for example, Theodore Hsi-en Chen, Chinese Education Since 1949, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), pg.9, Stuart E. Fraser (ed.), Education and Communism in China An anthology of commentary and
documents (London: Pali Mall Press, 1971), pg.9, and R.F. Price, Education in Communist China (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pg.28.
2 Ruth Hayhoe, CHINA’S UNIVERSITIES 1895-1995 A century of cultural conflict (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1996), pg.78.
reforms introduced in higher education after 1949 had led to the exclusion of China’s “revolutionary” classes, the workers, peasants and soldiers, from leading universities and colleges .
The reforms introduced by Mao and the radical Left during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution sought to “re-radicalize” higher education policy by breaking the monopoly of the bourgeoisie by revolutionizing the leadership of China’s universities and changing enrollment procedures to benefit workers, peasants and soldiers. The Cultural Revolution saw renewed emphasis on political issues as a fundamental aim of higher education,
however the radical Left remained aware of its role in training scientists and technicians to take part in China’s economic reforms. This is highlighted in the debate over academic quality that took place in 1970-71, and the radical Left’s efforts to demonstrate the quality of students enrolled under the new
procedures.
In the post-Mao era, Hua Guofeng sought to balance the twin aims of revolutionizing higher education and improving access with the need to
support economic reform, however, as China placed renewed emphasis on the
‘Four Modernizations’ and opening to the outside world, Deng Xiaoping and other moderates placed far more empahsis on the issues of academic knowledge and learning. 1977-78 saw a return to the policies of the pre- Cultural Revolution period which once again focused on training students to support "the economic and social goals” of economic reform.
c. Higher education in the PRC. 1966-1969.
As part of the wider “cultural” sphere, education became a major focus for criticism from the radical Left during the Cultural Revolution. The “Decision of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” (the “16-Points”), adopted by the Central Committee 9 August,
1966, explicitly targetted education for radical reform.3 Institutions of higher education played a leading role in the opening stages of the Cultural
Revolution and the suffering of many academics during this period and the destruction of educational facilities has been well documented both by outside observers and those actually involved in the conflict.4
The “Decision on Enrollment in Higher Educational Institutions" of 13 June, 1966 had envisaged universities and colleges closing for a period of six months while students took part in Cultural Revolution activities, however, as Theodore Hsi-en Chen noted, “it was far easier to close the schools down than to reopen them”.5 Students from China’s universities took advantage of free travel on China’s railways to spread their message of revolution across the country, or simply to engage in sightseeing or visit their families. In order to speed up the return of the students, Mao issued a new directive on March 7, 1967, which called on the military to help with the re-opening of the schools.6 The military presence in China’s univesities after Mao’s directive was issued was instrumental in allowing classes to resume, although often they had to forcibly ensure calm on the campuses.
Workers and peasants were also given a direct role in the administration of universities and colleges in an attempt to ensure proletarian leadership over the institutions of higher education and prevent a return to what had been seen as the domination by “bourgeois" (professional) academics, at the expense of members of the proletariat. In a directive issued on 30 August, 1968, Mao
3 “Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution”, in the Peking Review, August 12, 1966, in Theodore Hsi-en Chen The Maoist Educational Revolution (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), Appendix B.
4 See, for example, Anne Thurston, Enemies of the People: The ordeal of intellectuals in China's Great Proletarian Revolutionx(Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press, 1988), Nien Cheng, Life and Death in Shanghai (New York: Grove Press, 1987), and William Hinton, Hundred Day War The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972).
5 Theodore Hsi-en Chen, Chinese Education Since 1949, pg.90.
6 “Mao’s ‘March 7 Directive’ Concerning the Great Strategic Plan for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution”, translated in the Peking Review, March 15, 1968, reprinted in Chen, The Maoist Educational Revolution, Appendix D.
stated:
In carrying out the proletarian revolution in education it is essential to have working-class leadership; it is essential for the masses of workers to take part and, in co-operation with the Liberation Army fighters, bring about a revolutionary ‘three-in-one” combination, together with the activists among the students, teachers and workers in the schools who are determined to carry the proletarian revolution through to the end.7
In line with Mao’s directive, millions of workers and peasants were drafted in to take part in what were officially known as Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams. Together with any military personnel based in the universities, these teams played a leading role in the re-opening and administration of China’s universities and colleges.
In the following section I will examine the radical assessment of higher
education between 1969 and 1971, focusing in particular on some of the model institutions they developed in their attempt to influence higher education policy
making.
