Character, Virtues, and Moral Responsibility

Instead of direct acts and their consequences, the focus of responsibility for character is on the properties of character that the actor possesses, as well as the previous voluntary acts that have produced these properties. In Aristotle’s context, these properties of character are related to the effective cause, instead of the principle of teleology.194

If the beginning of NE book III (as well as the EE195_{) only was consulted, it}

would be sufficient to summarize the basics of Aristotle’s theory of responsibility along the lines of Irwin’s simple theory. However, as the critics point out, once Aristotle included book III.5 in the Nicomachean Ethics, the big picture became less tidy with the comment that it would be “irrational to suppose that a man who acts unjustly does not wish to be unjust or a man who acts self-indulgently to be self-indulgent”.

The full passage, which includes the effect of character within moral responsibility, is:

[F]or it is activities exercised on particular objects that make the corresponding character. This is plain from the case of people training for any contest or action; they practise the activity the whole time. Now not to know that it is from the exercise of activities on particular objects that states of character are produced is the mark of a thoroughly senseless person. Again, it is irrational to suppose that a man who acts unjustly does not wish to be unjust or a man who acts self-indulgently to be self-indulgent. But if without being ignorant a man does the things which will make him unjust, he will be unjust voluntarily. (NE III 5, 1114a 8–14.)

In this observation, Aristotle introduces a new set of considerations into the theory, on which there is considerable devergence of opinion.196 _Throughout

the act, then, the unjust or self-indulgent man probably acts as his character dictates. At the moment the act takes place, it is thus possible that the unjust or self-indulgent act is done voluntarily and in full knowledge. Here Aristotle is criticising Plato’s view that nobody does wrong knowingly. One can do wrong, and can be held responsible for the act and be blamed for it, even if the actor has full knowledge of the situation (see Roberts 1989, 32-33).

According to Aristotle, the actor is simultaneously responsible for his actions directly and indirectly through his character as well. As per responsibility for action, the feedback of society is aimed at action that is taking place not what the actor has done in the past. In the case of

194 _{See G. E. M. Anscombe 1977, 68–69 for comparison.} 195

According to Irwin, considerations of responsibility for character are not included in the Eudemian Ethics, but claims related to the topic are made in 1225b11-17 and 1223a5-14 (Irwin 1980, 154).

responsibility for character, the viewpoint shifts to the virtues or excellences of the actor.197 _{Taking into account both the actions as well as the moral}

characteristics of the agent indicates a prospective, forward-looking dimension of responsibility (Sarah Broadie 1991, 124-125). What are these virtues and excellences, and how does the interaction between them and the acts happen in Aristotle’s theory?

Aristotle includes virtues (or excellences198_{) within his conception of the}

soul (NE II 5, 1105b20–1106a12). Virtues are, depending on the interpretation, a means to the good life or an end in themselves (See NE X 6, 1176a30–1176b8). They are states of character that each have their corresponding two vices (kakia). One of these means lack of the virtue or excellence and other its excess. For example, courage is the golden mean where cowardice is the lack of it, whereas rashness is its excess. Through practice, the virtues or the excellences tend to approach their golden means. In determining responsibility, virtue or excellence appears as a guiding property of character in the Aristotelian account. It decisively affects the selection process of the act to be committed from all possible alternatives leading to the same end. The behavior of the individual is determined by causes of action originating from himself, from his own ethical practice. Nevertheless no one can become virtuous in a vacuum. Could the origin of virtues or excellences be the society? To answer this, Aristotle’s distinction between intellectual virtues and those of the character must be considered. Aristotle writes on these different types of virtue:

Excellence, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual excellence in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral excellence comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name [ēthikē] is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word for 'habit' [ethos]. From this it is also plain that none of the moral excellences arises in us by nature; (NE II 1, 1103a15–21.) As Roberts’s critique (1989) points out, character appears to be a major feature in Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility. Its inclusion is also the main difference between Aristotle’s account and the contemporary theories. (See Roberts 1989, 28.) 199

Whereas Irwin focused on the action and the conditions of responsibility, character is present in what Bobzien calls “Aristotle’s theory of what makes us responsible for our actions and character” and the reasons for its prominence include setting the deliberation of action within the teleological

197 _{Compared to this, responsibility for action was focused on the act leading to a certain end and}

the praise and blame given by the society based on the result (see 5.1.1).

198

The words virtue and excellence are treated here synonymously.

199 _{“This is a difficulty for anyone trying to to find a hint of a modern notion of moral responsibility}

context, in which character has sway over the possible choices. (See Bobzien 2014, 2.)

This section provides a broad sketch about how the character is related to moral responsibility in Aristotle’s theory. For simplicity’s sake, the term “responsibility for character” is referred to as that part of moral responsibility concerned with the questions of character. Character consists of the character virtues as well as their complementary vices for each agent. Aristotle’s essentialist metaphysics mean that the same type of virtue that could be shared between individuals was identical in different people. A short summary of what the virtues are is discussed next, and it is then explained how in Aristotle these virtues are connected to the decision-making capacities of human beings. In this case, the relevant concept is prohairesis. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered on how the considerations related to character appear in Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility, as discussed in the Nicomachean Ethics III.1-5.

Therefore excellence also is in our own power, and so too vice. For where it is in our power to act it is also in our power not to act, and vice versa; so that, if to act, where this is noble, is in our power, not to act, which will be base, will also be in our power, and if not to act, where this is noble, is in our power, to act, which will be base, will also be in our power. (NE 1113b3-7).

In the encyclopedia article on Aristotle (2001), Irwin claims that within Aristotle’s theory “[r]ational deliberation [intellectual virtue/practical reason] and decision [prohairesis] are the source of responsibility for character no less than for action” (Irwin 2001, 95). In order to frame his argument, Irwin includes two relevant passages. “Virtue and Character“ (Irwin 2001, 92-93) and “Voluntary Action and Responsibility” (ibid. 94-95).

The following are true in Aristotle’s theory concerning the virtues of character: 1. Virtue is a state (hexis), which is a distinct form, but involves both capacities (dynamis) and feelings (pathe). 2. Virtues are to be followed as the means to good life, but they should also be consciously followed for their own sake in order for the agent’s life to be good. 3. The virtues are generally a mean between two vices, but the correct conduct depends on the situation. For example, “extreme anger” can be called for in some circumstances. 4. Moral education is needed in order to align the non- rational part of the soul with practical reason as well as to have better control over the emotions generally. 5. A prohairesis-type informed decision and the capability to use it is required for wisdom and the good life. (Irwin 2001, 92- 93.)

Myles F. Burnyeat’s article “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good” (1999) starts by asking “Can virtue be taught?”200 _{Burnyeat’s article argues that a}

200 _{In Burnyeat’s article, “Aristotle on Learning to be Good” (1999) it is asked whether being}

person who is complete in terms of virtues or is otherwise a perfectly formed moral individual cannot be akratic, as the two conditions are mutually exclusive. (Burnyeat 1999, 224.) In advancing his argument, Burnyeat aptly describes how the practice of the virtues came to form the character of the person. He describes Aristotle’s work as a continuation of Plato’s pioneering work in moral psychology. Plato and Aristotle agree on one thing, that Socrates was right about education, since moral development should be seen in terms of the conception of virtue. (Burnyeat 1999, 205.) Virtue is thus the key concept within the moral theories of the three Socratic-period philosophers.

Nancy Sherman equates virtues and excellences in her entry on “excellence” in Becker & Becker’s Encyclopedia of Ethics (2001). She calls for a couple of distinctions to clearly understand the Aristotelian use of the concept. For one, Aristotle’s definition of virtue is broader than the usual reference to moral virtues that is used today. Including these, Aristotle’s virtue encompasses “any stable state or disposition of a thing which makes that thing do its work well”. (Sherman 2001, 504.)

In the entry on “excellence”, Sherman also raises concerns over the point in moral developmen, beyond which the agent moves from non-cognitive habituation to full self-authored agency.201 _{Any definition of such a point is}

arbitrary and is bound to be controversial. (Sherman 2001, 505.) The point from which childhood changes to adulthood, implying full moral responsibility, is never clear-cut, as Sherman notes that “Aristotle says ethical immaturity can occur at any chronological age” (Sherman 1999a, 237). Following this, it is reasonable in Aristotle’s context that young people are supposed to be educated in order to be responsive to rational arguments. Another conjecture from this premise is that rational persuasion cannot have an effect on adults who are “corrupted by a life of pleasure”. This could be the way that Aristotle discusses the cases now referred to as psychopaths. (Sherman 1999a, 237 – 238.)

Nancy Sherman’s article “The Habituation of Character” (1999a) discusses how the concepts of virtue, moral education and the development of moral agency among children appears in Aristotle’s work as well as discussing the relation between virtues, their education and the development of moral agency in their case. Sherman writes about how the development of character and the attainment of full moral status through this process of maturation are fully dependent on the environment in Aristotle’s moral theory. This means that character, which is integral to moral responsibility, is social in origin, and therefore no one can become virtuous in a vacuum in his theory. We learn our habits from others and by practice we gain our virtues,

note, thanks to Malin Grahn-Wilder for bringing the intricacies of education of virtues in Aristotle to my attention.

as Sherman writes: “Aristotle’s account extends well beyond the truism […] “We learn by doing””. (Sherman 1999a, 257.)

Children are not to be considered responsible in Aristotle’s context; that much is certain. He does not however underestimate their cognitive capacities.

Susan Meyer’s Aristotle on Moral Responsibility describes a feature of the modern theories of responsibility in which the responsibility for character is responsibility for the necessary condition of an action, and goes further in holding responsibility for character the foundation of contemporary moral responsibility in general.202 _{Voluntary action happens through reflection and}

deliberation. Deliberation and the chosen act based on it (prohairesis) is an essential mechanism of Aristotelian ethics. Virtuous action, as it is understood, is also governed by prohairesis choice. (Meyer 1993, 122; see also p. 130.)

The key concept of prohairesis, which is based on knowledge and the virtues and which is what children lack, thus distinguishing their moral status from that of adults, is also discussed by Sherman. The child is not responsible because his “desire obeys the reason of the authoritative part as a child listens to his father” (see NE 1102b31-1103a3).

Through education, morality can be more persuaded than forced to take hold of the student, and thus it can affect the choices requiring moral deliberation. Sherman discusses Aristotle’s attempts to divide the soul into rational and non-rational. She notes directly afterwards however that Aristotle questions such undertakings in De Anima (Sherman 1999a, 235). Sherman is interested in the type of desire that is based on the rational: the rational wish or boulesis, which is distinct from appetites and emotions. As in Eudemian Ethics, where Aristotle asks “how and by what sources does virtue arise?” he states that “character [êthos] is a quality of the non-rational part of the soul (Sherman 1999a, 236). Wanting and wishing is directed at the natural needs and as such are less the subject of choice. Prohairesis as the rational counterpart of boulesis is more important in terms of moral responsibility. According to Aristotle, the child is incapable of making prohairesis choices. (Sherman 1999a, 244).

Summarizing Sherman, Aristotle maintains that children have tools for making voluntary decisions and judgments, and that the task of parents is to persuade the child into a certain understanding about whatever situation he is in, such as behaving in one way is correct in one situation but wrong in another. The point is that the parent cannot make the actual decision for the child. The goal of the educator is not to manipulate, but prepare the child for eventual full moral maturity. In Aristotle’s case, this means developing the means to make prohairesis choices. (Sherman 1999a, 242.)

