The last chapter discussed how ecological modernisation theorists cast their eye towards China because of the Chinese government’s policy responses to that country’s deteriorating environment. China, they argued, was experiencing a unique version of ecological modernisation. The chapter concluded with the suggestion that a discursive, constructivist reading of ecological modernisation could potentially provide a useful framework to understand the motivation behind China’s environmental policy reforms and could shed light on the theoretical controversies over the value of ecological modernisation within the Chinese context. From this discussion, a set of research questions emerged:
• If ecological modernisation ideas have been incorporated into the policy agenda, to what extent have these ideas evolved?
• Which institutions and officials have been the critical advocates for the inclusion of ecological modernisation ideas within the Chinese government’s environmental policy agenda?
• What concerns have been the key drivers for the inclusion of ecological modernisation ideas within the Chinese government’s environmental policy agenda?
This chapter outlines the methodology that I adopted in answering those questions. It begins with a personal reflection on how my research evolved into its current state, noting how my difficulties with applying ecological modernisation theory (EMT) to China’s power generation industry led me to realise that a discursive understanding of ecological modernisation could potentially present a more useful lens to explore changes in China’s environmental policy agenda. From that discussion, I integrate the ‘themes’ of Molian EMT into the existing constructivist literature on ecological modernisation to generate the discursive indicators for my research. The rest of this chapter outlines my case studies and how I operationalised my research questions and hypothesis to gather the evidence needed to explore the role of ecological modernisation ideas within China’s environmental reform measures.
Applying Ecological Modernisation Theory to China’s Power Generation Industry
When I first commenced my research, I wanted to evaluate Arthur Mol’s claim that ecological modernisation was occurring in China.256 Based on my review of the literature, I believed that early evidence existed to justify the use of EMT as a theoretical framework to examine in more depth the environmental shifts occurring in China’s power generation sector. I chose this industry because of my interest in its critical significance for China’s ongoing modernisation. I also broadened my focus beyond the renewable energy industry because I wanted to explore whether the process of ecological modernisation affected industries that utilise traditional generating technologies, such as coal-fired power and hydropower. That choice seemed appropriate because hydropower and coal-fired electricity comprised the vast majority of China’s installed electricity capacity.257 However, I eventually discovered that this approach opened up a set of difficulties as to how I could measure the process of ecological modernisation within China’s power generation industry. The main difficulty I faced centred on operationalising EMT. Although the EMT literature had established a set of ‘themes’, or theoretical indicators, in reality the interpretation of these themes seemed arbitrary and heavily influenced by the subjective values of the researcher (an example is the hydropower industry, discussed immediately below). Because of this methodological ‘fuzziness’, it was difficult to find categorial evidence to support the claim that the process of ‘ecological modernisation’ was occurring. Here the looseness that neo-Marxists identified in EMT emerged as a real problem.258
China’s hydropower industry provides an excellent example of the methodological concerns that materialised in the preliminary stages of my research. (A similar case could also be made for the coal-fired power industry and renewable industry). To give a brief context of hydropower in China, it has undergone significant expansion since Chinese authorities first released the sluice gates of the Three Gorges Dam hydropower plant in 2003.259 Since then,
256 Albeit uniquely, see Chapter Two.
257 Zhongguo dianli qiye lianhehui. 2019. “2018 Nian dianli tongji nian kuaibao jiben shuju yilanbiao” (2018
electricity statistics annual express bulletin: basic data list), http://www.cec.org.cn/guihuayutongji/tongjxinxi/ niandushuju/2019-01-22/188396.html. Accessed 22 June 2019.
258 See Chapter Two.
259 Wang Yichen. 2018. “Sanxia jituan: yinling Zhongguo shuidian yong pan xin gaofang” (Three Gorges
Group: leading China’s hydropower to climb new peaks), Xinhua wang, 17 December, http://www.xinhuanet. com/power/2018-12/17/c_1210016832.htm. Accessed 22 June 2019; Zhongguo dianli qiye lianhehui. 2019.
