This chapter will examine the period between 1928 and 1929. It traces the shift in policy within the Comintern from the united front to the Third Period’s ‘class against class,’ the CPA’s resistance to this policy change and the causes behind the removal of the Australian leaders responsible for resisting the Comintern line. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section will provide a detailed overview of the period before the 6th Comintern Congress, with subsections tracing the changing international line, new international organisations and domestic activity embarked upon by the CPA. The second part of the chapter will discuss the proceedings of the 6th Comintern Congress. The chapter’s third section will explore the CPA’s response to the 6th Comintern Congress,
internationalist activity conducted by the CPA and events leading to the inception of the new Central Committee led by Herbert Moxon and L. L. Sharkey at the end of 1929. The chapter will demonstrate that during this period, the CPA had an equivocal approach towards proletarian internationalism. This largely resulted either from domestic realities facing the party (e.g. the political inexpediency of opposing White Australia) or to outright objection to policies inaugurated internationally. The latter found clearest expression in the CPA’s resistance to Comintern policy, specifically the relevance of the Third Period to Australia and the party’s consequent reluctance to accept the ‘class against class’ tactic. In doing this the party both contradicted the organisational aspect of proletarian internationalism, and demonstrated the complexity of CPA-Comintern relations. Equivocation was also evident in the CPA’s approach to anti-war work, which was central to proletarian internationalism. While the CPA abounded in anti-war propaganda, it was accompanied with little action. Similarly, the CPA’s solidarity and anti-colonial work was rhetorically in keeping with those aspects of proletarian internationalism described in chapter two, though again lacked supporting action.
Before the 6th Comintern Congress: The Comintern Moves Left
The Changing International Line
In the eighteen months leading up to the 6th Congress in mid-1928, a fundamental shift to the left in the Comintern line was almost furtively executed. The old strategy of collaboration with social democracy became anathema. The ‘new line’s’ emergence was protracted, yet far reaching. Two events were its immediate cause. First, as Stalin emerged triumphant over the ‘left opposition’ in the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) by late 1927, a new conflict was brewing with Bukharin. This partially accounts for the leftward swing in the CPSU and the Comintern; Stalin now required left- wing support for the struggle against Bukharin’s right-wing and his ambitious new domestic policies intended to build socialism in one country. The second cause of the leftward swing was the unravelling of the united front following the opening of hostilities in China between Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CCP). These events were the most significant in instigating the change in policy; but, as will be shown below, they were not the sole cause of the shift to the left.
The new policies were elaborated at three important meetings. These were the 15th CPSU Congress in December 1927 and two Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) Plena held in May 1927 and February 1928. Numerous features first visible here remained hallmarks of the new line: the so called ‘war danger’ against the USSR and the Chinese revolution; the internal ‘right danger’; and capitalist rationalisation and its communist response which signalled the outbreak of hostility between communists and social democrats. For its part, the CPA was blissfully impervious to these changes; it did not draw the correct conclusions from the new line and only belatedly adopted its terms in late 1929.
The first meeting was the 8th ECCI Plenum in May 1927. It met during a tense period for the Soviet Union. The country was enveloped in a ‘war scare,’ with seemingly sound reasons. Russo-British relations had cooled and plummeted further following a raid on the Soviet trade delegation in London, the so-called Arcos raid. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were then severed. Events in China, as already mentioned, were taking a turn for the worse. Consequently, with the Soviets facing a less than amicable Britain and potential threat from China, the ‘war danger’ was the main topic for Plenum’s consideration.1
The 8th ECCI dissected the contributing factors to the ‘war danger,’ and predetermined the communist response to imperialist war. It predicted that a future war was likely to take the form of an aggression against the Soviet Union and/or the colonial liberation
1 8th ECCI Agenda contained in the Comintern periodical International Press Correspondence [hereafter
Inprecorr], vol. 7, no. 31, 26 May 1927, p. 638. For the Arcos raid see H. Flory, ‘The Arcos Raid and the Rupture of Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1927,’ Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 12, no. 1, (1977).
