156 Introduction
This chapter applied constructivist approaches to understand the evolution of state behaviours
by explaining the actors’ roles in the Gulf region to provide stability and the security.
This chapter seeks to explain the different visions of security in the Gulf through
study and analysis of the political and security trends in the region where the study will
clarify visions security of Iraq and Iran and the states of the GCC. This will be in accordance
to the constructivist theory; as mentioned in the theory chapter that the identity is defined by
ideas, perceptions and criteria determines the format of the interests of other actors on the one
hand, and the direction these actors take within their international behaviour. Where there are
a lot of factors affecting security and stability, the search remains for the vision and the
perception that satisfies all parties, which is one of the urgent priorities in the region.
The Gulf region has witnessed significant change over the last three decades in the
perception of the importance of the region in terms of global energy security, that the regional
security perception of the Gulf states determines the general policy toward the external
powers that have direct impact on the region’s security and stability. To be clear the hegemonic state, which is the USA, has a significant role and direct impact in the
relationships, stability and the balance of power by signing bilateral agreements, which
include the sale of arms and provision of military support to the states that have signed these
agreements, such as the GCC states and Iraq which discussed in chapter one. As a result of
this the Iranian security vision needs to be reviewed and discussed later in this chapter.
Development of relations and the security concept
Before reviewing the security visions for the countries of the region, there is a need to clarify
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concept of security in general, is to maintain against any internal or external threat, whether
this concept is related to the state or the system of regional or international order, and is
usually taken as one of the states’ foreign policy aims that is achieved by following procedures that provide stability in their region. With regard to national security, Baldwin
(1997 p. 13) mentions that “the concept of national security has traditionally included
political independence and territorial integrity as values to be protected; but other values are sometimes added”. But within the regional security level, Gulf states have different
perceptions in terms of the way in which stability can be achieved and in protecting the
region, which is discussed below. Moreover, regional security is a necessary variable for the
emergence of a regional system based on agreement between the states and their commitment
to a set of criteria to govern their relationships. This system does not mean the removal of all
the differences between the states, but the development of an environment to reduce those
differences and prevent them from becoming out of control.
The concepts of security in the Gulf region are different according to the vision of the
dominant power in the region. In the past, this has meant security in the Gulf at the stage of
the British presence in the region was to achieve peace (PAX BRITANICA) to guarantee
near total control by Great Britain on the capabilities of the area. After the British withdrawal
from the Gulf in 1971, the meaning of security in the region was to maintain the stability of
the regimes, ensure the flow of oil and prevent subversive activities (Mojtahed-Zadeh 2013).
On the other hand, there have been several US strategies, which are related to the
names of many US presidents, such as: the Nixon Doctrine, the Carter Doctrine, and the
principle of strategic conflict in the era of President Reagan, and the principle of dual
containment under the Clinton administrations, as we have already discussed in chapter two.
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the US intervention to protect the flow of oil tankers, as well as the Second Gulf War in 1991
and its implications and changes on the structure of the Gulf regional system. As a result, the
USA has become a leader in the region and the hegemonic power inside the regional system.
The states that are involved in the regional system in the Gulf, come from the international or
external region, this means the regional security system is built upon both the international
and external powers’ interests and capabilities.
Many factors have imposed the US role in the region, including the new changes in
the international system (namely the emergence of the USA as the only superpower in 1990-
91), and the military and security agreements signed by the GCC states with the USA,
individually and as an alternative to the collective security of the Gulf (Interview No 19). For
more details about those security agreements please see above the military means chapter two
page 97. After the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 by the USA, the map of powers and
regional balances of power changed, where the relations of regional states have developed
with remarkable convergence between most GCC states and Iraq and Iran (Amirsadeghi
2012). That the Gulf states were quick to support Iraq, and help the Iraqi people after the war,
by providing humanitarian aid and cancelling some of the debt owed to them by Iraq is
indicative of this new set of relationships.