China’s generation of hydroelectricity has grown from 283.7 Terawatt-hours (TWh) to 1155.8 TWh in 2017 (just under 18 percent of total production).260 State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government officials are strong advocates of hydropower because of its ‘abundance’ in China’s southwest – a coal-poor region. Over one-quarter of all electricity generated in China comes from hydroelectricity.261
On a broad level, China’s rapid hydropower expansion could provide evidence that the process of ecological modernisation is occurring. More hydroelectricity means less coal and, consequently, less emitted carbon and air pollutants. Chinese officials have understood this for several decades. In 1983, then minister of the former Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power262 Qian Zhenying stated that ‘hydropower is comparatively economical and clean energy’.263 When calling for more expansion in the hydropower industry, Chinese officials often extolled the benefits of hydroelectricity, specifically, whether it is small- or large-scale hydropower.264 For instance, Chen Lei , the longstanding minister of the Ministry of Water Resources265 (MWR), argued that China’s small hydropower of 80 GW in 2000 involved a saving of 30 million tonnes of coal, equivalent to 72 million tonnes of carbon dioxide.266 Jiao Yong , a vice-minister and chief engineer at the MWR, also noted in a 2009 paper that the Three Gorges Dam’s 22.5 GW installed generating capacity reduced the consumption of 74.8 million tonnes of coal each year, thereby reducing China’s carbon dioxide emissions.267 Although an argument could be mounted concerning the ‘Jevons Paradox’268,
“2018 Nian dianli tongji nian kuaibao jiben shuju yilanbiao” (2018 electricity statistics annual express bulletin: basic data list), http://www.cec.org.cn/guihuayutongji/tongjxinxi/niandushuju/2019-01-22/188396.html. Accessed 22 June 2019.
260 Hydroelectricity statistics taken from BP 2019. “Statistical Review of World Energy – all data (1965-2018),”
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/downloads.html. Accessed 22 July 2019.
261 BP 2019. “Statistical Review of World Energy – all data (1965-2018),” https://www.bp.com/en/global/
corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/downloads.html. Accessed 22 July 2019.
262 Chinese name was . 263 Qian Zhengying 1984, 4. 264 Chen Lei 2002; Jiao Yong 2009. 265 Chinese name is
266 Chen Lei 2002, 12. 267 Jiao Yong 2009, 1.
268 The Jevons Paradox (or ‘rebound effect’) was named after William Jevons an economist who argued that
more efficient coal use would result in more, rather than less, coal consumption because the cheaper-cost of coal encouraged more innovation in coal-consuming technologies, see Jevons 2001 [1865].
these statistics support China’s officials backing of hydropower: less carbon and pollution are emitted into the atmosphere because of China’s new hydroelectricity expansion.
Hydropower can also have positive influences that extend beyond reducing coal-derived carbon emissions and air pollution. Hydropower development, especially small hydropower or ‘rural hydropower’ ( ), provides electricity to homes that traditionally had to resort to biomass for their heating and cooking. Resorting to such fuel has been a lead contributor to deforestation in China. In 2002, minister of the MWR, Wang Shucheng , stated that ‘rural hydropower was the “leader” in water projects for mountainous regions’ and that ‘15 years of rural electrification has resolved the problem of 120 million people without power’.269 The result of this electrification, he claimed, was the reduction in approximately 300,000 acres of felled forest each year, or 9 million cubic metres of wood products harvested.270 His successor, Chen Lei, expressed the same sentiment several years later. Writing in Small
Hydropower in 2011, Chen announced that because of the ‘construction of 236 small
hydropower replacing fuel combustion projects’ over the preceding 5-year period, over ‘460,000 rural homes had their fuel problem resolved’, which resulted in the ‘protection of roughly 900,000 acres of forests’.271 Chinese companies have also undertaken locally-designed innovation to improve the efficiency of hydroelectricity generation through developments in generator technology and advances in hydrology.272 China has also invested in technology to reduce the environmental impact of large-scale dams. Dams unnaturally block fish migrations, so some Chinese engineers have implemented fish ladders and artificial breeding in an attempt to ensure that concrete dams do not negatively impact fish species. Moreover, innovations have occurred concerning how reservoirs are managed to reduce dry stream beds and better manage dam and river temperature levels.273 These examples illustrate that an argument could be mounted that ecological modernisation is occurring in China. Hydropower has modernised parts of China’s society that previously relied on traditional forms of energy. Moreover, Chinese companies are implementing technology and better management practices to reduce the environmental impact of dams.