movements. In the interim, communists were urged to concentrate on sloganeering and incessant propaganda against imperialist war.2
Budding hostility towards social democracy, linked to the war scare, was already notable. It was exacerbated by two events following the Plenum. Most significant was the September decision of the British Trade Union Congress (TUC) to dissolve the Anglo- Russian Trade Union Committee. Second was the refusal of the Austrian social democrats to call a general strike following a workers’ uprising in Vienna. These events directly contributed to the discrediting and unravelling of the previous tactic of the united front ‘from above.’ By the 6th Comintern Congress a year later, it had been abandoned entirely. But at this Plenum, issues related to defence and colonial policy were the cause of vituperation against social democrats. The Plenum claimed that ‘reformists’ were aiding war preparations, directed particularly against China and the USSR.3 Further, the ECCI criticised the British ‘reformists’ for approving the dispatch of soldiers to quell rebellions in India and China. It encouraged a more confrontationist stance by applauding the CPGB’s energetic fight ‘against the imperialist policy of the Labour Party.’4 The CPGB was instructed to continue its struggle against ‘imperialist tendencies’ in the labour movement and to continually explain to British workers ‘that the colonial peoples are fighting the same capitalist enemy [as ourselves].’5 Similar activities were expected from all communist parties. Although this was a sign that the sectarianism of the Third Period was gathering pace, these tasks were also consistent with Leninist proletarian internationalism.
The emergent sectarianism of the 8th ECCI was intensified during the 15th CPSU Congress, which opened on 2 December 1927. It was the first since the expulsion of Trotsky on 14 November 1927.6 Trotsky’s demise also signified the triumph of the Stalinist conception of proletarian internationalism. In August 1927, Stalin described an internationalist as one who ‘unreservedly, unhesitatingly and without conditions is prepared to defend the USSR because it is the base of the world revolutionary movement.’7 Hence, the struggle against war in general and anti-Soviet war in particular,
2Inprecorr, vol. 7, no. 40, 14 July 1927, p. 896. 3Inprecorr, vol. 7, no. 35, 16 June 1927, p. 737. 4Inprecorr, vol. 7, no. 36, 23 June 1927, p. 765. 5 Ibid. p. 768.
6 Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1970), p. 310.
7 Quoted in Geoffrey Stern, The Rise and Decline of International Communism (Aldershot: Edwin Elgar Publishing Limited, 1990), p. 71.
was nominated by Stalin as the touchstone of proletarian internationalism. While Lenin certainly attached importance to the defence of the USSR, he did not consider it to be the primary factor in deciding internationalism.
N. I. Bukharin, the then Comintern president, delivered the main Congress report that took a further step towards the Third Period. It is necessary to state here that it was Bukharin, not Stalin, who formulated the ideas underpinning the Third Period. Indeed, Stalin’s line until late 1927 was, as McDermott and Agnew observe, essentially ‘Bukharinist.’8 Stalin did, however, subsequently plagiarise and distort Bukharin’s ideas.
In his report, Bukharin characterised this new period in post-war capitalism as an epoch of wars and revolution, yet one in which a partial, relative and temporary9 stabilisation of capitalism had been attained. This was qualified with the observation of ‘internal contradictions’ of capitalist stabilisation largely absent in previous years. These were manifested in growing cases of economic decline; overproduction due to rationalisation/mechanisation; fiercer class struggles in the form of a ‘capitalist offensive’ against the wages and conditions of the workers (ostensibly to provide capitalists a competitive edge over rivals, though with the deleterious effect of shrinking the purchasing power of the domestic market); strikes to resist the ‘capitalist offensive’; increased unemployment; and, of particular relevance to Australia, the removal of British unemployed to Australia.10 The resultant overproduction and contraction of domestic markets, in addition to the insatiable capitalist appetite for cheaper labour and resources, contributed to the increase in the so-called ‘external contradictions’ of capitalism. This was manifested most acutely in the threat of war as a solution to the simmering economic crisis, as capitalists aggressively turned to international markets to dispose of surplus goods. War was predicted between the imperialist states as they jostled for supremacy in the colonies or even turned their guns on the Soviet Union11 In all this, social democracy was seen as a willing accomplice, thus positioning itself against the working class and the Soviet Union. However, this was a forecast. According to Bukharin, capitalism had not yet reached the abovementioned crisis.