She describes how virtuous actions have their own external ends in Aristotle’s theory, so that in practicing these actions, the practice itself

becomes virtuous: “For full virtues Aristotle requires not merely that actions be “chosen” [prohairesis] in the above sense, but that they be chosen for their own sakes.” This is possible through the way that virtuous action has ends that are external. It is thus not enough to just choose actions that lead to these ends, but to be fully virtuous one should also act in order to promote those ends as well. Doing so successfully enables the actions to be valued by the external ends in the process.203 _{The actions become the ends in}

themselves. (Sherman 1999a, 244-245.)

Following Richard Sorabji (1980), Sherman describes the learning process of a virtue,204 _{with first imitating the desired course of action, and}

through gradual refinement the action approaches its ideal:“in the cases of virtue, the practice of actions will obviously be more complex virtuous action, as we have said, will combine a judgment of circumstances, reactive emotions and some level of decision about how to act. Here too the learner will follow the examples of emulated models and may have in mind general precepts and rules of thumb” (Sherman 1999a, 248). Early learning might be motivated by the pleasures of acting in a certain way and conversely of pain when punished for doing wrong. Later the action becomes its own end, at which point the moral habituation is completed. (Ibid. 256-257.)

Sorabji writes that even though the individual can affect his character virtues by training them, the practice by itself is not enough to make the character virtuous (Sorabji 1980, 211). According to Aristotle, individuals belonging to a species, including humans as representatives of their species, tend to gravitate toward realising the characteristics of their species. Here Aristotle is following Plato’s thought by bringing up the option that the individual could form or acquire habit-virtues through upbringing and/or education, meaning a sort of blueprint for virtue (Sorabji 1980, 211–212). By initially practicing the habit-virtue, the character virtues become determined by individual action and in this way as states of the character they could affect the selection of acts directed at their ends.205 _{Even if the activity of the}

actor is needed, the origin of the virtues according to Aristotle lies in the society to which the actor belongs (see Broadie (1991) 170).

According to Aristotle education and the city state are essential in the generation of the intellectual virtues [or excellences]. Aristotle also includes

203

Here Sherman refers to Eugene Garver’s “Aristotle’s genealogy of Morals” (1984).

204 _{Nancy Sherman’s “The Habituation of Character” (1999) concentrates on the character virtues:}

she discusses the nature of virtue, and whether they originate from nature or are taught. Sherman’s article can be read as continuation of some of the themes of Richard Sorabji’s article "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue" (1980), as it is mentioned as the second major source cited in her bibliography. Sorabji discussed how the virtues are formed in Aristotle’s theory. Basically, mimicking an outside example to become a habit is a model for behavior that if consistently followed, forming an actual virtue as a result.

205 _{Seconding this point, Burnyeat notes Aristotle’s Evenus quote: “I say that habit’s but long}

practical reason (phronēsis) in the group of intellectual virtues. Practical reason is defined by education and experience and will help the individual to achieve the golden mean of his character virtues or excellences. (Sorabji 1980, 210.) By providing education, the society gives the individual the means to attain his ideal state more efficiently. Practical reason thus has an important role in how well the character virtues or excellences are adopted, but it does not directly determine their substance.

Practical reason contains the process of deliberation and reflection, which leads to the selection of the act that fulfils the end. (Broadie 1991, 179). The virtue-guided selection of possible acts is called prohairesis by Aristotle.206

The word is difficult to translate, but its meaning is close, as Salkever writes, to a choice made with full awareness of alternative possibilities (Salkever 1990, 69). The concept is so central to the Nicomachean Ethics that it is seen as the defining trait of human action (NE VI 2, 1139b5–6). The resulting choice made after deliberation reveals the virtues or vices of the actor to the society around him. Praise and blame are given based on these same virtues and vices.207 _{It is important to note that since in Aristotle’s theory only adult}

human beings are capable of deliberated, voluntary acts, the definitive threshold of responsibility for character resides at the difference between mature actors and those that are not (e.g., animals and children) (NE III 2, 1111b4–9).

If we accept that the premise that responsibility for action and responsibility for character describes different aspects of Aristotle’s conception of moral responsibility, the resulting understanding can expand the usual picture of Aristotle’s responsibility only as the relation between the