269 Wang Shucheng 2002, 12. 270 Ibid, 13.
271 Chen Lei 2011, 1. 272 Jia 2016.
Despite these perceived benefits, hydropower expansion has negatively impacted China’s environment. This fact I could not disregard. The anti-dam NGO International Rivers states that ‘while water is a renewable resource, the rivers and the ecosystems that they sustain – including floodplains, wetlands, estuaries and marine environments – are not renewable. Given the serious, irreversible ecological impacts of dams, dam-based hydropower cannot be considered a renewable source of power’.274 Chinese language research exists that focuses on the environmental (and social) problems caused by China’s hydropower expansion. For instance, International Rivers funded a report by a group of Chinese scientists on hydropower development in China which argues that:
rivers are ancient complex ecosystems, the value of these systems and the resources they provide are much more than mere power generation. Rivers maintain the health of the ecosystems and as they shaped ancient civilisations in the past, today they provide services that support the whole economy… [d]ams alter the natural flow of rivers, resulting in the reduction and extinction of rare fish species. Upstream hydropower development dries up rivers and lakes in the downstream, Dongting Lake and Poyang Lake being the most shocking examples in China. Dams in the southwest regions inundate fertile valley land, and compromise self-purification capacity of rivers, which causes serious pollution in reservoirs. The cumulative effect of cascade dams can cause ecological losses and dry up rivers, which ultimately will affect human beings at the top of the food chain. Moreover, the ecological remedy measures designed to decrease dams’ impact have failed repeatedly. The dams on Jinsha River and Shuiluo River, as well as Xiaonanhai Dam have significantly compromised river ecosystems. The damage is not just caused by construction of the dams, but also by mismanagement and irrational decision-making linked to ignoring existing laws to protect rivers.275
In this report, the ecological consequences of hydropower are interpreted negatively. Rather than viewing hydropower as a contributor to minimising climate change and limiting deforestation, critics view dams as human-made structures that disrupt and damage river ecology.276 These ecological impacts raised some crucial methodological questions in my research: should I emphasise examples where technological innovations or improved management of dams have made hydropower generators more environmentally sustainable? Should I centre my attention on cases where power generators have continued to use less than best-practice technology? Linked to this, how many of China’s 50,000 dams would I need to scrutinise before I could be confident that I had a representative sample that would afford me
274 International Rivers. 2013. “Hydropower,” 26 March, https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/
hydropower-7901. Accessed 24 May 2014.
275 Li, Bo, Songqiao Yao, Yin Yu and Qiaoyu Guo. 2014. “The “Last Report” On China’s Rivers,” International
Rivers, https://www.internationalrivers.org/sites/default/files/attached-files/final_rivers_report_english_small. pdf. Accessed 11 March 2015, 4; Chinese version is Li Bo, Yao Songqiao, Yu Yin, Guo Qiaoyu. 2013.
“Zhongguo jianghe de ‘zuihou’ baogao zhongguo minjian zuzhi dui guonei shuidian kaifa de sikao ji ‘shisanwu’ guihua de jianyi” (The “last” report of China’s rivers: thoughts on Chinese hydropower development by Chinese civil organizations and suggestions for the 13th Five-Year Plan), International Rivers, 24 December,
the confidence to conclude that ecological modernisation has reached a watershed moment concerning hydropower?
A further issue was how my research should scrutinise hydropower projects that were cancelled on purported ecological grounds. The example of the Nu River ( , also known as Salween River) in Yunnan provides an excellent example of this conundrum. In the early 2000s, the Chinese government had initially allowed the SOE Huadian ( ) the right to construct thirteen cascade dams with a planned overall capacity of 21.3 GW without an environmental impact assessment. 277 The project soon drew heavy criticism from environmental NGOs, scientists and local environmental bureaucrats because of the lack of an environmental impact assessment and because they believed the project would negatively impact the ‘Three Parallel Rivers’ ( ) region, which the United Nations had recently declared a World Heritage Site.278 In particular, civil society stakeholders, such as China Rivers Network (a consortium of seven NGOs in China), played an essential part in mobilising attention towards the environmental impacts of hydropower and the need for rigorous and transparent environmental impact assessments. The critique of the hydroelectric project culminated in February 2004 when Premier Wen Jiabao stated that ‘such a large hydropower station project that draws high social attention, and has environmental controversy, should be cautiously studied, and scientifically decided’.279 Two months later he placed a moratorium on damming the Nu River.280 Studies have shown that the NGOs played a significant role in drawing Wen’s attention to the environmentally problematic nature of the project.281 Again, the role of civil societal (and non-state or quasi-state) stakeholders in driving environmental reform could present as evidence for ecological modernisation. Mol and others have explored how civil society has influenced ecological restructuring in late-modern nations.282
277 Watts, Jonathan. 2011. “China’s big hydro wins permission for 21.3GW dam in world heritage site,” The
Guardian, 2 February, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/feb/01/renewableenergy-china. Accessed 23 May 2018; Magee and McDonald 2006, 47.