8 See argument pursued by McDermott and Agnew, The Comintern, p. 75.
9 According to communists, capitalism could only temporarily stabilise itself. This interpretation was influenced by basic Marxist tenets: that crisis was inherent under capitalism, that cyclical ups and downs were inevitable and that these factors would lead to the downfall of capitalism, a historically assured outcome.
10Inprecorr, vol. 7, no. 73, 29 December 1927, p. 1671. 11 Ibid., p. 1672.
Bukharin had previously labelled this new period of post-war capitalism as the Third Period in 1926.12 The first period from the end of the First World War to the mid-1920s was characterised by revolutionary struggle and communist advance. The second period from the mid-1920s was the era of capitalist stabilisation and the united front. The main feature of this Third Period was the return and intensification of the class struggle and capitalist crisis as a consequence of the abovementioned internal and external contradictions of capitalist stabilisation.
The intensification of the class struggle necessitated the adoption of policies in conformity with the Manichean slogan ‘class against class.’ This promoted the distinct identity of communist parties ‘as the sole working class party’ and therefore pitted communists against all other forces in society, though primarily against rivals for the leadership of the proletariat, the social democrats. In practice, this meant that communists were bound to challenge social democrats in all spheres – especially industrial and political. In the course of this struggle, prophesied Bukharin, communists would be victorious. Evidence for this was found in increased communist electoral victories, mass demonstrations, strikes and trade union influence won by communists in Europe.13 The prognosis was that the influence of communism would grow and that of social democracy would wane.
Bukharin’s assessment revealed ominous fault lines between himself and Stalin. Contradicting Bukharin’s assertion of a temporary capitalist stabilisation, Stalin argued that capitalist stabilisation was in the process of decay and that it was approaching (if not already in) a grave crisis, signalling that capitalism had unmistakably entered a period of destabilisation.14 Bukharin was subsequently forced to concede ground on this point. Additionally, he was forced to recognise the presence of a right-wing deviation from party policy (termed the ‘right-danger’), which, nevertheless, did not spare him criticism from certain Stalinists. Although seemingly minor, this division of opinion was a harbinger of conflict.
12 For the origins and development of the Third Period see McDermott and Agnew, The Comintern, pp. 68- 80 and Matthew Worley, ‘Courting Disaster? The Communist International in the Third Period,’ in Worley (ed.), In Search of Revolution, pp. 1-17. See also Tim Rees and Andrew Thorpe, ‘Introduction,’ in Rees and Thorpe (eds.), International Communism and the Communist International, p. 4.
13Inprecorr, vol. 7, no. 73, 29 December 1927, pp. 1674-1675. ‘Sole working class party’ quote cited in McDermott and Agnew, The Comintern, p. 73.
Nevertheless, both were in strong agreement on the fiendish character of social democracy. On account of their centrality to Third Period communism, the deliberations on social democracy merit greater consideration. Bukharin argued that the leftward swing of the European proletariat was met with a turn to the right from the heads of social democracy in a desperate bid to retain influence. This idea was inseparable from the Third Period and provides an explanation for communist loathing of their reformist counterparts. Through their advocacy of conciliatory economic and industrial policies, the social democrats had shown their ‘complete capitulation to bourgeois ideology’ despite ‘left’ manoeuvres and posturing.15 He reasoned that social democratic policy,
from its acceptance of the League of Nations to the idea of working within the bourgeois democratic state, shared little common ground with communist policy.16 Moreover, Bukharin’s powers of prophecy predicted that social democrats would rally to the defence of their own government in the event of war with the Soviet Union. ‘That is as clear as daylight’ said Bukharin. ‘Seen from this standpoint, all talk of sympathy for the Soviet Union is an open and malicious deception of the broad masses.’17 The ‘Resolution on the
Report of the Delegation of the CPSU in the ECCI’ was even more scathing of social democracy. Part of the resolution read
In spite of the most varied hypocritical manoeuvres there is revealed precisely in this question the true nature of Social Democracy, which in reality is assisting the imperialists in organising the war against the Soviet Union.18
This assertion placed social democrats squarely in the camp of Russia’s and the Comintern’s enemies.
This prompted a further unravelling of the erstwhile tactic of the united front. A more belligerent approach towards the leaders of social democracy, complemented with the building of the united front ‘from below’ (that is with rank and file social democrats) around the fight against war and for the defence of the USSR, was the order of the day.19 Communist parties were advised to adopt class against class and go on the offensive by contesting elections in opposition to the social democrats, ostensibly to highlight their
15Inprecorr, vol. 7, no. 73, 29 December 1927, p. 1675. 16 Ibid., p. 1676.
17 Ibid.
18Inprecorr, vol. 8, no. 2, 12 January 1928, p. 71. 19Inprecorr, vol. 7, no. 73, 29 December 1927, p. 1676.
‘treachery’ and to assert the working class bona fides of the communist parties.20 By the 1929 Australian federal elections, the CPA had still not grasped this change of tactics. The above changes in policy commonly, though incorrectly, ascribed to the 6th Comintern
Congress, laid the foundation for hostility towards social democracy, the main feature of Third Period communism.
By the 9th ECCI Plenum, held in February 1928, international communism had unofficially entered the Third Period. ‘Class against class’ became the new orthodoxy. The perceived mass turn to the left and accompanying swing to the right from social democracy, asserted by Bukharin at the 15th CPSU Congress, was for communists becoming increasingly evident. It was also at this Plenum that the Stalinists begun to construct a dangerous ‘right deviation,’ intended, ultimately, to manoeuvre Bukharin out of the Comintern.21
The 9th ECCI dramatically escalated communist hostility toward social democracy. The
British Labour Party was subjected to a severe diatribe, accused of betraying the working class and the Chinese and Indian revolutions, as well as preparing to ‘go over’ to the side of the bourgeoisie. As Pravda stated, the Comintern now had to ‘direct its whole front towards the most possible strengthening of the struggle against international social democracy, which constitutes the chief hindrance to the winning of the broad masses of the working class for communism.’22 Communist parties had to carve out an independent
identity as the ‘only true party of the working class.’ Competition against social democrats in all spheres, using the united front from below, was encouraged for the purpose of winning the allegiance of the working class and the ‘complete exposure and annihilation of social democracy.’23 This was the meaning of class against class.
With the universal validity of class against class assured, the Plenum set about formalising changes to the tactics of the CPGB and the Communist Party of France (PCF) initiated months earlier. While the CPGB and PCF came in for the greatest scrutiny, it is important to note that all other communist parties, including the CPA, were expected to draw lessons from the Plenum’s instructions and apply similar tactics, where relevant, to
20 Ibid., p. 1677.
21 McDermott and Agnew, The Comintern, p. 75. 22Inprecorr, vol. 8, no. 8, 16 February 1928, pp. 168-9. 23 Ibid. p. 169.
their own situation.24 This was common practice in the organisational dimension of proletarian internationalism.
The CPGB and PCF were directed to spurn electoral alliances with social democrats and contest elections. Through doing this, they would be asserting an independent identity and, therefore, fighting for the support of the working class. Any collaboration with the leaders of social democracy was forbidden.25 Communists were instructed to work with rank and file social democrats against the reformist leadership. A leading British communist, R. Palme Dutt, aptly described the new line: the CPGB was to field the maximum number of candidates and ‘go forward as an independent party to direct and open conflict with the official reformist leadership of the Labour Party.’26 The PCF, even prior to the Plenum, had undertaken to contest elections on a ‘class against class’ basis in opposition to the French Socialist Party (SFIO).27 If before the Plenum there was any doubt as to the Comintern’s direction on social democracy, there was none after its conclusion.
This was the line of international communism leading into the 6th Comintern Congress. The sharp turn to the left, to the belligerent tactic of class against class and from the previous policy of the united front, had already been set in train by the Comintern. The 6th Congress need only approve what was a fait accompli.
New International Organisations
As described in chapter 2, Lenin believed a significant aspect of proletarian internationalism was the international organisation of revolutionaries. In this regard, there were a number of new international organisations that exerted a direct bearing on the CPA. Of these, three will be discussed: the League Against Imperialism (LAI), the