The frame of the conflict between Iran and Iraq and the GCC states changed relations
in a way that they can be described as cooperative relationships. Where we observe visits
between senior Iranian officials and Iraqis, as well as cooperation with the GCC states, where
Iran signed the security agreement with Saudi Arabia, then signed another security agreement
with Kuwait, and relations of defence cooperation with Oman, then the new understandings
between the UAE and Iran after the visit of Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed, the UAE Minister of
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December 2007, and the invitation of Saudi King Abdullah to the Iranian President
“Ahmadinejad” to perform the Hajj in December 2007 (Hadji-Janev 2013)
Security in the Gulf region reveals a chronic dilemma, where calm in this region is
linked to foreign hegemony, in light of the inability of regional powers to take collective
actions to build a system able to protect the region. Macris (2009) discusses that the situation
is not secure, but the security arrangements may be difficult to achieve and will not be
achieved by continuing to rely on foreign parties to achieve security. Most Gulf states are
convinced that stability must come from within, far from any external interference. However,
international powers impose on everyone, due to international interests in this region.
Therefore, the countries of this region are forced to accept foreign parties formulating the
security of the region. According to this arrangement, the USA has sought to play the role of
hegemonic state, as the Gulf states, particularly those in the GCC, unable to protect the
region’s security. This means that the issue of security in the Gulf came out from the regional to the global stage because of the size of the growing local link with external forces.
Bilateral security agreements and protection agreements have allowed other countries
to control security in the Gulf, as discussed in chapter two. However, these opened the door
to a long-term Western military presence, as well as construction of military bases and
weapons storage in several countries. Despite the Gulf states owning the necessary means to
achieve a certain amount of security, such as the necessary funding and modern weapons as
discussed in chapter two, they were not critical and may not be able to achieve or address
regional threats from the beginning without the need for international assistance. The next
chapter will discuss the balance of power and the capability of each state in the region to
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Economic potential can be used independently to achieve the security of the Gulf, with the
military supporting national security policy. Training of armed forces, armaments, the
development of skills, and attention is part of defence plans, with the aim of protecting
independence, stopping dependence, and achievement of territorial integrity against any
aggression. It is worth mentioning that the military aspect of national security policies varies
in different countries, in terms of power. In the small countries, such as the GCC states
except Saudi Arabia, the military side is limited to supporting their capacity to cope with the
risks of any aggression in self-defence, which no state in the Gulf is able to achieve. However,
major countries use their military capabilities to protect small states, and achieve substantial
economic and political gains from this role, particularly the continuing of the flow of the gas
and oil. The USA is doing this in several regions of the world, including the Gulf (Bastaki
2003).
Within this understanding of the evolution of security in the Gulf, one can talk about a
lot of perceptions of the security system by applying the theoretical framework based on the
constructivist theory, to understand the Gulf states’ security perspective and their security conceptions. This helped to clarify the role and the behaviour of the states in the region as
actors have the ability to build a conceptual framework for the security in the Gulf. The
following presents the perceptions of GCC states, Iran and Iraq for the security system of the
Gulf:
The concept of security in the GCC
The security concept adopted by the GCC relates to the protection of rulers and regimes, in
the face of any internal or external threat, and protection of their rights in the lifestyle they
choose, and the right to choose the means of achieving security even from an external state or
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Gulf dimension of security arrangements through building a force capable of coping with any
similar crisis. A meeting of the GCC Chiefs of Staff on 22 October 1991 confirmed that Gulf
security responsibility was that of the states themselves (Kamal Mohammed 2013). Moreover,
each state had the right of recourse to other parties to ensure its security in the region (Ibid).
From this point the process of the use of external powers to ensure security and stability
in the region developed. If we look at the potential economic benefits of oil, these are
sufficient to achieve security; but what are the means used by the GCC countries to achieve
security and stability? Oil revenues in the Gulf countries are not used to develop defences,
but to sign protection agreements, which are driven by foreign interests, such as those of the
USA, which will put its objectives and interests first, in any offensive military action or even
in defensive military action (Badr al-Din, Abdul Hamid.Qasim, Zakaria. Bloomfield, Lincoln
2013). From here, it is clear that these policies are restricted to a certain extent, for example,
if the UAE tried to retrieve the islands occupied by Iran, it will be powerless without external
assistance. From this perspective, we can see the weakness of the GCC security system,
which is based on reliance on external powers, and has its disadvantages and negative impact
in the long-term. Perhaps the concept of security in the GCC has taken a new direction after
the Second Gulf War, most importantly (Suwaidi. and others 2008):
The priority of external security, instead of focusing on internal security, especially from the perspective of Saudi security and curtailing the role of international forces in
security. The Iraqi invasion gave priority to the external threats, and texts of the
security agreement provided by Saudi Arabia no longer had priority as in the 1980s.