278 Magee and McDonald 2006, 39-40. 279 Quoted in Mertha 2009, 1005. 280 Ibid.
281 Mertha 2008; Hensengerth 2014 282 See Chapter Two.
However, my research also led me to question how much emphasis should be placed on the influence of perceived adverse environmental outcomes within the government’s overall decision to halt dam construction. Although protecting the biodiverse flora and fauna of the Nu River was a consideration, social costs also heavily influenced the political leadership. Installing the proposed thirteen dams would have inundated villages within the Nu River valley and led to the forced relocation of at least 50,000 people.283 (Chinese environmental impact assessments take into account social impacts).284 The Nu River presents just one example, albeit prominent and significant, of large-scale dams being halted on environmental grounds. Conversely, the Lancang River (also known as the Mekong River), also in Yunnan, has undergone significant transformation, with over twenty dams proposed to be built along the waterway and seven large dams already built.285 Once completed, the dams along the Lancang River will have an installed capacity of over 30 GW of hydroelectricity, considerably larger than the planned overall capacity for the Nu River. Although the specific environmental impacts of damming the Lancang River vary compared with the Nu River because of differing geography, the overall environmental impacts remain the same with problems for biodiversity and river systems.286 Overall, I was left with more questions than answers with respect to whether ecological modernisation was underway within the hydroelectricity industry.
From my preliminary research, I could have concluded that the hydropower industry was a weak case study to examine ecological modernisation in China and tried to find a more appropriate case study. However, EMT’s proponents presented their theory as a universally applicable approach to understanding the manner in which societies ecologically restructure.287 Although Mol principally derived the theoretical aspects of ecological modernisation from his evaluation of the chemical industry in the Netherlands, he did not preclude any industries from the theory’s purview. Moreover, technological advances in hydropower suggested that the industry had progressed and, in some instances, become more environmentally sustainable. I could have also determined that ecological modernisation was in its infancy in China, and yet to reach a breakthrough moment. However, the point at which I could label an event or project
283 Magee and McDonald 2006, 40; Tullos et al. 2013. 284 Gao 2001.
285 Yeophantong 2014; International Rivers. 2013. “Lancang River Dams: Threatening the Flow of the Lower
Mekong,” August, https://www.internationalrivers.org/sites/default/files/attachedfiles/ir_lacang_dams_2013_ 5.pdf. Accessed 21 January 2019.
as an instance of ecological modernisation was unclear. The result of this initial groundwork is that I could also have tentatively resolved that the process of ecological modernisation was either lacking or stymied in China’s hydropower industry. With more questions than answers emerging from my preliminary investigation, my research had reached an impasse.
By contrast to the difficulties I encountered in operationalising EMT, my exploration of the discursive aspect of the theory was more productive. The last of the theory’s themes centres on an ecologically-grounded discourse, or ‘environmental rationality’, that challenges the economic-based discourse, or ‘economic rationality’.288 No longer does economic rationality dominate the ecological. I was able to find policy statements from senior Chinese government policymakers that shed light on how they interpreted hydropower development within the broader context of China’s environmental problems.
Reflecting on their statements caused me to re-examine my focus on this process of ecological modernisation. I could have decided to continue my exploration of ecological modernisation in China as a social process, even if that emphasis meant that the bulk of material uncovered in my research was centred on discursive material. However, it seemed more relevant in light of this new evidence to explore in greater depth the idea or discourse of ecological modernisation in China and see whether Chinese policymakers viewed environmental reform and economic development from an ecological modernisation mindset. This new research focus would allow me to undertake an intellectual history and explore the environmental policy ‘first principles’ of these officials, by examining the institutions and officials that promote what sound like ecological modernisation views.
Research Case Studies
With this new approach, I formed the realisation that the power sector was unduly restrictive of my research aims to study the value of ecological modernisation in the Chinese context. However, while exploring the discourse of Chinese ministers and policy researchers, I would often find them referring to ideas such as ‘sustainable development’ ( ), ‘cleaner production’ ( ), ‘circular economy’ ( ), ‘green GDP’ ( GDP), ‘environmentally friendly society’ ( ), ‘low-carbon economy’ ( ), ‘green economy’ ( ) or ‘ecological civilisation’ ( ) when justifying environmental projects and legislation
relevant to the power generation industry. Through further exploration, I noticed that these concepts went into more depth than political slogans such as ‘conserve energy and reduce emissions’ ( ), avoid the path of ‘pollute first, clean up later’ ( ) or ‘give priority to prevention’ ( ).289 Beyond that, prima facie evidence existed in the statements of these officials for me to believe that these concepts aligned with ecological modernisation.290 (This was not a surprising revelation as Arthur Mol had noted that ecological modernisation was congruent with circular economy, green GDP and cleaner production, see Chapter One). I also noticed after a broader investigation that these concepts were not just applicable to the power generation industry. They were used in a broader sense to frame China’s overall environmental reform.
Consequently, I broadened my focus from the power generation industry to include five general concepts of environmental reform that have occurred since the early 1990s in China: