THE CHARACTER OF GEOGRAPHY AS DETERMINED BY ITS POSITION AMONG THE SCIENCES

If the classification of the sciences were in fact, as is frequently supposed, analogous to that of the species of organic life, we could expect to derive the character of geography in major part from a consideration of the generic character of the order and genus of sciences to which it belonged, and simply add to that the specific differences between geography and other sciences of the same genus. But Hettner reminds us that no branch of science is in reality a separate and distinct science [161, 110 ff.]. There is only one science, which human limitations require us to divide more or less arbitrarily. The classification of these parts of science involves, therefore, difficulties similar to those which we found in classifying the areas of the world that are simply parts of a single whole.

Consequently, it represents a distortion of science to attempt to arrange its parts in any simple system of classification, such as that which recognizes the natural and social sciences as quite separate groups within each of which various classes of individual sciences are distinguished. "All knowledge of the inorganic, organic, and human world is one interlaced whole," as Heiderich has emphasized [153, 212]. Only the fact that this whole of science is far too much for any one person requires that it be divided into more or less conventional branches, and the necessities of academic organization may require that these be grouped in major orders. This conventional grouping, however, proves in many cases to be anything but convenient. Since geography, in particular, must examine phenomena in the actual complexes in which they are found, it is impossible for it, in practice, to separate natural and human phenomena.

When we consider geography, in this particular aspect, in comparison with the single unity of all science, rather than in comparison with any other particular branch of science, the charge that geography is dualistic because it includes both human and non-human phenomena has no weight. As Penck comments, "a dualism is felt only by a person who sees boundaries rather than zones of contact between the sciences, who emphasizes the differences between the social and the natural sciences more than the interconnection of all sciences, their belonging together in one great unit science. The divisions of that unit

science do not lie beside each other like the lands on a map. They stand in manifold relations with each other" [162, 41].

Almost all modern geographers are agreed that geography cannot adapt itself to the conventional division between natural and social studies; not only does geography as a whole fit into neither group, but neither can it be divided into two halves, natural and human. It is not the position of geography, however, that is illogical: the separation of things natural from things human is possible only in theory, in reality they are interwoven. Geography, like psychology, is evidence of the arbitrary character of the conventional division of science.

To be sure, there are geographers who assert that they are interested primarily in "the physical aspects of geography," but one will look hard and long to find any of them who do not contribute published studies involving human aspects of the subject. Fortunately, when such students become concerned with a particular area, they quite forget that they have labeled themselves "physical geographers" and proceed to study all features interconnected in the area.

Indeed, it is somewhat misleading to overemphasize the position of geography as "a bridge between the natural and the social sciences." Though Penck has used this analogy a number of times he would be one of the first to insist that, insofar as there is a gulf between the two groups, the gulf is of man's making, it is not present in the reality that science is to study. We cannot, however, accept his further inference that the concept of scientific laws has been developed only on the one side of this artificial gulf and the bridge of geography is needed to carry it across to the social sciences on the other [158, 54; 163]. A concept of this kind requires no bridges. On the other hand, Penck may mean that scientific laws in the social sciences can be developed on a sound basis only if they are connected, through geography, to the natural sciences. Even in this sense we would be claiming too much, for the social sciences have other connections with the facts and relationships of the non- human world, notably through human physiology and psychology [cf. Kraft, 166, 12]. Whatever conclusions may be drawn with respect to that question, geography is not to be thought of as a connecting link between two groups of sciences, but rather as a continuous field intersecting all the systematic sciences concerned with the world. It therefore has not two, but many facets, as Schluter observed; the difference in methods between studies of climate and of landforms is in many respects greater than the difference between the study of natural vegetation and of cultivated crops [148, 145 f.].

The most that we can learn about the nature of geography from the conventional classification is that geography necessarily shares in whatever difficulties or limitations the social sciences are heir to, and that, on the other hand, it shares in part in the greater ease with which facts and relationships can be determined if the human element is not involved. Since the developments of the last generation have destroyed the faith in absolutes of the nineteenth century physicists, we know that there is here no difference in kind, but only in degree, between the two groups and among the different sciences in each group. Furthermore, this is a difference which applies only in general, not necessarily in the

particular instance. Failure to recognize this fact has led many geographers to presume that geographic work had a major degree of soundness if its feet were established in the natural sciences, regardless of how wildly it might leap from there to conclusions in the uncertain atmosphere of the social sciences. In reality, few facts of the natural environment can be established with such a degree of certainty as the rate of population growth in the United States, or the areas included within the dominions of the political states of the world.