The military security approach is more important than the societal security approach, because of the presence of the external risks facing everyone. Therefore, it has
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become the focus and military capability was built to face these external challenges,
with increased arms purchases in terms of quality or quantity.
Intensified foreign military presence in the region, thereby increasing security dependency of the GCC on an international force led by the USA (Legrenzi 2011).
Marginalisation of Arab participation in the security arrangements, reduced enthusiasm for the Damascus Declaration, and most of the GCC states signed bilateral
agreements with the USA, because it possessed the high-tech weapons that were used
to expel Iraq from Kuwait.
Perhaps the reason for the failure of the GCC countries, in terms of security, led to
consolidation of the national versus the integrative approach that could unite the GCC
countries in the framework of collective action. Moreover, the issue of population had a clear
impact on Gulf security and its military capacity. Topping all the challenges is the lack of the
local population, and so the region needed support regarding to manpower, in order to defend
the region. The Gulf states could not address this problem properly, only through collective
action and the search for regional and international alliances to mitigate the shortage in
manpower (Pirseyedi 2012).
Moreover, the demographic depth of the GCC composed of Arab countries, which have
the ability to secure the labour force needed to keep the Arab national identity of the region,
for example Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, and others have a surplus of labour,
which can be brought to the Gulf. Therefore, the Gulf states should be able to build
foundations for a security system capable of protecting the region and accommodating
everyone. The GCC countries suffer from serious defects in the internal fabric, in terms of
sectarian problems, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain suffer from sectarian problems between Shiites
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country is divided between Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, which could affect or increase the
sectarian problems in both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (Fürtig 2007 p.634-635)
The regimes of the GCC states must change this policy with more political participation
containing all parties in Gulf states. Where Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani the Emir of
Qatar, accession address Speech on (June 27, 2013) said “as Arabs we reject dividing Arab
societies on sectarian or doctrinal basis, because this affects their social and economic immunity and prevents its modernization and development on the basis of citizenship, regardless of religion, sect or religious thoughts, and because this split allows outside powers to intervene in internal Arab issues and have influence over them”.
Furthermore, one of the main factors that caused an imbalance in the Gulf security
system is the lack of democracy and popular political participation. The Gulf states vary in
the political reform steps, with different approaches according to each state. Iran has
advanced in terms of political participation, compared with the rest of the Gulf states in terms
of the presidential and parliamentary elections but remaining problems relate to human rights
and the control of the military under political jurisdiction (Marschall 2013). For example
since 2000 Iran held presidential elections in 2001 and elected Mohammad Khatami, in 2005 Ahmadinejad was elected, in 2009 Ahmadinejad was re-elected, and in 2013 Hassan Rouhani
was elected. Furthermore, over the same period Iran held three parliamentary elections (in
2004, 2008 and 2012) which shows the gap between the GCC states and Iran regarding
political participation.
Kuwait is different from the rest of the GCC states in being the first state to adopt a
permanent constitution for the country, and expanded popular participation in government
through elections, and more than other Gulf states in paving the way for freedom of
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In Oman, the UAE and Qatar, where the internal pressure is weak and there is no possibility
of extreme violence, and no economic crisis could impact on these states (Segal 2012). On
the contrary, Saudi Arabia is the least developed state in the field of political development
and the political reform among the states of the Gulf, also because of the nature of its
inception and the existing government. One could say that the government is still capable
with its economic and security means to resist the pressures of political change, but it failed
apparently to convince its citizens about the importance of the changes that were brought
about seven years ago, which are the Shura Council (the system of local governance areas).
All these measures to devolve the political participation are not seen from the citizens that
could constitute the minimum required for the reform (Szajkowski 2012).
In Oman, the UAE and Qatar, where the internal pressure is weak and there is very little
possibility of extreme violence, and no economic crisis could impact on these states. Finally,
Iraq after the war in 2003 developed political participation with the support of the USA to
build a modern democracy that included all the parties in Iraq, but several domestic problems
have prevented the process of political reform, most importantly the lack of security and
stability, and sectarian problems (Worrall 2012 and Lambert 2011).
Thus, all the international powers that talk about vital interests in the region can only see
the governors and their families that control the wealth, money and land, and so can reach
any agreement with them, on issues affecting the essence of the security of the region and its
people. This is done without transparency, or any popular control able to hold rulers
accountable for what they have done to the people and the people's money (Sokolsky,
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