2. The radical assessment of higher education in China: 1969-1971
The 9th National Congress of the CCP marked the end of the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution and the end of the worst of the violence directed towards China’s intellectuals. In his political report to the Congress, Lin Biao summarized this trend somewhat crudely when, discussing the Party’s policy towards intellectuals and cadres, he said “[We] should expand the
amount of education, and reduce the amount of hitting” (yao kuoda jiaoyu mian, suoxiao daji mian). Lin stated that when dealing with intellectuals and cadres, the Party should fully implement the more moderate policy of “learning
7 "Mao’s Directive on Working Class Leadership” translated in the Peking Review, August 30, 1968, reproduced in Chen, The Maoist Educational Revolution, Appendix E.
from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and curing the sickness to save the patient” (chengqian bihou, zhibing jiuren). He also talked at length on the significance of Mao Zedong’s 1957 speech “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", which Mao had used to try and launch the '100 Flowers’ movement. Lin repeated Mao’s earlier message that it was important to distinguish between the two kinds of contradictions, antagonistic, and non-antagonistic, when handling the cases of intellectuals and cadres and treat the latter with leniency.8
HoweM^, while intellectuals found themselves subject to less direct violence, the emerging Party line emphasized the need for intellectuals to undergo “re
education” (zai jia o y u )9 This work was to be led by the military and the Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams, and the newly established ‘Three-in- one’ revolutionary committees. While offering intellectuals an opportunity to reform, literally a “way out" (chulu), in practice re-education often meant undergoing lengthy sessions of study and self-criticism and long periods in May 7th cadres schools located across the countryside of China.
a. The new leadership in China's institutions of higher education
As described above, millions of workers, peasants and soldiers had entered China’s schools at all levels during 1968 and 1969 as part of the Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams. The activities of these teams received prominent media coverage, and together with the military personnel also based in China’s universities and the ‘revolutionary’ students and teachers, they exercised a dominant influence over China’s instutions of higher education during the period 1969-71, indeed, speaking in August 1968, Mao Zedong had envisaged a permanent role for the teams:
8 Lin Biao, “Report at the 9th National Congress of the CCP", in the Renmin Ribao, 28 April, 1969, pg.3.
9 Only a month after the 9th National Congres closed, the Renmin Ribao carried a front page article, “Jiji reqing de dui zhishi fenzi jinxing zai jiaoyu” (Vigourously and enthusiastically carry out the re-education of intellectuals), in the Renmin Ribao, 29 May, 1969, pg.1.
The workers’ propaganda teams should stay permanently in the schools and take part in fulfilling all the tasks of struggle-criticism- transformation in the schools, and they will always lead the schools.10
In a highly publicized display of support for the activities of the teams, Mao donated a gift of mangoes he had received from the visiting Pakistani Foreign Minister, Arshad Husain to the Work Team stationed at Tsinghua University.11
While the majority of the members of the teams were poorly educated and had been chosen mainly for their loyalty to Mao Zedong and the Party centre, some of the team members were senior Party and military cadres. Many of these figures assumed leading roles in the administration of the various universities and colleges as the regular Party committees were re-established in schools across China after the 9th Party Congress. Beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution in higher education, these figures were natural allies to the radicals within the Party who had promoted that line.
Two figures in particular, Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi, both members of the propaganda team that entered Tsinghua University in 1968, were strong supporters of the radical Left and close to Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao.
They were subsequently purged following the Gang’s arrest in October 1976.
It is worth looking at their background’s as they were probably typical of many of the senior members of the propaganda teams (although without
comprehensive biographical material this is difficult to confirm). The propaganda team that entered Tsinghua University was drawn largely from members of the elite 8341 central bodyguard unit of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), highlighting the concern the leadership felt with regards to Tsinghua’s successful reopening. At that time Chi Qun was the Head of the Propaganda Section of this unit, a significant post in such a prestigious unit.
10 “Mao’s Directive on Working Class Leadership" translated in the Peking Review, August 30, 1968, in Theodore Hsi-en Chen, The Maoist Educational Revolution, Appendix E.
11 Edward E. Rice, Mao's Way, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pg.455.
Xie Jingyi also worked in Unit 8341, “handling confidential material”.12 Chi Qun later went on to serve as Secretary of the Party Committee of Tsinghua University and dominated the political scene at Tsinghua in the first half of the 1970s. He was also a leading figure in the Central Science and Education group formed in 1970 to lead work in education. Xie Jingyi served as Deputy- Director of the Revolutionary Committee of Tsinghua University and later became First Secretary of the Beijing Communist Youth League. Chi Qun in particular was active in support of the Gang of Four and played a leading role in the National Educational Work Conference of 1971 which I discuss below and the launch of the ‘Campaign to Criticize Confucius and Lin Biao’ in 1973.
Both Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi were key figures in the "Peking and Tsinghua Universities’ ‘Criticism Group’”, a mouthpiece for the policies of the Gang of Four, which often published under the name “Liang Xiao”, a homonym for “two schools”, a reference to the two universities from which most of its members were drawn.
As the violence in China's universities and colleges subsided, it was under the guidance of figures such as Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi that the movement to
“re-educate” the intellectuals took place. The presence of figures like Chi and Xie in some (but not all) of China’s universities, and their role on central organs like the Science and Education Group was significant in giving the radical Left access to, and influence over, the policy debate on higher education.
b. The “re-education” of intellectuals
Lin Biao, in his report to the 9th Congress, had emphasized the need for the
Lin Biao, in his report to the 9th Congress, had emphasized the need for the