We can secure much more insight into the character of geography if we consider it in terms of the classification which we discussed in the fourth section of this paper. According to Kant, Humboldt, and Hettner, it is necessary to look at science as a whole from different points of view. From one point of view, all reality may be regarded as a collection of many different kinds of phenomena which can be sorted into groups according to the kinds of objects with which they are concerned. The student who approaches science from this point of view endeavors to learn everything he can about the phenomena of one particular group of objects regardless of where and when they may be found. Since it is possible to classify all objects, roughly, as animate and inanimate, of non-human (natural) or human origin, this "systematic" point of view permits a fairly clear subdivision into different if "systematic sciences."

In the reality which science is to study, however, the phenomena are not arranged according to the classification which the systematic point of view constructs. Consequently this point of view gives an incomplete view of reality. If phenomena were simply piled and mixed together in reality without meaning, it would perhaps be sufficient simply to state that fact. We know, however, that there are significant relations between the different kinds of phenomena that are found together in any particular section of reality, and also between phenomena in different sections of reality. That is, there is some degree of system or order in the actual arrangement of phenomena in reality. To comprehend reality more fully, therefore, we must not only study phenomena, but must also study the different sections of reality in order to understand the character of each section in comparison with the character of other sections. To understand the character of any section of reality we must attempt to comprehend the integration of phenomena of different kinds that are actually integrated in it.

Although this integration can be stated theoretically in the singular, the nature of reality forces us to take two separate points of view. The whole of reality may be divided into sections in terms of either space or time. Though a single section combines these--here and now is one point in reality--it becomes practically, if not theoretically, impossible to consider simultaneously differences in time and differences in space. Only if the phenomena are relatively simple, as in astronomy, or the data relatively meager, as in paleogeography, have efforts to combine the two met with (see Sec. VI A). The consideration of sections of reality in terms of historical point of view, represented by historical geology, prehistory, and history in the narrower sense. The consideration of sections of reality in terms of space is the chorological point of view, represented by astronomy and geography.

Every one of these historical 98 _{and chorological sciences must study all the kinds of} phenomena that are found in its particular sections of reality. Theoretically these could include phenomena of all the systematic fields, whether physical, biological, or social. Only special circumstances limit the range within certain of these fields. W. M. Davis recognized this common characteristic of geography, history, and astronomy. "Dealing with things or events of many kinds in definite relations to time or place, they cannot have the singleness of content which subjects like mathematics and physics and chemistry possess." Astronomy, he continues, is essentially the mathematics, physics, and chemistry of the universe, and only the fact that evidence of organic life has not been found in the heavens has prevented the astronomer from overlapping into biology, or even one might add, the social sciences [104, 213 f.]. Likewise, it is only the circumstance that natural conditions on the earth have changed but little in historical (not human) times that largely limits history--as distinct from "prehistory"--to human phenomena. Nevertheless the eruption of Vesuvius is a phenomenon of concern not only to the geologist but perhaps even more to the historian--as is indicated by the fact that the reader knows at once to which eruption we refer. Likewise anyone studying the history of Holland in the, Middle Ages must consider the changes consequent upon the formation of the Zuider Zee.

It may be particularly instructive to glance at that special division of the historical view of science known as historical geology. The innocent layman might suppose that one could study the inanimate rocks of the earth's crust without overlapping into the fields that study the phenomena of life. But since the historical geologist is the only scientist who is presented with material for studying the history of the world in remote times, he finds that he must include historical botany, zoology, and human anatomy, and even to some extent historical social anthropology.

This consideration of the nature of different kinds of science should enable us to meet "the oft-discussed assertion" of which Colby speaks in his presidential address, namely, "that geography has no distinctive phenomena 99 _{at the center of its interest, as have, for} example, soil science, botany, and chemistry" [107,2]. The geographer need not hesitate to acknowledge the truth of that assertion, even though it establishes an essential difference in character between his field of study and the systematic sciences like chemistry, botany, or political science. The group of sciences among which geography is thereby classified should not, one would suppose, prove humiliating to the geographer.

Geography does not claim any particular phenomena as distinctly its own, but rather studies all phenomena that are significantly integrated in the areas which it studies, regardless of the fact that those phenomena may be of concern to other students from a different point of view. The astronomer has no monopoly of the study of the stars, he is not disturbed if physicists and chemists study the elements of the stars. Similarly, geography need not look for any concrete objects as its own. The rocks which the historical geologist uses for his data are equally the concern of the dynamic geologist and his pet fossils are proper objects of study for the botanist, zoologist, or anthropologist. Likewise the historian is not disturbed if told that his field is an aggregate of economics, political science, and sociology.

Finally, geography does not distinguish any particular kind of facts as "geographic facts." As Barrows has often insisted, any particular fact--meaning a primary fact, not a relationship loosely considered as fact, nor a deduction from relationships--is not a "chemical fact," a "geological fact," or an "economic fact"; it is simply a fact, and any branch of science may use it. It is only because various kinds of facts are more commonly studied in certain sciences than in others that these conventional, but misleading expressions are in common use. Thus the facts concerning the price of wheat in different places and different times may be considered most frequently in economics, and therefore are called "economic facts," but they could equally well be called "historical facts" or "geographic facts." Geography in particular cannot accept either the popular misconception which classifies under "geographic facts" only the facts of location, or, the misconception common in scientific circles which considers this term as including, in addition to the facts of location, only the facts of natural phenomena. In the broadest sense, just as all facts of past time are historical facts, so all facts of the earth surface are geographical facts. And just as history does not use all facts, but only those--of whatever kind--that are "historically significant," so geography will determine which facts it will utilize, not according to their substance, but according to their geographical significance, i.e., their relation to the areal differentiation of the world [cf. Sec. VIII].

To state, for example, that Vesuvius is (and was) a volcano located at 40° 49' N., 14° 46' E., is to state a fact which is no more geographic than geologic or historical--it is of course simply a fact. In the systematic geography of volcanoes, we are concerned with this fact in its relation on the one hand to the zone of diastrophic action that runs through the Mediterranean region, and, on the other hand, to the fertile ash soils of the neighboring Campagna, to the ruins of Pompeii and buried Herculaneum, the hazards of life of the population of the area, and the landscape effect of the volcanic mountain in the level plain. In sum, then, geography, like history, is to be distinguished from other branches of science not in terms of objects or phenomena studied, but rather in terms of fundamental functions. If the fundamental functions of the systematic sciences can be described as the analysis and synthesis of particular kinds of phenomena, that of the chorological and historical sciences might be described as the analysis and synthesis of the actual integration of phenomena in sections of space and time.

Both history and geography might be described as naive sciences, examining reality from a naive point of view, looking at things as they are actually arranged and related, in contrast to the more sophisticated but artificial procedure of the systematic sciences which take phenomena of particular kinds out of their real settings.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find both history and geography developed as fields of study in the earliest period of scientific thought. Furthermore, it was natural enough that each of these should have become a "mother of sciences." The attempt to integrate all kinds of phenomena in space or time leads to the discovery of many kinds of phenomena, any of which may then appear to be worthy of study in themselves; indeed the attempt to understand their significance in a total integration requires that they be studied in themselves. Consequently we may expect this evolutionary process to continue

indefinitely, so long as the new kinds of phenomena discovered are deemed worthy of study in their own right. Thus, if geographers have discovered the phenomena of house types and can demonstrate that they are sufficiently significant, we may expect some branch of systematic science to make these objects a subject of special study.

On the other hand it should not be supposed, as has often been done, that the recognition of the independence of daughter fields thereby reduces the extent of the field which geography or history is to study. On the contrary the mother field remains exactly what it was before. Furthermore, as Richthofen observed [73, 27 f.] and as Hettner has repeatedly emphasized, the progress in these related fields enriches the materials to be studied in geography. Just as the development of economics and political science has greatly increased the ability of historians to interpret history, so modern geography has benefited enormously from the development of systematic physiography, climatology, soil science, etc., and should benefit from the findings of economics and other social sciences. What contribution geography can make in return will be considered later.

The failure to understand that geography is to be defined essentially as a point of view, a method of study--just as all science is a method of study--has caused many to suppose that the growth of the daughter sciences had left nothing for the parent science to do. Attempts have been made to save the day by claiming for geography a particular type of phenomena, such as relationships between man and nature, or by searching for new objects of study which no one else has previously considered worth studying [Crowe, 201, 2], or by attempting to metamorphose abstract concepts of area into concrete objects. Each of these efforts, to a greater or less extent, has caused geography to depart temporarily from its path of development in directions which have proved, or will prove, to lead either fields that other sciences will not cede to geography, or into the bog of mystical thinking.

One answer to the question at the head of this section, therefore, is that geography is a study which looks at all of reality found within the earth surface from a particular point of view, namely that of areal differentiation. This might be called the position of geography as a field of knowledge. More significant to the general question is the character of